{"id":226107,"date":"2019-11-21T09:43:53","date_gmt":"2019-11-21T08:43:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/?p=226107"},"modified":"2022-11-18T11:20:06","modified_gmt":"2022-11-18T10:20:06","slug":"duro-will-forgive-you-beating-you-up","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/en\/duro-will-forgive-you-beating-you-up\/","title":{"rendered":"\u201c\u0110uro will forgive you beating you up\u201d"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Political and social contexts in which we work<\/h1>\n

Bosnia and Hercegovina: Not Great, Not Terrible<\/h2>\n

They are rare and extraordinary, those books that describe processes from the recent or more remote past and that by asking obvious though never considered questions describe in such plastic detail the present and foreshadow the possible future of a society. Max Bergholz manages to do this in his brilliant book Violence as a Generative Force<\/em><\/strong> that examines the violence in the small town of Kulen-Vakuf during the Second World War.<\/p>\n

Bergholz asks a number of questions unfettered by time and place, the first of which is, of course, why<\/strong> did the violence happen?\u00a0 Not how, though reconstructing the course of events is key for any attempt to answer the question. As the historian Yuval Noah Harari observes, the question of why something happened just as it did is the central question of history as an academic discipline. Because, any attempt to answer it will unmistakably lead us, according to Harari, to the realisation that at some fork in the road of history, our forebears went one way and not the other. Years later, it is hard for us to explain why<\/strong> they took that path, while we clearly see a host of other options, which were perhaps invisible to our ancestors, that they could have taken, but didn\u2019t. This liberation from historical determinism would lead contemporary humans to an awareness of their own responsibility for the choices society will make.<\/p>\n

Experience of Violence<\/h4>\n

Bergholz develops Harari\u2019s thesis by researching the events in a small area over a brief period. In answering the question of why<\/strong> violence happened in Kulen-Vakuf, Bergholz reveals the complexity of processes in a community that found itself in a vortex of violence, or rather, that was sucked into the violence. Here we see the relationship of central authorities to lower levels of government, local actors who promote violence, but also those who suppress it, we see the points when violence prevails and when it does not, we follow along as the spiral of violence, once set in motion, turns victims into perpetrators of (preventive or vengeful) violence... Later, all of this complexity is reduced through managed remembering (and forgetting) to an oversimplified us<\/strong> (victims, innocents, victors) and them<\/strong> (criminals, culprits, the defeated). Bergholz also deals with the issue of the extent and manner in which an experience of violence shapes the identity of a community.<\/p>\n

Reading Bergholz, you feel like you have before you an excellent analysis of what happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period between the elections (autumn 2018) and negotiations on constituting the government (autumn 2019). Bosnian-Herzegovinian society is predominantly marked by the experience of violence from the 1990s and memories of that violence. Scratch the surface of any topic, be it elections, politics, mass emigration, sports or culture, and you will find narratives, fears and memories that derive from the experience of violence, which again generates new violence.<\/p>\n

This violence, though as a rule no longer physical, is present in society at all levels, and we can identify concrete examples of political violence, structural violence, cultural violence, environmental violence, etc. In contrast to the previous period, no attempt is made to disguise this new violence into some acceptable form, instead it is explained by the simple maxim: Better that we<\/em> (outvote, discriminate, etc.) them, then they us<\/em>. In the words of a local twitter warrior: You wanted democracy, well, democracy is when we outvote you because we can<\/em>.<\/p>\n

The elections fully laid bare the functioning of political violence. The call to vote in order to elect \u017deljko Kom\u0161i\u0107 (DF) as the Croat member of the Presidency was not packaged into any sort of story about a civic BiH, but simply presented as a mode of preventive violence<\/em> to stop the election of Dragan \u010covi\u0107 (HDZ BiH) to that position. The call, directed predominantly to Bosniaks, demonstrated how fear of concrete negative actions on the part of Dragan \u010covi\u0107 and memories of experienced violence become a mobilising factor for a community. At the same time, Milorad Dodik (SNSD) mobilised his voters around a story about how his political opponents from SDS and PDP were mere traitors who have to be defeated. In his election campaigning, Dodik openly, at public rallies, threatened employees that they would be out of a job if they did not vote for his party.<\/p>\n

Control of Memory<\/h4>\n

Bosnia and Herzegovina is an example of a country where the entire state apparatus at all levels is placed in the service of structural violence by the majority against the minority. Enjoying basic rights is possible only if you live in the appropriate part of the country where your people makes up the majority, and now legislation continues to support this model. For example, the Law on Civilian War Victims in RS that hinders or prevents Bosniaks and Croats from being given the status of civilian war victims. At the same time, new legislation in FBiH continue to prevent access to social rights by veterans and their families if they fought on the side of the so-called Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia.<\/p>\n

Control of memory is certainly another area where majority violence against the minority is visible. In a war of memories<\/em>, the memories of the other side<\/em> are perceived as hostile, as something to be eliminated from the media, school textbooks, public discourse, etc. In Republika Srpska, two new commissions have been set up to investigate the victimisation of Serbs in Sarajevo and the events in Srebrenica from 1995. Without going into the final findings of the commissions and their work, it is clear that when Republika Srpska established these commissions, it was not out of a commitment to dialogue about a painful past and the legacy of the 1990s wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region, or out of a desire to stop using this legacy to deepen conflicts and pose threats to the future. Statements given by the highest officials of Republika Srpska about the reasons for establishing the commissions and their aims in doing so, unfortunately, confirm this. The need to achieve recognition also for our victims<\/em> (in this case Serb victims in Sarajevo and Srebrenica) and to call for the prosecution of war crimes committed against our people (in this case against Serbs in Sarajevo and Srebrenica) should not be abused in order to establish a counter narrative whose aim is to reinforce entrenched positions in the war of memories<\/em> among the peoples in BiH, which is currently being waged. At the same time, the announcement by the president of Na\u0161a stranka Pe\u0111a Kojovi\u0107 that he is prepared to go and engage with people in Western Herzegovina and Republika Srpska in an effort to find a minimal common denominator<\/em> about events from the 1990s was perceived by Bosniak politicians as absolute treason and the initiator was treated to a barrage of abuse.<\/p>\n

Prosecuting war crimes was long a bright spot in the process of dealing with the past. Even today, BiH is more of an exception that the rule in global terms, when it comes to the number of prosecuted war crimes cases at domestic courts. Unfortunately, due to the sloppiness of the BiH Prosecutor\u2019s Office, the politicisation of justice and attempts to merely keep up statistics, according to an OSCE report, the percentage of convictions in war crimes cases has dropped in the past five years from almost 90 to below 40 percent. In practice, this means that indictments are badly written and cases are poorly investigated, which only adds to the frustration of victims who are still prepared to testify. This ultimately makes room for political abuse of judgements where acquittals are celebrated without reference to parts of the judgement which acknowledge that crimes were committed, even though the accused were not found guilty of them.<\/p>\n

In the past year, Bosnian-Herzegovinian society is as stuck<\/em> as in the preceding years. Without having solved any of the contentious issues from previous years (changes to election legislation, disputes over NATO membership) new problems have now been to the agenda, partly through our own (in)action and partly due to global events, such as the refugee route that moved around 30,000 refugees through Bosnia and Herzegovina in one year.<\/p>\n

As a rule, reactions to events in society are quick, fierce, mostly emotional, and everything is just as soon forgotten because the spotlights keep shifting. The best example is a case from Gornji Vakuf where a Bosniak reported that an unknown person or persons had scrawled offensive graffiti across his house and car. In a town that is today divided into the Croat and the Bosniak part, this caused a fair bit of concern, and oil was poured onto the fire from all sides. We\u2019ll see who laughs last<\/em> was said verbatim, but three days later the police found how the Bosniak who reported the graffiti had in fact scrawled them himself. A few apologies from those who were quick to cast the first stone<\/em> and use the case to argue for or justify their claims about preventive violence as the only solution, a few deleted shameful tweets, hateful status updates and calls to mobilisation and that was that. The consequences in the form of a delivered dose of hatred, fear and hostility remain.<\/p>\n

Who still remembers all the big talk about the introduction of reserve and auxiliary police forces in RS and the response from FBiH that theirs (police forces) will always be bigger? The murder of two police officers in Sarajevo who clashed with the car mafia has not been brought to light, and the murders of young D\u017eenan Memi\u0107 in Sarajevo and David Dragi\u010devi\u0107 in Banja Luka remain unsolved. Protests that had lasted for months have quietened down in Sarajevo and were brutally suppressed in Banja Luka where for days the police hounded the citizens who assembled peacefully in the main square.<\/p>\n

At the same time, all these events are not unequivocal or unidirectional in the sense that they offer only the prospect of more conflict. In the case of Gornji Vakuf, for instance, as soon as they heard the news, Croat neighbours came to the house with the graffiti, condemned the wrongdoing and pointed out that despite harsh wartime conflicts in Gornji Vakuf, there had been no incidents after the war. The fathers of the murdered young men, Muriz and Davor, lent their full support to each other and people from Sarajevo went to attend peaceful protests in Banja Luka, while people from Banja Luka came to Sarajevo. When the two police officers in Sarajevo were killed, their colleagues from Isto\u010dno Sarajevo gave full support to their families and participated in the investigation, saying that the same group had been responsible for attacks on police officers in Isto\u010dno Sarajevo.<\/p>\n

There were events that demonstrated that we still have the creativity and will and knowledge to do good things. Sarajevo and Isto\u010dno Sarajevo hosted the European Youth Olympics Festival (EYOF), showing how we can cooperate in positive stories. This September, the first BiH Pride Parade was organised in Sarajevo under the slogan Ima iza\u0107\u2019<\/em> [Coming out]. It has probably been years since a single event managed to polarise society to such an extent where the counter-demonstrations and public discussions brought to light a host of mechanisms revealing the inner-workings of our society: minorities have no rights, the majority gives them the rights that the majority wants them to have.<\/p>\n

For example, the argument was used that the overwhelming majority of citizens opposed the parade, which should automatically mean that those in the minority should accept that they cannot have rights that the majority disagrees with, then there was talk of how the rights of the majority were being endangered and not those of the LGBT minority, which is another argument frequently heard when anyone mentions minority rights. There were also those saying that the minority should respect the feelings of the majority (another frequent argument) and the counter-rallies were organised to protect the traditional family<\/em> defined so as to exclude not just LGBT people, but also heterosexual couples without children, widows, single parents, parents with special-needs children, etc.<\/p>\n

The Pride Parade was organised primarily thanks to the courage, will and perseverance of a small group of activists and it was significant that they received support from the cantonal authorities under the leadership of Na\u0161a stranka and SDP. The first Pride Parade is important because it brought to light all the prejudice, discrimination and lack of understanding that we must continue to work on.<\/p>\n

Brussels reported that in 2018, some 50,000 people from BiH emigrated to EU countries. Mass emigration is not a problem only for the economy, which is already feeling the effects of the departure of young professionals. It is a tremendous loss for BiH society, felt in all areas of life, including peacebuilding. It is difficult to make up for the already small number of people, especially in smaller local communities, who were willing to work on difficult topics such as confronting their own community with its painful past. On the other hand, BiH institutions do not have official data on how many people have emigrated, from where and to where, not to mention that nobody has seriously looked into the causes and consequences of this phenomenon.<\/p>\n

All in all, Not Great, Not Terrible<\/em>, as the chief engineer at the Chernobyl nuclear plant said in the popular series following the nuclear catastrophe.<\/p>\n

Ned\u017ead Novali\u0107<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

Montenegro Context: And what have you got against Milo?<\/h2>\n

It has been another year that Montenegrin society has advanced at breakneck speed (much faster than the other societies in the region) towards the EU; it has continued to approximate what still represents or is at least being portrayed as a symbolic framework for upholding human rights and rule of law. At this incredible speed, soaring and flying, there are fewer and fewer chapters to open, negotiations to finish, laws to adopt and implement, problems to solve, conditions to meet. However, it seems that amidst all that speedy prosperity and welfare, we are left with a feeling of nausea, the dizzying climb has made our heads spin. Our brains and stomachs find it hard to adjust to the speedy driving down European highways, still under construction.<\/p>\n

And what have you got against Milo? Many a citizen of Montenegro would ask after these introductory sentences. I\u2019ve got nothing against Milo, nothing against DPS, either, and I\u2019ve got nothing against Montenegro, if you really want me to follow that faulty logic, that is, official state policy. But allow me to explain what I am against.<\/p>\n

Thieves of youth. Divisions and nationalism.<\/h4>\n

For too long, Montenegro has been hanging in the balance between, on the one hand, the impossibility of changing the government, which has become brazen in its omnipotence and increasingly arrogant, and, on the other, the opposition, which expresses its political futility and ineptness through the frustrations of a perennial loser. Citizens protest in alliance with the opposition calling for a change in government, failing to understand that the real struggle must be brought elsewhere - within the institutions of the system, with the aim of strengthening them and making them independent. I am against such an unchangeable state of affairs that has been going on since 1997, long enough to earn the label of \u201cthief of youth\u201d for a number of generations.<\/p>\n

The political elites, among them outspoken antifascists, as well as their opponents, proudly point out and promote SFRY iconography, presenting today\u2019s Montenegro as a continuation of Yugoslav anti-fascism and inter-ethnic harmony. Installing a monument to Josip Broz Tito in the centre of Podgorica is the most illustrative example of this new-old trend. And there would be nothing wrong if it weren\u2019t for the constant neglect or deliberate oblivion to the growing gulf between, for instance, Montenegrins and Serbs. I am against increasing ethnic rifts in present-day Montenegro. Never more independent in our never deeper divisions.<\/p>\n

On the other hand, much of the opposition, encouraged by an awakened and never more alert nationalism, seeks to minimise or completely abolish all the values we inherited from the secular and antifascist former large homeland, primarily the idea of a civic state and gender equality. As if following some second-rate script, ethnic motifs and blood and soil policies of the nineties keep cropping up like vampires, evidently never having been properly buried.<\/p>\n

Of course, this is almost always seasoned with various interpretations, falsifications and understandings of the past, which in turn almost always become signposts for the future, i.e. directions for organising the state. There is neither will nor courage, and apparently nobody feels the need to deal with the not-so-bright present image of Montenegrin society. Instead, perspectives are focused far into an idealised past in search of legitimacy for present political action. Thus, for example, the Montenegrin parliament adopts a decision annulling the decisions of the Grand National Assembly from 1918 on accession with Serbia. I am against the trend of changing the past to change the future. \u201cMisunderstanding its own past is at the heart of every nation\u201d.<\/p>\n

Army of the party. Criticism<\/h4>\n

I refuse to accept the lack of capacity at institutions, I am against incompetent civil servants. For years, high offices have been occupied by party soldiers (mostly lying in wait, but prepared to sit up and even jump when their master calls on them to do his bidding). They are, after all, better equipped than us to think and, of course, work better and more. I do not like seeing all those professionally humiliated by this, I don\u2019t like seeing their offended civilities as they grin and bear it. This past year has been rich in scandals of university professors, ministers, etc. plagiarising papers and purchasing diplomas. All unpunished, of course.<\/p>\n

I cannot accept the deep and still deepening social stratification. It almost always goes hand in hand with an incredible lack of constructive political and public dialogue about crucial issues. And the crucial issues are always there, inexhaustible and ever-present when we need to neglect our real problems. I admit I myself prefer talking about language than about low wages, about the church than about increasing emigration of young people from MNE, about this beautiful independent environmental country than about the cost of living being twice the average salary, etc.<\/p>\n

If democracy also means accepting difference and allowing for criticism, then I cannot ever like the fact that Montenegro does not deserve to be called a democracy. Though historically always full of diversity, that fact was never given its proper due. This wealth of diversity was almost always, and this is especially true today, a fertile field for manipulation and conflict, often also for blood-soaked divisions. Criticism, that progress cannot do without ever since Kant, remains reserved in MNE only for narrow ineffective academic circles or else benign discussions at the bar, while any and all constructive criticism is seen as an attack against the state itself.<\/p>\n

Media<\/h4>\n

I do not accept that a place where since 2004, when the editor in chief of Dani Du\u0161ko Jovanovi\u0107 was killed, more than 80 attacks against reporters and media property have been registered, that such a place deserves to be called a state. Of those, 32 were reported in just the last two years. The targets of these attacks were by and large reporters at anti-government or pro-opposition media. In the most recent attack, Olivera Laki\u0107, a reporter for Vijesti, was wounded and, like most such attacks, it remains unsolved, some never even see their day in court. When we add to this the dire financial situation of most media, as well as the unavoidable deep division into pro-government and pro-opposition media, as well as the inevitably high politicisation, then the media image is truly \u201cpink\u201d.<\/p>\n

Continuous political meddling at RTCG (the public broadcaster) and the Agency for Electronic Media (AEM) was most directly demonstrated through the dismissal of members from the RTCG Board and its management. I am against the failure to establish editorial independence and professional standards at RTCG and that the RTCG Board remains unprotected against political influence and pressure, including in the appointment of its members. It is enough to take a look, and those with a dark sense of humour might even bring themselves to do so, at the programming of the public broadcaster. A universal approach and universality of content can be seen, but only if they\u2019re part of a rare SF film.<\/p>\n

Mafia and independence of the judiciary. Debt and debtors<\/h4>\n

I have much against the fact that dozens of young lives were ended before they properly began, in the \u201cclash of the clans\u201d (40 people were killed since 2015) and that the state is not showing its (lack of) power by seriously committing to fighting against organised crime. Many would say, how are they to fight against themselves.<\/p>\n

I do not like the fact that the judiciary has become so degraded and has fallen so low that no attempt is made anymore to conceal political interference. As a reminder, I would like to refer to the arrest and detention of Neboj\u0161a Medojevi\u0107, a Democratic Front (DF) member of parliament, as well as the fact that his colleague Milan Kne\u017eevei\u0107 served three months in prison for assaulting an officer, as well as other similar set-ups and the \u201cCoup\u201d trial that had been long in the works and whose only aim was apparently to do away with any opponents.<\/p>\n

I do not like that we are breaking records when it comes to public debt. This year thanks to the loan for a highway segment whose construction is, of course, running behind schedule. The fact that the same highway is putting at risk one of the most beautiful and cleanest rivers in Europe, the Tara, that does not worry me at all, because as the responsible minister said, the construction of the highway did not move the riverbed, it just changed the river\u2019s course.<\/p>\n

The \u201cenvelope\u201d scandal (a recording clearly showing a high state official (DPS) taking an envelope with 97000 euros from a businessman during the election campaign) has been suppressed, concealed and, I\u2019m afraid, already forgotten. The expected parallel with the Austrian scenario: prosecution, resignations, dismissals, etc. remains just an expectation. The Anti-Corruption Agency refused to publish a decision against the ruling party (DPS) determining a breach of law and setting a penalty. I don\u2019t know who wouldn\u2019t be against such selective application of law.<\/p>\n

Patriotism<\/h4>\n

I am against the fact that the official, and I\u2019m afraid the only possible \u201cpatriotism\u201d policy is precisely this misguided policy of \u201clove for the state\u201d. According to this policy, I can only help my country, my society, if I love it unconditionally. That is why any criticism, any possibility of change, progress, is viewed and perceived as hatred of the state, i.e. hatred of DPS or Milo. Because today it is \u201ceasier to imagine the end of Montenegro as a state than the end of DPS rule\u201d.<\/p>\n

Finally, perhaps I am most against the fact that these words will make me a traitor in the eyes of half of Montenegro, and a true patriot in the eyes of the other half, that in the by now historical game of rifts and divisions into patriots and traitors, I will be sucked into one of the two camps. I do not like that no third opinion, which is actually Other, i.e. different from both, can develop in such a post- or pre- democratic environment that is today\u2019s beautiful Montenegro.<\/p>\n

Radomir Radevi\u0107<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

Croatia: \u201c\u0110uro will forgive you beating you up\u201d<\/h2>\n

We start this annual review of events that impact or are relevant for peacebuilding and dealing with the past in Croatia from the end, or from the end of summer in any case, given that this is unfortunately not the end, but only an overture indicating the fierceness campaigning for the presidential elections in Croatia that will take place late this year or in early 2020. The scapegoat is Milorad Pupovac, the long-representative of Croatian Serbs, and the ostensible motive is his interview to the Radio Sarajevo portal where, according to the Croatian Bishops\u2019 Conference, the prime minister, various other ministers and veterans\u2019 associations, he had \u201cequated Croatia with NDH\u201d. In actual fact, commenting on the wave of violence against those that identify or are perceived as Serbs, Pupovac said that such actions are \u201cclosely related to the historical revisionism manifest in Croatia in efforts to rehabilitate the Usta\u0161a movement and establish it in the new European context, in the new European Croatia.\u201d Those that he referred to as drivers of this process harnessed all their forces to show him how it was high time he left his homeland because, as a Serb, he had no right to speak that way about Croatia. Pupovac, however, was stating the obvious: according to the data of the Serb National Council, from 2013, when the wave of violence started with the smashing of dual language signs on state institutions in Vukovar, until 2018, there had been 1376 verbal and physical attacks on citizens of Serb nationality in Croatia, with 381 occurring only in 2018. The most recent case recorded this year took place in Uzdolje in northern Dalmatia where masked attackers assaulted a group of people, women and children among them, at a cafe where they were watching a football match of the Belgrade club Crvena Zvezda. Zvezda had been targeted a number of times this year, so, for example, a waiter doing seasonal work in Dubrovnik was beaten up for having a Zvezda tattoo and the Crvena Zvezda water polo team was assaulted while having coffee at the Split waterfront. This inspired creative interpretations of the Croatian reality to the effect that such incidents were proclaimed violence among sports fans. But the assailants of seasonal workers in Supetar on the island of Bra\u010d made sure we would have no doubts about what was truly at stake when they attacked four seasonal workers, among them two young men of Serb nationality from Vukovar, with cries of \u201cwho\u2019s a Serb here, kill the Serb\u201d. In June this year, Radoje Petkovi\u0107, president of the Serb National Minority Council in the town of Kastav, succumbed to injuries sustained a month earlier when he was brutally beaten by a war crimes suspect. The prime minister and the president go out of their way to relativise these events, calling them mere incidents and malicious provocations that should be resolutely opposed. How? The president demonstrated in a TV interview by energetically slamming the table with her fist. Already the next day, the front pages were adorned by photos showing a fan of the Hajduk football club from Split, wearing a mask, holding lit torches and donning a T-shirt that said \u201cKill the Serb\u201d, being the hero on his side of the stadium. The police noted that \u201cthere were no major incidents\u201d at the match.<\/p>\n

What it\u2019s like to be a Serb in Croatia<\/h4>\n

That the government has brought us up in its own image was best demonstrated by the campaigning for the European parliament elections, whose main actors and a litmus test for the state of society were again the Serbs. Because of their campaign \u201cDo you know what it\u2019s like to be a Serb in Croatia\u201d, candidates Pupovac, Jovi\u0107 and the party they represent, SDSS, were accused of tendentiously launching or inspiring an unseen amount of violence in public space \u2013 throughout Croatia, their campaign posters featuring a mix of messages in Latin and Cyrillic script were regularly torn and\/or vandalised with messages of hatred. This campaign elicited ambivalence from the great majority of Croats with no extremist leanings, and it was not rare to find comments on social media condemning the campaign as provocation, saying it was not reflective of the general state of society and that only a handful of extremists were defacing the posters. However, what remained unnoticed was the lack of any condemnation of such messages by both the parties in power and their opposition. When in the centre of Zagreb, across a campaign poster of SDSS for the EU elections featuring Milorad Pupovac, in the immediate vicinity of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, someone scrawls: \u201cSlaughter Serb children. Kill the Serb\u201d and similar acts are repeated in Split, Rijeka, \u0160ibenik, Sisak and other places, this constitutes content that, in the words of the renowned lawyer Vesna Alaburi\u0107, can be legally qualified as nothing else than the crime of inciting genocide. It is thus qualified by the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide to which Croatia is a signatory. The commission of this crime does not require that genocide be committed, attempted, or likely, only that a message is expressed with genocidal intention, publicly, and that its content may reasonable be interpreted as direct incitement to destroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, in whole or in part. Legally speaking, it is entirely irrelevant whether the message will ultimately incite someone to action or not.<\/p>\n

The campaign is no longer mentioned by anyone, but it is already evident that treating these acts as incidents, sporadic or unimportant is extremely dangerous for society as a whole.<\/p>\n

Force, but not Violence<\/h4>\n

\u201cSometimes, a bit of force, but not violence, is needed when there\u2019s a group of more than 50 people coming at you. There is no violence there, no bodily harm, shock bombs, tear gas, wire,\u201d the Croatian president said commenting on statements by the BiH minister of security Dragan Mekti\u0107 that there was evidence of violence by the Croatian police against migrants (as refugees on the Balkan route are now routinely referred to). That the Croatian police has resorted to illegitimate use of force in preventing these people from accessing European territory has been noted not just by the BiH authorities, but also by various non-governmental and humanitarian organisations whose reports have for months included evidence and testimony of police brutality and unlawful treatment. There are testimonies of beatings, confiscation of documents, money, food and water, denial of the right to seek asylum, unlawful transfer of people found in the territory of Croatia back to BiH, etc. Meanwhile, the EU acts as if this is none of its concern, so we must conclude that the use of illegitimate force against people of different skin colour on the periphery of the European continent is, in fact, desirable.<\/p>\n

That such policies, which Croatia loyally upholds, are not just limited to the unfortunates from Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan or Iran was best illustrated by protests in \u010cakovec under the affirmative title \u201cI want a normal life\u201d, used to conceal their fundamentally racist content. The protests were directed at the Me\u0111imurje Roma population who, in the words of the organiser, \u201cbeat and steal\u201d, who are \u201cabusers under the influence of opiates,\u201d \u201cincapable of taking care of themselves, let alone so many children\u201d. And should \u201ctherefore be taught how to live, how to raise children, how to manage their money and how to develop hygienic habits\u201d. The racist rhetoric season with forged police statistics was meant to draw attention away from the systemic discrimination of Roma, attested by the fact that the Roma themselves were not allowed to organise a counter-protest, though such bans are unlawful and unconstitutional.<\/p>\n

That is why among the social media commentators, the most quoted poem this year was \u201cFirst they came...\u201d changed to fit the moment:\u00a0 First they came for the Serbs, and I did not speak out, because I was not a Serb. Then they came for the Roma, and I did not speak out, because I was not a Roma... We still cannot be certain how to name the next social group in line for a lynching, given that it currently includes historians opposed to falsifications of history supported by the system and the government, especially from the period of 1941-1991, persons who speak out critically about the Homeland War and Tu\u0111man\u2019s legacy, reporters who report on hate crimes, in brief, all those whose speech and actions do not fit into the invented version of history, or the invented version of the state that has no place for them.<\/p>\n

Who is it that\u2019s leading us?<\/h4>\n

That we are falsifying history and discussing it in order not to ask too many questions about politics, crime in the public sector, corruption and other issues concerned with social ethics \u2013 this is abundantly clear. But apart from individual protests by courageous individuals and a few politicians, there is no organised resistance to such tendencies, neither in the opposition nor on the streets. There are many small fires and everyone is fighting the best they can and where they think they can truly make some headway \u2013 the left wing in the Zagreb city opposition against the unlawful manipulations of the mayor with city owned land, property, public space and projects; non-governmental organisations against the police and system managing the refugee crises; citizens\u2019 initiatives and organisations against local authorities to protect their immediate natural environment, etc. Although the divisions within Croatian society are increasingly clear, and not just along ideological lines, solidarity has not yet become completely extinct, but after years of taking heavy blows, it is exhausted.<\/p>\n

What ordinary citizens think about the reactionary tendencies in social development is hard to say beyond mere statistics. According to the German Federal Institute for Statistics, since Croatia\u2019s accession to the EU, from 2015 to 2017, some 200,000 Croatian citizens have emigrated to Germany, of which almost 100,000 were employed. The number of Croatian citizens that have emigrated in the past two years is perhaps best reflected in the deserted villages and towns of Slavonia and Baranja. These citizens are predominantly ethnic Croats, and given that the villages of Lika, Banija and Kordun, where Croatian Serbs used to be the majority, have been empty since 1995, it is unclear who the Croatian right wing is so vehemently fighting. The emigration is far higher than the official statistics and the main trends are the following: \u201cthese are predominantly young people aged 20 to 40 who were usually employed and who usually emigrate with whole families. In contrast to previous emigrations, the majority of the current emigrants are young people with higher education degrees. Most respondents blame the current situation and mass emigration of young people from the country on incompetent politicians, the ineffective justice system and war profiteers. The immorality of political elites, legal uncertainty, nepotism and corruption are the prime motives that have contributed to emigration. Research has confirmed that political uncertainty and instability incited many to leave. Based on research results, we have seen that young Croatians are not leaving because of money, their aim is not to get rich. Wealth is not a key value to any of them. In Germany, they are prepared for more sacrifice and hardship than in their homeland, simply because they believe their efforts will pay off in Germany, while they have lost trust in their homeland\u201d[1]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n

Davorka Turk<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

Kosovo: Rendering our stories<\/h2>\n

\"Dede!<\/em>\",<\/p>\n

says this kid holding a gadget; \"this school you said you had to walk to, 12.5 kilometers daily; google maps says it's only 1.7 kilometers away...<\/em>\" The joke is circulating these days amongst youth in Kosovo, expressing their superiority toward the elders, for having the accurate information, here and now.<\/p>\n

Neyse...,<\/p>\n

allpoetry.com says that there is this poet who attended a Serbian Orthodox elementary school, studied Slavonic, Russian, Greek, Latin and French, and entered the Orthodox Seminary of St. John the Theologian...<\/em> This is Millosh Gjergj Nikolla - Migjeni, for whom in wikipedia you will read that he is one of the most literate and most important literary writers of 20th-century Albanian literature<\/em>, and a Kosovo portal would say that, no other poet of the Albanian nation has been so discreet in the realistic description of Albania's social status<\/em>.<\/p>\n

But you know,<\/p>\n

if you are an Albanian, and you are labeled \"Esat Pash\u00eb<\/em>\", that would mean you are the worst of the traitors. Well, not anymore; that was the narrative molded by the political opponents of his time. Otherwise, Esat Pasha Toptani (1863\u20131920) was an Ottoman army officer who served as the Albanian deputy in the Ottoman Parliament, cooperated with the Balkan League after the Balkan Wars and established the Republic of Central Albania<\/em>, based in Durr\u00ebs. Recently, a number of scholars from Albania are shedding light upon this interesting figure of the Albanian past.<\/p>\n

Rendering our stories?<\/p>\n

Yes! I am absolutely convinced that there is always the right moment to step back, recapitulate the past narratives and create an understanding of it that is useful for us today, in the here-and-now. The means will always change, but the time is always right. It is not about opposing the past narratives, it is about adding something better to them. For Kosovo society today, and for the whole region (they call us WB6 now; cool!<\/em>) this has become of crucial importance for moving forward. And the only permissible movement in universe is indeed forward<\/em>. Such a movement forward world make it possible for us to explore and learn more about those \"Esat Pashas\" from our pasts, to continue feeling the grief-stricken Migjeni's poetry in Albanian by knowing of his Serbian heritage. And I dare to say, such a movement forward will enable us to understand why these 1.7 kilometers of today's kid were dozens of kilometers for this Dede in the joke above. But it will not, under any conditions, give us the right to condemn that old man, nor those times gone by. There has to be something we still don't know. And that's exciting!<\/p>\n

rather than a bio:<\/p>\n

since May 2018, the author of this article got invited to be a member of the Preparatory Team for establishing Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Kosovo<\/em>, initiated by the Office of the President of Kosovo. Such an initiative, like any other can be easily hijacked, having the current establishment, in Kosovo and all over the WB6. Maybe we need to learn how to add something better<\/em>, not only to our pasts, but also to the here-and-now we get engaged in, or are affected by. We already live, and are conditioned by, a number of good and not-so-good undertakings from the past, and their aftermath. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Kosovo is yet another opportunity, still being shaped, to contribute to a meaningful transformation, in Kosovo, and wider.<\/p>\n

and a post.scriptum<\/p>\n

this article was thought as an analysis of the situation in Kosovo within Sep 2018 - Sep 2019 period; allow me just say that the \"diplomatic tangos\" continued in-and-around border issues, dialogue, 100% tariffs of Kosovo on Serbian products, and more. As for the past, a lot of energy was invested on finding ways to punish, blame, damage and win over \"the other\". Laudly. Silent are only the voices of those less visible; on 14 March 2019, the UN<\/em>'s Special Rapporteur on Toxics said that \"compensation should be paid to Kosovo Roma people who suffered lead poisoning while living for years in UN-run camps near a mining complex after the Kosovo war<\/strong>.\" If this compensation is indeed paid, it would mean a lot to surviving Kosovo Roma population, and for the justice in Kosovo. If this statement is UN's responsible overview of their own past, than better times are ahead of us.<\/em><\/p>\n

Abdullah B. Ferizi<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

North Macedonia: Neither Here Nor There<\/h2>\n

\u201cLife for All\u201d in the North<\/h4>\n

After the consultative\/failed referendum on the 30th<\/sup> of September 2018, and the long process of negotiations, amnesty and bribery, the Republic of Macedonia became the Republic of North Macedonia, and with it began its path towards joining NATO.<\/p>\n

North Macedonia\u2019s government coalition led by the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) who ran the election campaign under the slogan \u201clife for all\u201d, the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) and half of the newer Albanian party BESA, this past year made big progress in foreign relations but has been seriously failing to properly tackle most serious domestic issues that persist.<\/p>\n

With the great burden of hope that a post-regime government governs, great disappointment may be the norm but it is not an overstatement to say that the new government has made too many mistakes, has lied too many times, given too many fake apologies and has failed to push forward needed reforms or has given up on some altogether, and disappointed most of the people who wanted or took action to bring about change. And this has frustrated so many people that the phrase \u201call are the same\u201d has become a normal political phrase even among more politically aware citizens, lowering the seriousness of the crimes and injustice of the VMRO-DPMNE regime and bringing with it the risk of getting VMRO-DPMNE back to power. The same VMRO-DPMNE, unreformed and full of nationalists and criminals. All the while the other half, or a third of the named regime, DUI, are still in power, pretend to push the country towards its Euro Atlantic path yet use every chance to continue their corrupt practices and to keep the country ethnically divided.<\/p>\n

In addition, NATO propaganda is normalizing the militarization of our society and is even penetrating schools to approach the youngest among us. At the same time, public officials, including the Prime Minister and the Spokesperson of the Government have contributed to normalizing hate speech although, after using it, have given superficial dishonest apologies.<\/p>\n

One important positive event that happened was the Skopje Pride Parade, the first Pride Parade in the country. It was held on the 29th<\/sup> of June, with no serious incidents and with considerable, though superficial support by the government.<\/p>\n

A Parent for the Nation<\/h4>\n

On the 21st<\/sup> of April 2019, we had the Presidential Elections, the first elections after the failed\/consultative referendum on the change of the name. They represented a real challenge for SDSM who took on the risk of going ahead with the name change yet have been governing problematically, to say the least.<\/p>\n

The elections, in a way, showed us the more probable and accurate result of the referendum if the opposition had not decided to boycott it, having in mind that the whole election campaign and the political discourse were focused and stuck on the name issue and the disappointment with the new government in most aspects. Especially in the second and final round, it practically divided the country much like it was divided during the referendum.<\/p>\n

There were three candidates in the race to become the \u201cparent\u201d of the nation. Stevo Pendarovski from SDSM (who won), ran a campaign that struggled to push the messages across because it had to deal with all the shortcomings of the government. Another candidate was Gordana Siljanovska, a professor who, although wasn\u2019t previously a member of VMRO-DPMNE, became their candidate and ran a nationalist campaign that was tragicomical and full of lies and irrational populism typical for VMRO-DPMNE but not typical for her personally. The third candidate was Blerim Reka, an Albanian professor who ran a refreshingly non-nationalistic campaign but struggled to be consistent when addressing the media, the Macedonians and the general public, and when addressing his Albanian supporters in his rallies.<\/p>\n

It was ridiculous that all three candidates were insisting that they are not party candidates. Siljanovska, after being chosen to be VMRO-DPMNE\u2019s candidate in their party congress, gathered signatures from citizens (VMRO members) to make the point that she is a non-party candidate. Pendarovski responded by doing the same and insisted he is an above-party consensual candidate although he was chosen by SDSM and the rest of the parties in government. Blerim Reka insisted he is an independent candidate although he was supported by two opposition Albanian nationalist parties and they actively assisted his campaign and got their voters to vote for him.<\/p>\n

The election campaign was also problematic because of misogyny and very, very superficial feminism with patriarchal tendencies. Siljanovska\u2019s feminism, especially with her campaign rhetoric, represented nothing but dishonest pandering, yet at the same time because of her sex and gender, as well as her age (she\u2019s 64) Pendarovski\u2019s and Reka\u2019s supporters often made many sexist and misogynistic comments and attacks, which Pendarovski failed to condemn properly. And I think that because of Siljanovska\u2019s terrible campaign and loss of the race, the political parties will be even more reserved in the future to go ahead with female candidates \u2013 they will justify it easier now and will use it as an excuse not to tackle their party patriarchal structures that greatly disadvantage women.<\/p>\n

Sometime between the first and the second round of the elections, there was a nationalist incident in the fortress in Ohrid. Someone from an Albanian folklore group (not from the country) put up a huge Albanian flag on the fortress walls facing the city, and it caused quite a big nationalist and anti-nationalist backlash. He was arrested, fined and expelled from the country, but having in mind that during the Presidential elections Ohrid was having local elections too (the previous mayor died), this only favored VMRO-DPMNE\u2019s candidate who later nevertheless lost. To add to this, although a bit off-topic, one of the main issues in the local elections (although it appeared on the presidential campaign too) was the building of an arguably illegal minaret of a mosque in Ohrid. There were even protests that tried hard to convince everyone that the issue is the (il)legality of the procedure and not the religion and ethnicity of those involved, but failed comically.<\/p>\n

A Mixture of Extortion and Bribery<\/h4>\n

These past few months Macedonia has been quite shaken by an extortion\/corruption scandal involving the Special Public Prosecution (which has been set up to handle all high-level crimes coming out of the illegal wiretapped recordings from the previous Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski and his cousin, the ex-Director of the Administration for Security and Counterintelligence, Sasho Mijalkov). After having begun working on over 150 cases with potential to become criminal charges, and quite a few criminal charges, the SPP got its reputation ruined by its chief, Katica Janeva.<\/p>\n

The scandal broke out with the publication of a few videos and audio conversations by an Italian\/Slovenian right-wing journalist on the website of the Italian newspaper La Verita<\/em>. Allegedly, the two extortionists had promised the businessman Orce Kamchev \u2013 who is one of the richest people in the country, with very close ties to the previous government and a suspect in a few of the criminal cases opened by the SPP \u2013 that he would walk free or at least get a much lighter sentence than he should for the crimes of criminal association, fraud, money laundering and other related crimes. The two had promised that they can deliver that because of their close ties to SPP\u2019s chief, Katica Janeva.<\/p>\n

Janeva, after taking a borderline illegal medical leave and disappearing from the public for some time, of course denied being involved and said that one of the extortionists had been misusing her name. But she is (allegedly) heard in one of the audio conversations, confirming that what has been discussed with the extortionist will indeed be done; that \u201ceverything will be okay\u201d.<\/p>\n

This investigation is being run by the regular Public Persecution, after Kamchev approached the Prime Minister Zoran Zaev who went ahead and reported it to the Public Persecution. Although, obviously, that didn\u2019t stop the opposition to ask for a resignation from Zaev and ask for new elections, as well as accuse him of being the one that has ordered the extortion. The specific reasons why Kamchev chose to approach the Prime Minister and not the Public Prosecution (as he is legally obliged to) are unclear, but it seems as though he wanted to incriminate him too. Especially having in mind that the video recordings in his house got in the hands of the right-wing anti-EU journalist Laris Gaiser who is in the presidency of the Paneuropean union along with Gruevski\u2019s former adviser Andrej Lepavcov.<\/p>\n

Not to go into too many other details, as a result of the investigation so far, quite a few persecutors from the SPP, as well as a few people from SDSM with close ties with one of the extortionists, have given statements to the Public Persecution sharing what they know and the two extortionists and Katica Janeva are under arrest. No one else from SPP and no one from SDSM has been charged so far.<\/p>\n

In any case, this scandal paralyzed the Special Public Persecution, and it sort of seems like an organized effort to dismantle it and bring down all the high-level investigations and charges brought forward. As a result, the only institution with the credibility and the obligation to seek and bring justice for the crimes of the VMRO-DPMNE regime\u2019s officials and their rich friends not only got its reputation ruined but is also under threat to have its investigations taken over by the regular Public Persecution which is not really reformed after having served the regime for over 11 years. And it leaves the public further disillusioned and divided.<\/p>\n

Whether Katica Janeva has fallen prey to greed or she was na\u00efve enough to be set up, or whether Orce Kamchev was extorted or he tried to bribe people to avoid facing justice for his crimes (both equally and non-exclusively possible), while Katica is under arrest and SPP is slowly being dismantled, Orce Kamchev is free and living the rich life.<\/p>\n

Love Thy Partner<\/h4>\n

In last year\u2019s report<\/a>\u00a0I wrote that SDSM and DUI are continuing the tradition of VMRO-DPMNE and DUI in \u201cDUIng business\u201d in accordance to the law, but with serious suspicion of corruption. Now I can confidently say that indeed it continued, involving other coalition partners.\u00a0 DUI took it a step further and its party officials are blatantly breaking the laws and not facing the consequences.<\/p>\n

The country has a serious problem with corruption for decades \u2013 it\u2019s not something new. But with the new government, there was new hope that finally, at least the corrupted ones, in the previous 11 years will face justice and that we\u2019d move forward in tackling the issue. Needless to say, that did not end up being the case. It began relatively soon after they came to power, especially clearly when the Fund for Innovations gave big grants to companies to innovate, among which were the companies of the Vice Prime Minister, millionaire Kocho Angjushev. After the scandal broke out, instead of resigning from the government, he got his companies to pull back and give up the grants. The public prosecution opened a criminal inquiry into it, but to this day to the best of my knowledge there are no information regarding the findings of that inquiry.<\/p>\n

DUI party officials have had produced multiple scandals this past year. One of corruption and theft scandals was initiated by the Ministry of Social Affairs which found out that the pension fund is missing a couple million euros; that the money planned for the second pension fund has disappeared. The Directors of the institution responsible for it, have been appointed from DUI for years, and this shook the coalition relations a bit and again somehow disappeared from the public \u2013 no news, no information, no criminal charges.<\/p>\n

Other criminal affairs include DUI officials building illegal objects, physically attacking people, contracting their own firms for public works, abusing their positions, buying \u0430 luxury car for municipality\u2019s (mayor\u2019s) needs after the central government payed back most of the huge municipality debt \u2026 The \u201cowner\u201d of the named car, DUI mayor of Struga, Ramiz Merko, justified it by arguing that it is shameful for the mayor to be driven in a car that is not good enough. There are plenty of other examples, albeit not only for DUI.<\/p>\n

On a side-note, it\u2019s important to mention that these cases show another grim reality of the Macedonian politics and interethnic relations: the general public, and Macedonian nationalists especially, see the political opportunism and breaking of laws by the DUI officials as an Albanian approach to politics and as Albanian nationalism, yet fail to see that this behavior is primarily harmful to the Albanians outside DUI\u2019s political structures. That it is those Albanians that have been left with no state protection and borderline bullying and violence in DUI hands. To illustrate with an example, the two men physically attacked by the DUI member of Ohrid\u2019s city council Nafi Useini, are both Albanian.<\/p>\n

The SDSM mayor of the majority Roma municipality Suto Orizare, Kurto Dudush, who is also Roma, recently had an audio recording leaked to the internet where he is heard insulting and beating up someone. There is an ongoing investigation but it seems that this case too will disappear like those related to DUI. This to note that the Roma citizens have also been left to deal alone with their local bullies while Macedonian nationalists justify the bullying as a cultural thing rather than a state structural problem and neglect.<\/p>\n

And all this is tolerated by the SDSM officials partly because they are also focused on their interests and corruption, partly because it could worsen coalition relations and partnerships, and partly because the non-Macedonian ethnic issues are seen, by the bigger Macedonian parties, as issues to be left to those ethnicities themselves. Regardless of what that means for those communities.<\/p>\n

In any case, the Republic of North Macedonia with its endless na\u00efve hope, continues its path towards the EU; the everyday issues of the citizens will just have to wait for now.<\/p>\n

Emrah Rexhepi<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

Serbia: Who\u2019s Next?<\/h2>\n

For months now, the first thing I ask myself when I open my eyes in the morning is: \u201cHow will I get to work?\u201d I rent a flat in Belgrade, in the city centre, and the Centre for Nonviolent Action also has its offices in the city centre. What\u2019s the problem? The problem is that Belgrade, as a city with a population of more than two million, has a large city centre and it\u2019s not easy to get from one end to the other. In the past few months it\u2019s been neither quick nor easy. Every route through the inner-city centre is closed, changed, displaced. Belgrade looks like a large construction site where an ambitious investor with suspicious 1990s funds had started work on a castle, only for the hand of justice or underground competition to catch up to him, leaving the works forever unfinished and a legacy of bequeathed megalomaniacal wishes and enormous debt. Two plaster lions guard the gates of the castle. Such are the aesthetics of Belgrade. Megalomaniacal, kitsch, a cheap looking expensive investment. And then, when I manage to make my way, usually on foot, to Republic Square, whose renovation works have shut down the most visited part of Belgrade for a year now \u2013 this would be akin to shutting down the Moscow Red Square for a year or Trafalgar Square in London \u2013 on the dug-up concrete of the construction site, I find no one. Sometimes, in a corner somewhere I might spot two or three workers smoking or the like. Mostly, nothing is happening. That nothing is paid for by the city budget, to the tune of close to 8 million euros (922 million dinars). Public transport is in shambles. I got on a bus yesterday, it had air conditioning and enough seats. I thought, finally, something works in a country where everything is falling apart, perhaps there is still hope, one shouldn\u2019t be cynical. Two stops later and the bus stalled. It broke down, all the passengers had to continue on foot. So much for hope.<\/p>\n

Why am I starting this text for the wider public with seemingly insignificant details of my morning worries? I have been writing or reading texts like this one for years, and each year, the situation in Serbia gets worse in every segment of society. It is difficult to explain in a relatively brief text everything that is worse compared to last year, the list is very long, and the human brain has the fortunate tendency to delete bad things from memory. But then when I start recalling everything that has happened, I come up against an avalanche of fascism, curtailed freedom, pressure, blackmail, murder, corruption, lies, people being targeted and calls for lynching, violence against people who think or speak differently, discrimination on all grounds, poverty, unemployment, brain drain, mass emigration of qualified people hungry for work of all levels of education... It occurs to me, if I start from the personal, from what we all have in common, and explain how it\u2019s different in Serbia than elsewhere, perhaps this will serve to illustrate my point? Perhaps it will then be easier to understand the problems we face and the things we have to live with daily.<\/p>\n

The Tank<\/h4>\n

We live in an atmosphere of fear, tension, accusations of treason, being called second-rate Serbians (them, the nationalists are first-rate, we are \u201csecond-rate\u201d, the \u201cothers\u201d, those who are not part of the \u201cwe\u201d, degenerates, rejects), and any common sense question posed to anyone in power or in the ruling party (though there is no difference between the two, here the ruling party has all the power, there are no institutions, no controls, everything is subjugated to a single party and a single man) is considered as an attempt to destabilise the state and engagement in hostile activities.<\/p>\n

In late August, before a match with the Swiss BSC Young Boys, a tank was installed in front of the largest (for now, though the president has promised to build a new, grandiose, \u201cnational\u201d) stadium in the country, popularly known as \u201cMarakana\u201d, home to FC Crvena Zvezda,\u00a0 A tank from Vukovar. Whether that very tank was in Vukovar, no one can say with certainty, but it is symbolic of the 1990s wars and the destruction of Vukovar, which was referred to by the Serb side in those years and by nationalists today as the \u201cliberation of Vukovar\u201d. A war symbol in front of a football stadium is not there to send any other message than a threat. Already the next day, a tractor was installed in front of FC Dinamo\u2019s stadium in Zagreb \u2013 to symbolise Operation Storm, the ethnic cleansing of Serbs from Croatia, who escaped to Serbia on tractors. The police minister stated that it was \u201cnot a tank, but a model of a tank\u201d and that he could \u201cnot understand why anyone would see a model of a tank in front of the stadium as a symbol of the nineties\u201d.<\/p>\n

He went on: \u201cThis was obviously meant to serve as a political game for some sort of attack, primarily on President Aleksandar Vu\u010di\u0107, because apparently he is now to blame for this because he is to blame for everything that happens. This is obviously a case of politicking by part of the opposition that, unfortunately, has nothing better to show for itself.\u201d<\/p>\n

Vu\u010di\u0107 is to be credited for everything happening in the country, and everything that goes wrong is an attempt to set him up. Everything revolves around his life and work as he oversteps his constitutional authority in every segment, he is both prosecutor and police, and prime minister, and minister, and an independent body, he is responsible for everything and he solves everything. In political terms this is called a dictatorship, but in Serbia there is no force that would call it by its proper name and stand up to it.<\/p>\n

What the police minister calls the \u201cpoliticking by part of the opposition\u201d is actually the division of the opposition into \u201cgood\u201d and \u201cbad\u201d opposition to the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). The good opposition, ideologically aligned, are Vojislav \u0160e\u0161elj, a convicted war criminal and now president of a parliamentary party and a member of parliament, and his Serb Radical Party, the origin of Aleksandar Vu\u010di\u0107 and the major share of SNS that left it in 2008 to form their own party. Members of their former party are the \u201cgood\u201d opposition. The other part, the \u201cbad\u201d opposition, is everyone else on the political scene: from the extreme right-wing Bo\u0161ko Obradovi\u0107 (Dveri), then Vuk Jeremi\u0107 (People\u2019s Party) and the centrists in the Democratic Party and the Movement of Free Citizens, all the way to the left-wing civic movements of Ne davimo Beograd and Local Front. That opposition is broken down and weak for two reasons: the first is that they are satanised by the ruling structures headed by Aleksandar Vu\u010di\u0107 who never misses an opportunity, no matter how banal and beside the point, to disparage those parties and their leaders, while they themselves are at the same time completely prevented from appearing on national television and in the major newspapers. The other reason is that the opposition (with the exception of the Local Front and Ne davimo Beograd) is mostly made up of people from the previous government who are responsible for losing the elections and ushering us into a period of rule of poorly disguised radicals that will last for who knows how long.<\/p>\n

Given that regular parliamentary elections await Serbia already in 2020 (I will emphasise that they are regular, because previous parliamentary elections were held in 2012, 2014 and 2016), it is not clear how any change in government will be possible given the present electoral conditions and disarray in the administration. And even if such a thing were to happen, there is still the possibility of a \u201cnatural coalition\u201d between SNS and SRS to replace the current cooperation with SPS, a party that has been a loyal coalition partner.<\/p>\n

Hope<\/h4>\n

Although, viewed from a distance, elections may look like an opportunity for change like my bus from the beginning of this text, with the current distribution of power among just a few people, change is not even a hope. Perhaps a dream.<\/p>\n

Hope had appeared in late 2018 when, first in Belgrade and then throughout Serbia, citizens came out in protest against the brutal beating of opposition politician Borko Stefanovi\u0107 by hooligans close to the government. \u201cStop the bloody shirts\u201d was the initial call of the protestors, which had the inclusive potential to gather around it everyone who was opposed to violence, whatever their political affiliation. Though initially unorganised, without a clear vision or goal, these protests kept gathering more and more people each Saturday at 6 pm. One of the most imposing gatherings was on 16 January 2019, on the day Oliver Ivanovi\u0107, a politician from Kosovo, was killed, with suspicions that individuals close to the government in Serbia were behind the murder and that the authorities were harbouring two suspects:\u00a0 Zvonko Veselinovi\u0107 and Milan Radoi\u010di\u0107. Led by the Local Front, a citizens\u2019 association from Kraljevo, who set out on foot on 12 January towards Belgrade and travelled 170 kilometres, the resounding silent question of the citizens was: \u201cWho killed Ivanovi\u0107?\u201d<\/p>\n

The very next day, Vu\u010di\u0107 organised his own gathering \u2013 making use of a state visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin and all the state privileges, honours and institutions, the welcome was actually the beginning of the \u201cFuture of Serbia\u201d campaign whose megalomaniacal gatherings, expensive videos and state privileges are used by the ruling party to present its vision of Serbia \u2013 once upon a time. It was never clear why the campaign was run in the winter and spring, unless it was a response to opposition gatherings. The government hired buses to transport its actual and coerced sympathisers (coerced and blackmailed on account of their jobs: Serbia has a law prohibiting further employment in state institutions, which means that since 2014 until today, no one could acquire full-time employment, and part-time employees are easy to manipulate, threaten and blackmail) from town to town, with expensive backdrops and populist speeches, while on the other side, in many towns, people opposing this government gathered every Friday or Saturday. Voluntarily, in show, in the winter, without a sound system and most often \u2013 spontaneously.<\/p>\n

In the spring, after the opposition attempted to enter the Serbian Radio and Television building, in protest that the public broadcaster was nor reporting on their activities, and after the gathering on 13 April where citizens from other parts of the country were invited, this type of protest slowly started decreasing in intensity. People still gather every Saturday evening in Belgrade and Kragujevac.<\/p>\n

The Target<\/h4>\n

The problem of lack of media freedoms is perhaps the most worrying: it prevents citizens who do not have access to online information or the only non-Vu\u010di\u0107 cable TV station \u2013 N1 from finding out whether the police minister bought a fake diploma both for his BA and his doctoral studies, whether an SNS official and director of Koridori Srbije highway company was speeding and hit a car waiting at the toll booth, which resulted in the death of the young woman in that car, only to vanish from the scene, who, how and with whose money organises people to defend (provide support and legal aid) to the mayor of Brus who sent his secretary 15,000 (no, there\u2019s been no mistake or extra zero \u2013 15,000) text messages amounting to sexual harassment, who installed the tank in front of the stadium and why, but more importantly: who will remove it, who is building mini hydropower plants and destroying Serbia\u2019s rivers, why have almost all the trees in downtown Belgrade been cut down, and when will this city start functioning normally... If you ask any of these questions out loud, you will be labelled an enemy of the state. A second-rate Serbian. Self-hating. We all wear targets on our foreheads, all of us who write about these things even on our private social media profiles. And we all receive threats from the SNS bot team made up of public sector employees who spend their working hours hounding the opposition to this government or writing up its glorious successes. (By definition, a bot is a robot imitating human behaviour. Vu\u010di\u0107 has turned that game upside-down, too \u2013 he has made people into robots. And robots, even these paid human ones, lack the minimum of feelings and empathy, so they draw targets, aim, threaten...)<\/p>\n

Let me remind you that Oliver Ivanovi\u0107 talked about being a target in the 2017 text \u00a0on the Kosovo Context<\/a>. By the time our report was printed, Ivanovi\u0107 had already been murdered. Since we know nothing about the circumstances of his murder or who ordered it, we can only ask: who\u2019s next?<\/p>\n

Katarina Mili\u0107evi\u0107<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

[1]<\/a>The above are findings of the research study \u201cContemporary Emigration of Croats to Germany: Characteristics and Motives\u201d; Migration and Ethnic Issues, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2017. The study is available HERE.<\/a><\/div>\n\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Political and social contexts in which we work: Not Great, Not Terrible (Bosnia and Hercegovina), And what have you got against Milo? (Montenegro), \u201c\u0110uro will forgive you beating you up\u201d (Croatia), Rendering our stories (Kosovo), Neither Here Nor There (North Macedonia), Who\u2019s Next? (Serbia)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":226140,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_et_pb_use_builder":"on","_et_pb_old_content":"

Konteksti u kojima delujemo<\/h1>

Bosna i Hercegovina: Not Great, Not Terrible<\/h2>

Rijetke su i izuzetne knjige koje, opisuju\u0107i procese iz bli\u017ee ili dalje pro\u0161losti i postavljaju\u0107i tako o\u010digledna, a opet nikad tematizirana pitanja, na tako plasti\u010dan na\u010din opisuju sada\u0161njost i predvi\u0111aju mogu\u0107u budu\u0107nost jednog dru\u0161tva. Uspjelo je to Maxu Bergholzu u sjajnoj knjizi \u201cNasilje kao generativna sila\u201d koja istra\u017euje nasilje u gradi\u0107u Kulen-Vakufu u Drugom svjetskom ratu.<\/p>

Bergholz postavlja nekoliko pitanja koja nisu ograni\u010dena vremenom i prostorom, a prvo pitanje svakako je za\u0161to <\/strong>se nasilje dogodilo? Ne kako se dogodilo, iako je rekonstrukcija doga\u0111aja klju\u010dna za svaki poku\u0161aj odgovora na ovako postavljeno pitanje. Kako je uo\u010dio histori\u010dar Juval Noa Harari, to pitanje za\u0161to se ne\u0161to dogodilo ba\u0161 onako kako se dogodilo je klju\u010dno pitanje koje stoji pred historijom kao naukom. Jer, poku\u0161aj odgovora nesumnjivo \u0107e nas odvesti, kako ka\u017ee Harari, ka tome da su na jednoj historijskoj raskrsnici na\u0161i preci krenuli jednim putem. Godinama poslije, nama je te\u0161ko objasniti za\u0161to<\/strong> su krenuli ba\u0161 tim putem, mi jasno vidimo niz drugih opcija, koje mo\u017eda na\u0161im precima nisu bile vidljive, kojim su mogli po\u0107i, ali eto nisu. To osloba\u0111anje pro\u0161losti determinizma vodilo bi savremenog \u010dovjeka osvje\u0161\u0107ivanju njegove vlastite odgovornosti za izbor puta i puteva kojim \u0107e krenuti dru\u0161tvo.<\/p>

Iskustvo nasilja<\/h4>

Bergholz ovu Hararijevu tezu razra\u0111uje istra\u017euju\u0107i de\u0161avanje na jednom malom podru\u010dju u kratkom vremenskom periodu. Odgovaraju\u0107i na pitanje za\u0161to<\/strong> se nasilje desilo u Kulen-Vakufu Bergholz pokazuje svu kompleksnost procesa u jednoj zajednici koja se na\u0161la u vrtlogu nasilja, ili, bolje kazano, koja je uvu\u010dena u nasilje. Tu vidimo odnos centralne vlasti ka ni\u017eim nivoima vlasti, lokalne aktere koji promoviraju nasilje, ali i one koji nasilje suzbijaju, vidimo u kojim momentima nasilje prevlada a u kojim ne, pratimo kako jednom pokrenuta spirala nasilja od \u017ertava pravi po\u010dinioce (preventivnog ili osvetoljubivog) nasilja\u2026 Ta kompleksnost poslije se kroz upravljanje sje\u0107anjem (i zaboravljanjem) maksimalno pojednostavljuje po principu mi <\/strong>(\u017ertve, nevini, pobjednici) i oni <\/strong>(zlo\u010dinci, krivi, pora\u017eeni). Tako\u0111er, Bergholz ukazuje i na pitanje koliko i kako iskustvo nasilja oblikuje identitet jedne zajednice.<\/p>

\u010citaju\u0107i Bergholza imate osje\u0107aj da je pred vama odli\u010dna analiza onoga \u0161to se de\u0161avalo u Bosni i Hercegovini u vremenskom periodu ome\u0111enom izborima (jesen 2018.) i pregovorima o uspostavi vlasti (jesen 2019.). Bosanskohercegova\u010dko dru\u0161tvo dominantno je obilje\u017eeno iskustvom nasilja iz 1990-ih i sje\u0107anjem na to nasilje. Zagrebite malo ispod bilo koje teme, od izbora, politike, odlaska stanovni\u0161tva, sporta, kulture i nai\u0107i \u0107ete na narative, strahove i sje\u0107anja koja su posljedica iskustva nasilja koje, opet, generira novo nasilje.<\/p>

To nasilje, iako vi\u0161e po pravilu nije fizi\u010dko, prisutno je u dru\u0161tvu na svim nivoima, pa na konkretnim primjerima mo\u017eemo govoriti o nasilju na politi\u010dkom planu, strukturnom nasilju, kulturnom nasilju, ekolo\u0161kom nasilju\u2026 Promjena u odnosu na neki raniji period jeste da se nasilje uop\u0107e ne poku\u0161ava maskirati u neku prihvatljiviju formu ve\u0107 se obja\u0161njava jednostavnim obrascem: Bolje da mi njih <\/em>(preglasamo, diskrimini\u0161emo\u2026) nego oni nas<\/em>. Kako bi rekao jedan ovda\u0161nji twitter ratnik: Htjeli ste demokratiju, e pa demokratija je da vas preglasamo jer to mo\u017eemo<\/em>.<\/p>

Izbori su do kraja ogolili kako funkcioni\u0161e nasilje na politi\u010dkom planu. Poziv da se glasa za \u017deljka Kom\u0161i\u0107a (DF) kao hrvatskog \u010dlana Predsjedni\u0161tva nije pakovan ni u kakvu pri\u010du o gra\u0111anskoj BiH ve\u0107 je jednostavno predstavljen kao opcija preventivnog nasilja<\/em> kako bi se sprije\u010dio izbor Dragana \u010covi\u0107a (HDZ BiH) na to mjesto. Taj poziv, upu\u0107en dominantno Bo\u0161njacima, pokazao je kako strah od konkretnih negativnih poteza Draga \u010covi\u0107a i sje\u0107anje na pro\u017eivljeno nasilje postaju faktor mobilizacije jedne zajednice. Istovremeno, Milorad Dodik (SNSD) mobilizirao je svoje bira\u010de na pri\u010di o tome kako su njegovi politi\u010dki protivnici iz SDS-a i PDP-a tek izdajnici koji moraju biti pora\u017eeni. Dodik je u predizbornoj kampanji otvoreno na javnim skupovima prijetio zaposlenima da \u0107e, ako ne glasaju za njegovu stranku, ostati bez posla.<\/p>

Kontrola sje\u0107anja<\/h4>

Bosna i Hercegovina je primjer u kojem je fakti\u010dki cijeli dr\u017eavni aparat na svim nivoima stavljen u funkciju strukturnog nasilja ve\u0107ine nad manjinom. Ostvarivanje osnovnih prava mogu\u0107e je samo u slu\u010daju da \u017eivite u onom dijelu dr\u017eave gdje je va\u0161 narod ve\u0107ina, a nova zakonska rje\u0161enja jednako podr\u017eavaju ovaj model. Primjer je Zakon o civilnim \u017ertvama rata u RS-u koji ote\u017eava ili onemogu\u0107ava Bo\u0161njacima i Hrvatima ostvarivanje statusa civilnih \u017ertava rata. Istovremeno, u FBiH nova zakonska rje\u0161enja i dalje onemogu\u0107avaju ostvarivanje socijalnih prava veteranima i njihovim porodicama koji su se borili na strani tzv. Autonomne pokrajine Zapadna Bosna.<\/p>

Kontrola sje\u0107anja svakako je jo\u0161 jedno polje u kojem je vidljivo nasilje ve\u0107ine nad manjinom. U ratu sje\u0107anja<\/em> sje\u0107anje druge strane<\/em> se do\u017eivljava kao neprijateljsko, kao ne\u0161to \u0161to treba eliminirati iz medija, \u0161kolskih ud\u017ebenika, javnog diskursa... U Republici Srpskoj formirane su dvije nove komisije koje bi trebale istra\u017eiti stradanje Srba u Sarajevu i doga\u0111aje u Srebrenici 1995. Ne ulaze\u0107i u kona\u010dne nalaze same komisije i njen rad, jasno je da iza ideje vlasti Republike Srpske o formiranju ovih komisija ne stoji opredjeljenost za dijalog o bolnoj pro\u0161losti i naslije\u0111u ratova devedesetih u Bosni i Hercegovini i regionu kao ni te\u017enja da ona prestane biti instrument za produbljivanje sukoba i prijetnja u budu\u0107nosti. Izjave najvi\u0161ih du\u017enosnika Republike Srpske o razlozima formiranja komisije i njihovim ciljevima to, na\u017ealost, potvr\u0111uju. Potreba da se priznaju i na\u0161e \u017ertve<\/em> (u ovom slu\u010daju srpske u Sarajevu i Srebrenici) i da se pozove na procesuiranje odgovornih za ratne zlo\u010dine nad na\u0161im narodom (u ovom slu\u010daju nad Srbima u Sarajevu i Srebrenici) ne bi trebalo zloupotrebljavati za formiranje kontranarativa koji treba da oja\u010da utvr\u0111ene pozicije u ratu sje\u0107anja<\/em> naroda u BiH koji trenutno egzistira. Istovremeno, najava predsjednika Na\u0161e stranke Pe\u0111e Kojovi\u0107a da je spreman i\u0107i i razgovarati sa ljudima u Zapadnoj Hercegovini i Republici Srpskoj kako bi se poku\u0161ao izna\u0107i minimalni zajedni\u010dki imenitelj<\/em> o stvarima koje su se de\u0161avale 1990-ih u bo\u0161nja\u010dkoj politici je do\u017eivljen kao apsolutna izdaja te se na inicijatora sru\u010dila kuka i motika.<\/p>

Procesuiranje ratnih zlo\u010dina dugo je bila svijetla ta\u010dka u procesu suo\u010davanja s pro\u0161lo\u0161\u0107u. I danas je BiH vi\u0161e izuzetak nego pravilo u svjetskim okvirima kada se radi o broju procesuiranih predmeta ratnih zlo\u010dina pred doma\u0107im sudovima. Na\u017ealost, aljkavost Tu\u017eila\u0161tva BiH, politizacija pravosu\u0111a i poku\u0161aji da se zadovolji puka statistika, doveli su do toga da je, prema izvje\u0161taju OSCE-a, procenat osu\u0111uju\u0107ih presuda u predmetima ratnih zlo\u010dina u posljednjih pet godina pao sa skoro 90 posto na nivo ispod 40 posto. U praksi, to zna\u010di da su optu\u017enice lo\u0161e pisane, da su predmeti lo\u0161e istra\u017eivani \u0161to za posljedicu ima dodatnu frustraciju \u017ertava koje su jo\u0161 uvijek voljne da svjedo\u010de. To svakako otvara i prostor za politike zloupotrebe presuda po principu slavljenja oslobo\u0111enih bez tematiziranja dijelova presude koji su utvrdili da su zlo\u010dini po\u010dinjeni, ali za te zlo\u010dine nisu odgovorni oni koji su optu\u017eeni.<\/p>

U protekloj godini bosanskohercegova\u010dko dru\u0161tvo jednako je zaglavljeno<\/em> kao i prehodnih godina. Bez da smo rije\u0161ili ijedno sporno pitanje iz prehodnih godina (promjena izbornog zakona, spor oko puta ka NATO-u) na dnevni red smo dodali i neke nove probleme, dijelom vlastitim (ne)\u010dinjenjem, dijelom usljed globalnih de\u0161avanja kao \u0161to je izbjegli\u010dka ruta koja je kroz Bosnu i Hercegovinu provela oko 30.000 izbjeglica u jednoj godini.<\/p>

Na doga\u0111anja u dru\u0161tvu u pravilu se reagira brzo, \u017eestoko, uglavnom emotivno, pa se sve jednako brzo i zaboravlja jer se svjetla reflektora pomjeraju stalno. Najbolji primjer je slu\u010daj iz Gornjeg Vakufa kada je jedan Bo\u0161njak prijavio da mu je nepoznata osoba na ku\u0107u i automobil ispisala uvredljive grafite. U gradu koji je i danas podijeljen na hrvatski i bo\u0161nja\u010dki dio to je izazvalo uznemirenost, a ulje na vatru dolijevano je sa svih strana. \u0106erat \u0107emo se jo\u0161<\/em> doslovno je poru\u010divano tih dana da bi policija tri dana poslije ustanovila kako je Bo\u0161njak koji je prijavio slu\u010daj grafite ustvari ispisao sam. Poneko izvinjenje onih koji su poletjeli da prvi bace kamen<\/em>, i koji su slu\u010daj iskoristili za zagovaranje ili opravdavanje svoje teze o preventivnom nasilju kao jedinom rje\u0161enju, nekoliko obrisanih sramnih tvitova i statusa punih mr\u017enje i poziva na mobilizaciju i to je sva reakcija. Posljedice u vidu isporu\u010dene doze mr\u017enje, straha i netrpeljivosti ostaju.<\/p>

Ko se jo\u0161 sje\u0107a silne pri\u010de o uvo\u0111enju rezervnih i dodatnih policijskih snaga u RS-u i odgovora iz FBiH da \u0107e njihov (MUP) uvijek biti ve\u0107i? Ubistvo dvojice policajaca u Sarajevu u sukobu sa automafijom ni do danas nije rije\u0161eno, kao \u0161to nisu rije\u0161eni ni slu\u010dajevi ubistva mladi\u0107a D\u017eenana Memi\u0107a u Sarajevu i Davida Dragi\u010devi\u0107a u Banjoj Luci. Vi\u0161emjese\u010dni protesti su utihnuli u slu\u010daju Sarajeva ili su pak brutalno ugu\u0161eni u slu\u010daju Banja Luke gdje je policija danima maltretirala gra\u0111ane koji su se mirno okupljali na glavnom trgu.<\/p>

Istovremeno, svi pobrojani doga\u0111aji nisu jednozna\u010dni i jednosmjerni u smislu da nude isklju\u010divo perspektivu konflikta. U slu\u010daju Gornjeg Vakufa, recimo, kom\u0161ije Hrvati su odmah nakon objave vijesti do\u0161li u posjetu porodici na \u010dijoj su ku\u0107i ispisani grafiti, ogradili se od toga i podsjetili da uprkos \u017eestokim ratnim sukobima u Gornjem Vakufu nakon rata nije bilo incidenata. O\u010devi ubijenih mladi\u0107a, Muriz i Davor, dali su punu podr\u0161ku jedan drugom a ljudi iz Sarajeva i\u0161li su na mirna okupljanja u Banja Luku kao i ljudi iz Banja Luke u Sarajevo. Kada su ubijena dvojica policajaca u Sarajevu, njihove kolege iz Isto\u010dnog Sarajeva dale su punu podr\u0161ku porodicama i u\u010destvovale u istrazi poru\u010div\u0161i kako je fakti\u010dki ista grupa odgovorno i za napada na policajce u I. Sarajevu.<\/p>

Bilo je doga\u0111aja koji su pokazali da jo\u0161 uvijek imamo i kreativnosti i volje i znanja da \u010dinimo dobre stvari. Sarajevo i Isto\u010dno Sarajevo bili su doma\u0107ini EYOF-a pokazav\u0161i da mo\u017eemo sara\u0111ivati i u pozitivnim pri\u010dama. U Sarajevu je po\u010detkom septembra odr\u017eana prva bh. povorka ponosa pod sloganom Ima iza\u0107\u2019<\/em>. Vjerovatno niti jedan doga\u0111aj godinama nije toliko polarizirao dru\u0161tvo, pri \u010demu je na organiziranim kontraskupovima i u javnim raspravama na vidjelo iza\u0161lo niz mehanizama koji otkrivaju kako dru\u0161tvo funkcionira - manjine nemaju prava, ve\u0107 im ve\u0107ina daje onoliko prava koliko ve\u0107ina to \u017eeli. Naprimjer, kori\u0161ten je argument kako je velika ve\u0107ina gra\u0111ana protiv povorke \u0161to bi automatski trebalo zna\u010diti da oni koji su u manjini treba da prihvate da ne mogu imati prava sa kojima se ne sla\u017ee ve\u0107ina, potom se diskutiralo kako nisu ugro\u017eena prava LGBT manjine ve\u0107 prava ve\u0107ine, \u0161to je tako\u0111er vrlo \u010dest argument koji se \u010duje kad god se potegne pitanje prava manjine. \u010cuo se i poziv da bi manjina trebala voditi ra\u010duna o osje\u0107ajima ve\u0107ine (ponovo vrlo \u010dest argument), a kontraskupovi su organizirani sa ciljem za\u0161tite tradicionalne porodice<\/em> pri \u010demu je ta porodica definirana tako da isklju\u010duje ne samo LGBT osobe ve\u0107 i heteroseksualne parove koji nemaju djece, udovice, samohrane roditelje, roditelje djece sa pote\u0161ko\u0107ama u razvoju\u2026 Povorka je organizirana prvenstveno zahvaljuju\u0107i hrabrosti, volji i upornosti male grupe aktivista, a zna\u010dajna je bila i podr\u0161ka kantonalnih vlasti predvo\u0111enih Na\u0161om strankom i SDP-om. Prva povorka va\u017ena je jer je na vidjelo iznijela sve predrasude, diskriminaciju i nerazumijevanje, a u narednom periodu ostaje da se radi na tome.<\/p>

Iz Brisela je saop\u0107eno da je u 2018. iz BiH u zemlje EU iselilo 50.000 gra\u0111ana. Masovno iseljevanje nije problem isklju\u010divo za privredu koja ve\u0107 osje\u0107a posljedice odlaska mladih i kvalifikovanih. To je stra\u0161an gubitak za bh. dru\u0161tvo koji se osje\u0107a u svim sferama \u017eivota, uklju\u010duju\u0107i i rad na izgradnji mira. Te\u0161ko je nadoknaditi ionako mali broj onih koji su bili voljni da, posebno u manjim zajednicama, rade na te\u0161kim temama kao \u0161to je suo\u010davanje vlastite zajednice sa bolnom pro\u0161lo\u0161\u0107u. S druge strane, bh. institucije nemaju niti zvani\u010dne podatke o tome koliko, odakle i gdje im se ljudi sele, a da ne govorimo o tome da se neko detaljnije pozabavio uzrocima i posljedicama.<\/p>

Sve u svemu, Not Great, Not Terrible<\/em>, \u0161to bi u popularnoj seriji rekao glavni in\u017einjer nuklerane elektrane u Chernobylu nakon nuklerane katastrofe.<\/p>

Ned\u017ead Novali\u0107<\/p>

Crna Gora: A \u0161ta ima\u0161 ti protiv Mila?<\/h2>

Svjedoci\/kinje smo jo\u0161 jedne godine tokom koje se crnogorsko dru\u0161tvo strahovitom brzinom (mnogo br\u017ee od ostalih dru\u0161tava regiona) nastavilo pribli\u017eavati EU; nastavilo pribli\u017eavati onome \u0161to jo\u0161 uvijek predstavlja ili se poku\u0161ava predstaviti kao simboli\u010dki okvir po\u0161tovanja principa ljudskih prava i vladavine zakona. U toj nestvarnoj brzini, usponu ili letu sve je manje poglavlja koja treba otvoriti, pregovora koje treba zavr\u0161iti, zakona koje treba donijeti i sprovesti, problema koje treba rije\u0161iti, uslova koje treba ispuniti. Me\u0111utim, izgleda da nam je usled te brzine od prosperiteta i blagostanja ostao samo osje\u0107aj mu\u010dnine, a od vrtoglavog uspona - vrtoglavica. Mozak i stomak nikako da se naviknu na tu prebrzu vo\u017enju evropskim, jo\u0161 uvijek u izgradnji, autoputevima.<\/p>

A \u0161to ima\u0161 ti protiv Mila? Upitao bi me veliki broj gra\u0111ana\/ki Crne Gore nakon ovih uvodnih re\u010denica. Nemam ni\u0161ta protiv Mila, nemam ni\u0161ta ni protiv DPS-a, nemam ni\u0161ta protiv Crne Gore, ako ba\u0161 ho\u0107ete da slijedim tu naopaku logiku, pardon zvani\u010dnu dr\u017eavnu politiku. Ali dozvolite mi da ka\u017eem protiv \u010dega jesam i protiv \u010dega \u0161to\u0161ta imam.<\/p>

Kradljivci mladosti. Podjele i nacionalizam<\/h4>

U Crnoj Gori se suvi\u0161e dugo odr\u017eava balans, s jedne strane nesmjenjivosti vlasti, koja se toj u svemo\u0107i osilila i sve vi\u0161e bahati, i opozicije koja svoju politi\u010dku jalovost ili nemo\u0107 ispoljava kroz frustraciju vje\u010ditog gubitnika. Gra\u0111ani\/ke protestvuju u savezu sa opozicijom i tra\u017ee smjenu aktuelne vlasti, ne uvi\u0111aju\u0107i da se prava borba mora voditi negdje drugo - unutar institucija sistema, u cilju njihovog ja\u010danja i osamostavljivanja. Protiv sam takvog, nepromjenljivog stanja stvari, koje traje od 1997. godine, dovoljno dugo da zaslu\u017ei epitet \"kradljivca mladosti\" \u010ditavom nizu generacija.<\/p>

Politi\u010dke elite, me\u0111u kojima ima i deklarisanih antifa\u0161ista ali i onih drugih, sa ponosom isti\u010du i prote\u017eiraju\u00a0 SFRJ ikonografiju, predstavljaju\u0107i dana\u0161nju Crnu Goru kao nastavak jugoslovenskog antifa\u0161izma i me\u0111uetni\u010dkog sklada. Podizanje spomenika Josipu Brozu Titu u centru Podgorice naplasti\u010dniji je primjer tog novog-starog trenda. I tu i ne bi bilo ni\u0161ta lo\u0161e da se ne zanemaruje ili namjerno previ\u0111a \u010dinjenica ogromnog jaza izme\u0111u npr. Crnogoraca i Srba. Protivnik sam tom sve ve\u0107em produbljivanju etni\u010dkih distanci u modernoj Crnoj Gori. Nikad nezavisniji u svojim nikad dubljim podjelama.<\/p>

S druge strane, dobar dio opozicije, ohrabren probu\u0111enim i nikad budnijim nacionalizmom nastoji da minimalizuje ili potpuno ukine sve one vrijednosti koje nam je sekularna i antifa\u0161isti\u010dka biv\u0161a velika domovina donijela, prije svega ideje gra\u0111anske dr\u017eave i rodne ravnopravnosti. Kao po nekom drugorazrednom scenariju paralelno se sve vi\u0161e i sve \u010de\u0161\u0107e povampiruju etnomitovi i politike krvi i tla iz devedesetih, o\u010digledno nikad nisu ni bile na pravi na\u010din pokopane.<\/p>

Naravno ovo gotovo po pravilu biva za\u010dinjeno razli\u010ditim interpretacijama, krivotvorenjima i razumijevanjima pro\u0161losti, koja po opet nesu\u0111enom pravilu postaju putokazi za budu\u0107nost, tj. kako to zapravo dr\u017eava treba da izgleda. Za suo\u010davanje sa ne ba\u0161 lijepom trenutnom slikom crnogorskog dru\u0161tva nema ni volje ni hrabrosti, a o\u010digledno ni potrebe. Pogledi su zato itekako sna\u017eno i daleko usmjereni ka idealizovanoj pro\u0161losti, u kojoj se tra\u017ei legitimitet za dana\u0161nje politi\u010dko djelovanje. Pa se tako npr. u crnogorskom parlamentu donosi odluka kojom se poni\u0161tavaju odluke Velike narodne skup\u0161tine iz 1918. godine na kojoj je donijeta odluka o prisajedinjenju Srbiji. Protivim se trendu kojim \u0107emo mijenjaju\u0107i pro\u0161lost promijeniti budu\u0107nost. \"Pogre\u0161no razumijevanje vlastite pro\u0161losti u sr\u017ei je nacionalnog bi\u0107a\"<\/p>

Vojska partije. Kritika<\/h4>

Ne pristajem na manjak kapaciteta u institucijama, protivnik sam nekompetentnih kadrova. Na visokim pozicijama godinama \u010du\u010de (uvijek spremni ili da sjednu tj. legnu ali i da sko\u010de kad ih gospodar pozove) partijski vojnici. Oni ipak bolje od nas umiju da misle i naravno bolje i vi\u0161e da rade. Ne volim to \u0161to svi oni koji su time profesionalno uni\u017eeni, a i svi oni gra\u0111anski uvrije\u0111eni, \u0107ute i trpe. Godina za nama obilovala je nizom afera koje su se ticale plagiranih nau\u010dnih radova i kupljenih diploma univertzitetskih profesora, ministara itd. Naravno, neprocesuiranih.<\/p>

Ne mogu da pristanem na toliko duboko i sve dublje socijalno raslojavanje. Ono gotovo uvijek ide ruku pod ruku sa nevjerovatnim nedostatkom konstruktivnog politi\u010dkog i javnog dijaloga na klju\u010dne teme. A one, klju\u010dne teme, su uvijek tu, neiscrpne i samostvorene kada treba da zanemarimo realne probleme. Priznajem i meni je ljep\u0161e da govorim o jeziku prije nego o maloj plati, o crkvi prije nego o sve ve\u0107em broju odlazaka mladih ljudi iz CG, o prelijepoj nezavisnoj ekolo\u0161koj dr\u017eavi prije nego o dvostruko ve\u0107oj cijeni potro\u0161a\u010dke korpe od prosje\u010dne zarade itd.<\/p>

Ako demokratija u sebi sadr\u017ei izme\u0111u ostalog i prihvatanje razli\u010ditosti i dozvoljavanje kritike, onda nikako ne mogu da volim to \u0161to Crna Gora ne zaslu\u017euje da se nazove demokratskom. Iako istorijski jeste bila puna razli\u010ditosti, odnos prema toj \u010dinjenici se nikada na pravi na\u010din nije po\u0161tovao. To bogatstvo gotovo uvijek, pogotovu danas, jeste polje za manipulativno djelovanje i izazivanje sukoba i nerijetko krvavih podjela. Kritika, bez koje jo\u0161 od Kanta i nema progresa, u CG je ostala rezervisana samo za uske jalove akademske krugove ili pak bezazlene kafanske stolove, dok se svaka konstuktivna kritika do\u017eivljava kao napad na samu dr\u017eavu.<\/p>

Mediji<\/h4>

Ne pristajem na to da se dr\u017eavom naziva prostor unutar kojeg je od 2004. godine kada je ubijen glavni urednik \u201cDana\u201d Du\u0161ko Jovanovi\u0107, registrovano vi\u0161e od 80 napada na novinare i imovinu medija. Od toga \u010dak 32 u posljednje dvije godine. Mete tih napada u ogromnoj ve\u0107ini slu\u010dajeva bili su novinari antivladinih ili proopozicionih medija. Posljednji takav napad je ranjavanje novinarke \u201cVijesti\u201d Olivere Laki\u0107, koji kao i ve\u0107ina ostalih slu\u010dajeva ostaje nerazrije\u0161en ili \u010dak nikad ni ne dobija sudski epilog. Kada ovome dodamo jako lo\u0161u materijalnu situaciju u ve\u0107ini medija, kao i neminovnu duboku podijeljenost na provladine i proopozicione medije, uz neizbje\u017enu visoku politizovanost, onda je medijska slika zaista \"ru\u017ei\u010dasta\".<\/p>

Kontinuirano politi\u010dko mije\u0161anje u RTCG (Javni servis) kao i Agenciju za elektronske medije (AEM) najdirektnije se pokazalo kroz smjenu \u010dlanova Savjeta RTCG-a i njegovog menad\u017ementa. Protiv sam toga \u0161to uredni\u010dka nezavisnost i profesionalni standardi u RTCG-u nikako da se uspostave, a \u0161to Savjet RTCG ostaje neza\u0161ti\u0107en od\u00a0 uticaja i politi\u010dkog pritiska, uklju\u010duju\u0107i i sam izbor njegovih \u010dlanova. Dovoljno je pogledati, oni koji imaju crni smisao za humor mo\u017eda \u0107e i imati snage, program javnog servisa. Univerzalnost pristupa i univerzalnost sadr\u017eaja jesu uo\u010dljivi, ali u ponekom, rijetkom SF filmu.<\/p>

Mafija i nezavisno sudstvo. Dug i du\u017enici<\/h4>

Imam \u0161to\u0161ta protiv toga \u0161to se na desetine mladih \u017eivota zavr\u0161ava prije nego je i po\u010delo, u \u201cobra\u010dunu klanova\" (od 2015. godine 40 ljudi je ubijeno) i \u0161to dr\u017eava svoju (ne)mo\u0107 nikako da poka\u017ee u ozbiljnoj i konstantnoj borbi protiv organizovanog kriminala. Mnogi bi rekli kako \u0107e da se bore protiv sebe.<\/p>

Ne volim \u010dinjenicu da je sudstvo toliko degradirano i toliko nisko palo da se politi\u010dki uticaj na njega vi\u0161e ni ne poku\u0161ava prikriti. Podsje\u0107am na hap\u0161enje i zatvaranje poslanika Demokratskog fronta (DF) Neboj\u0161e Medojevi\u0107a, kao i na to da je njegov kolega Milan Kne\u017eevi\u0107 odslu\u017eio tri mjeseca zatvora zbog napada na policajca, kao i na po mnogo \u010demu montirani i dugo pripremani sudski proces \"Dr\u017eavni udar\", kojem je izgleda jedini cilj bio obra\u010dunavanje sa politi\u010dkim neistomi\u0161ljenicima.<\/p>

Ne volim \u0161to smo rekorderi kada je javni dug u pitanju. I to ove godine zbog zajma za dionicu auto puta, sa \u010dijom se izgradnjom, naravno, kasni. A to \u0161to taj isti autoput ugro\u017eava jednu od najljep\u0161ih i naj\u010distijih rijeka Evrope, Taru, to me uop\u0161te ne zabrinjava, jer kao \u0161to re\u010de nadle\u017eni ministar izgradnjom autoputa rijeci nije izmje\u0161teno korito ve\u0107 samo tok.<\/p>

Afera \"koverta\" (snimak na kojem se jasno vidi da visoki dr\u017eavni (DPS) funkcioner uzima kovertu sa 97000 evra od biznismena u toku izborne kampanje) se zata\u0161kala, sakrila i bojim se ve\u0107 zaboravila. O\u010dekivano preslikavanje austrijskog scenarija: procesuiranje, ostavke, smjene vlasti itd\u2026 ostaje samo o\u010dekivanje. Agencija za spre\u010davanje korupcije je odbila da javnom u\u010dini odluku protiv vladaju\u0107e partije (DPS), kojom je ustanovljeno kr\u0161enje zakona i odre\u0111ena kazna. Ne znam ko protiv ovakvog selektivnog primjenjivanja zakona ne bi bio protiv.<\/p>

Patriotizam<\/h4>

Protiv sam toga \u0161to je zvani\u010dna, ali bojim se i jedina mogu\u0107a politika \"patriotizma\" upravo ta naopaka politika \"ljubavi prema dr\u017eavi\". Prema njoj ja jedino mogu pomo\u0107i svojoj dr\u017eavi, svom dru\u0161tvu, ukoliko ga volim bez obzira na sve. Zato je i svaka kritika, svaka mogu\u0107nost promjene, napretka, sagledavana i do\u017eivljavana kao mr\u017enja prema dr\u017eavi, tj. mr\u017enja prema DPS-u ili Milu. Jer danas je \"lak\u0161e zamisliti krah dr\u017eave Crne Gore nego krah vladavine DPS-a.\"<\/p>

Na kraju, mo\u017eda sam ponajvi\u0161e protiv toga to \u0161to \u0107u posle ovih rije\u010di za pola Crne Gore biti izdajnik, a za drugu polovinu istinski patriota, \u0161to \u0107u u sada ve\u0107 istorijskoj igri podjela i razdora na patriote i izdajnike biti uvu\u010den u jedan od ta dva tabora. Ne volim to \u0161to nikakvo tre\u0107e mi\u0161ljenje koje je zapravo jedino Drugo, tj. druga\u010dije od oba, ne uspjeva za\u017eivjeti u takvom post ili pred demokratskom ambijentu, kakva je danas, prelijepa, Crna Gora.<\/p>

Radomir Radevi\u0107<\/p>

\"\"<\/a><\/p>

Hrvatska: \u201e\u0110uro \u0107e ti oprostiti \u0161to te tukao\u201c<\/h2>

Godi\u0161nji pregled doga\u0111aja koji utje\u010du ili su relevantni za izgradnju mira i suo\u010davanje s pro\u0161lo\u0161\u0107u u Hrvatskoj po\u010dinjemo s kraja, s kraja ljeta dodu\u0161e, budu\u0107i ovo na\u017ealost nije kraj, nego uvertira u \u017eestinu kampanje za predsjedni\u010dke izbore koji u Hrvatskoj imaju uslijediti krajem ove i po\u010detkom sljede\u0107e godine. \u017drtveni jarac je Milorad Pupovac, dugogodi\u0161nji predstavnik hrvatskih Srba, a povod njegov intervju portalu Radio Sarajevo u kojem je, kako tvrde Hrvatska biskupska konferencija, premijer, ministri i braniteljske udruge, \u201eizjedna\u010dio Hrvatsku sa NDH\u201c. Iako je Pupovac, komentiraju\u0107i val nasilja usmjeren na one koji jesu ili se percipiraju kao Srbi, zapravo rekao da su te radnje \u201etijesno povezane sa istorijskim revizionizmom koji se u Hrvatskoj ogleda u tome da se poku\u0161ava rehabilitirati usta\u0161ki pokret i ustanoviti ga u novom evropskom kontekstu, u novoj evropskoj Hrvatskoj\u201c. Oni koje je ozna\u010dio kao nositelje ovog procesa upregli su sve snage da mu poka\u017eu da je kranje vrijeme da napusti svoju domovinu jer, kao Srbin, nema pravo tako govoriti o Hrvatskoj. Pritom Pupovac isti\u010de o\u010dito: od 2013. kada je val nasilja zapravo zapo\u010deo lupanjem dvojezi\u010dnih plo\u010da na dr\u017eavnim institucijama u Vukovaru do 2018., prema podacima Srpskog narodnog vije\u0107a, bilo je 1376 verbalnih i fizi\u010dkih napada na gra\u0111ane srpske nacionalnosti u Hrvatskoj, samo u 2018. je tih napada bilo 381. Posljednji ovogodi\u0161nji zabilje\u017eeni slu\u010daj dogodio se u Uzdolju, u sjevernoj Dalmaciji, gdje su maskirani napada\u010di pretukli grupu ljudi, me\u0111u kojima je bilo \u017eena i djece, u kafi\u0107u u kojem su gledali utakmicu beogradskog kluba Crvena Zvezda. Zvezda je ove godine nekoliko puta bila ozna\u010dena meta, pa su, primjerice, batine sna\u0161le i konobara na sezonskom radu u Dubrovniku, koji je imao istetoviran Zvezdin grb, kao i vaterpoliste Crvene Zvezde koji su na rivi u Splitu pili kavu. Ovo je kreativnim tuma\u010dima hrvatske zbilje dalo za pravo da ovakve incidente proglase navija\u010dkim nasiljem. No da ne bismo imali nedoumica o \u010demu se zapravo radi pobrinuli su se napada\u010di na sezonske radnike u Supetru na Bra\u010du, koji su uz rije\u010di \u201eko je ovdje Srbin, ubij Srbina\u201c napali \u010detvero sezonskih radnika, me\u0111u kojima su bila dvojica mladi\u0107a srpske nacionalnosti iz Vukovara. U lipnju ove godine, od posljedica napada u kojem ga je mjesec dana ranije brutalno premlatio osumnji\u010deni za ratne zlo\u010dine, preminuo je Radoje Petkovi\u0107, potpredsjednik Vije\u0107a srpske nacionalne manjine grada Kastva. Premijer i predsjednica krajnje relativiziraju ove doga\u0111aje, nazivaju\u0107i ih tek incidentima i zlonamjernim podmetanjima kojima se treba odlu\u010dno suprotstaviti. Kako, demonstrirala je predsjednica za vrijeme televizijskog intervjua energi\u010dno lupaju\u0107i \u0161akom po stolu. Ve\u0107 sljede\u0107i dan naslovnice je krasila slika navija\u010da splitskog kluba Hajduk, koji je, maskiran i sa zapaljenim bakljama u rukama, sve u majici s natpisom \u201eUbi Srbina\u201c bio heroj vlastite tribine. Policija je zabilje\u017eila da na utakmici \u201enije bilo ve\u0107ih incidenata\u201c.<\/p>

Kako je biti Srbin u Hrvatskoj<\/h4>

Da nas je vlast odgojila po svojoj mjeri najbolje je pokazala kampanja za izbore za europski parlament, \u010diji su glavni akter i lakmus za stanje u dru\u0161tvu ponovno bili Srbi. Svojom kampanjom \u201eZnate li kako je biti Srbin u Hrvatskoj\u201c, kandidati Pupovac, Jovi\u0107 i stranka koju predstavljaju \u2013 SDSS, optu\u017eeni su da su tendenciozno pokrenuli ili inspirirali nevi\u0111enu koli\u010dinu nasilja u javnom prostoru \u2013 predizborni plakati su sadr\u017eavali mje\u0161ovito latini\u010dne i \u0107irili\u010dne poruke, i redovito su, \u0161irom Hrvatske, bili potrgani i\/ili pre\u0161arani porukama mr\u017enje. Ova kampanja kod velike je ve\u0107ine ni po \u010demu ekstremnih Hrvata izazvala podvojene osje\u0107aje, te nije bila rijetkost da na dru\u0161tvenim mre\u017eama na\u0111ete osu\u0111uju\u0107e komentare ovakve kampanje, smatraju\u0107i je provokatorskom, da to nije op\u0107e stanje dru\u0161tva, nego na plakate reagira tek omanja \u0161a\u010dica ekstremista. Me\u0111utim, ono \u0161to je pro\u0161lo nezapa\u017eeno je nedostatak bilo kakve osude ovakvih poruka od vladaju\u0107ih, ali i drugih opozicijskih stranaka. Kad na predizbornom plakatu SDSS-a za EU izbore s likom Milorada Pupovca u centru Zagreba, u neposrednoj blizini MUP-a, netko napi\u0161e: \u201eZakolji srpsku djecu. Ubi Srbina\u201c, a sli\u010dno se ponovi i u Splitu, Rijeci, \u0160ibeniku, Sisku i drugim mjestima, to je sadr\u017eaj koji se, prema rije\u010dima ugledne odvjetnice Vesne Alaburi\u0107, pravno mo\u017ee okvalificirati nikako druga\u010dije nego kao zlo\u010din poticanja na po\u010dinjenje genocida. Takvim ga kvalificira UN-ova konvencija o sprije\u010davanju i ka\u017enjavanju genocida, \u010dijom je potpisnicom i Hrvatska. Za po\u010dinjenje tog kaznenog djela nije nu\u017eno da genocid bude po\u010dinjen, poku\u0161an, ili vjerojatan, potrebno je tek da odre\u0111ena poruka bude izra\u017eena s genocidnom namjerom, javno i da se njen sadr\u017eaj mo\u017ee razborito protuma\u010diti kao izravno poticanje na uni\u0161tenje odre\u0111ene nacionalne, etni\u010dke, rasne ili religijske skupine, u cjelini ili djelomi\u010dno. Pravno je potpuno irelevantno ho\u0107e li poruka doista nekog potaknuti na djelovanje ili ne.<\/p>

Kampanju vi\u0161e nitko i ne spominje, ali je ve\u0107 sada evidentno da je tretiranje ovakvih \u010dinova kao incidentnih, sporadi\u010dnih ili neva\u017enih, krajnje opasno po dru\u0161tvo u cjelini.<\/p>

Sila, a ne nasilje<\/h4>

\u201ePonekad je malo sile, ne nasilja, potrebno, kada na vas ide skupina od vi\u0161e od 50 ljudi. No nema tu nikakvog nasilja, nema tu nikakvih tjelesnih ozljeda, \u0161ok bombi, suzavaca, \u017eice\u201c, izjaviti \u0107e hrvatska predsjednica komentiraju\u0107i izjave ministra sigurnosti BiH Dragana Mekti\u0107a o tome da postoje dokazi o nasilju hrvatske policije nad migrantima (kako se uvrije\u017eilo nazivati izbjeglice koje prolaze balkanskom rutom). Da hrvatska policija pose\u017ee za nelegitimnom upotrebom sile brane\u0107i ovim ljudima pristup na europski prostor bilje\u017ee ne samo bh. vlasti, ve\u0107 i razli\u010dite nevladine i humanitarne organizacije, koje ve\u0107 dugi niz mjeseci u svojim izvje\u0161tajima prila\u017eu dokaze i svjedo\u010danstva o njihovoj brutalnosti i protuzakonitom postupanju. Svjedo\u010danstva su to o batinanjima, oduzimanju dokumenta, novca, hrane i vode, odricanju prava na tra\u017eenje azila, ilegalnom prebacivanju ljudi zate\u010denih na teritoriju RH natrag u BiH... EU se pritom pona\u0161a kao da se nje sve to skupa ne ti\u010de, te iz toga zaklju\u010dujemo da je upotreba nelegitimne sile prema ljudima druge boje ko\u017ee na periferiji europskog kontinenta zapravo po\u017eeljna.<\/p>

Da takva politika, koje je Hrvatska vjerna sljednica, nije ograni\u010dena samo na nesretnike iz Sirije, Afganistana, Pakistana ili Irana, najbolje je pokazao prosvjed u \u010cakovcu, pod afirmativnim nazivom \u201e\u017delim normalan \u017eivot\u201c kojim se zapravo \u017eeljelo pokriti njegov temeljno rasisti\u010dki sadr\u017eaj. Prosvjed je bio usmjeren na me\u0111imursku romsku populaciju koji po rije\u010dima organizatora \u201emlate, kradu\u201c, koji su \u201ezlostavlja\u010di pod utjecajem opijata\u201c, \u201enisu sposobni brinuti se ni za sebe, a kamoli za toliki broj djece\u201c. Stoga \u201eih treba nau\u010diti kako \u017eivjeti, kako odgajati djecu, kako raspolagati novcem i kako razvijati higijenske navike\u201c. Rasisti\u010dka retorika za\u010dinjena krivotvorenjem policijske statistike imala je za cilj skrenuti pa\u017enju sa sustavne diskriminacije Roma, o \u010demu govori i \u010dinjenica da samim Romima nije bilo dopu\u0161teno organizirati kontraprosvjed, iako je takva zabrana protuzakonita i protuustavna.<\/p>

Zato je me\u0111u dru\u0161tvenim komentatorima ove godine najcitiranija bila pjesma \u201ePrvo su do\u0161li...\u201c sa izmjenama koje odgovaraju trenutku: Prvo su do\u0161li po Srbe, ali ja se nisam pobunio jer nisam bio Srbin. Zatim su do\u0161li po Rome, a ja se nisam pobunio jer nisam bio Rom... Jo\u0161 uvijek ne mo\u017eemo biti sigurni kako nazvati sljede\u0107u dru\u0161tvenu grupu koja je na redu za lin\u010d, budu\u0107i ona zasad broji povjesni\u010dare koji se protive od sustava i vlasti podr\u017eanom krivotvorenju povijesti, posebno one od 1941-1991., osobe koje kriti\u010dki progovaraju o Domovinskom ratu i Tu\u0111manovom naslije\u0111u, novinare koji izvje\u0161tavaju o zlo\u010dinima iz mr\u017enje, ukratko sve one \u010diji se govor i djelovanje ne uklapa u izmi\u0161ljenu verziju povijesti, ili izmi\u0161ljenu verziju dr\u017eave u kojoj za ove gore pobrojane nema mjesta.<\/p>

Kamo nas to vodi?<\/h4>

Da povijest krivotvorimo i o njoj raspravljamo kako se ne bismo previ\u0161e pitali o politici, kriminalu u javnim poslovima, korupciji i drugim pitanjima dru\u0161tvenog morala, jasno je svima. Ali osim pojedina\u010dnih istupa hrabrih pojedinaca, i ponekog politi\u010dara, organiziranog otpora ovakvim tendencijama nema, niti u opoziciji, niti na ulici. Po\u017eara je mno\u0161tvo i svatko se bori kako najbolje zna, i na onom polju na kojemu doista mo\u017ee ne\u0161to i u\u010diniti - lijevi blok u zagreba\u010dkoj gradskoj opoziciji protiv nelegalnih manipulacija gradona\u010delnika gradskim zemlji\u0161tem, vlasni\u0161tvom, javnim prostorima i projektima, nevladine organizacije protiv policije i sustava u upravljanju izbjegli\u010dkom krizom, inicijative i organizacije gra\u0111ana protiv lokalnih vlasti za za\u0161titu svoje neposredne \u017eivotne okoline... Iako su podjele unutar samog hrvatskog dru\u0161tva sve o\u010ditije, i to ne samo po ideolo\u0161kim odrednicama, solidarnost jo\u0161 nije izumrla, ali je, nakon dugogodi\u0161nje i neizgledne borbe, jako umorna.<\/p>

\u0160to o reakcionarnim tendencijama dru\u0161tvenog razvoja misle obi\u010dni gra\u0111ani te\u0161ko je re\u0107i, osim ako ih ne promatramo u brojkama. Prema podacima Saveznog zavoda za statistiku SR Njema\u010dke, od ulaska Hrvatske u EU 2015. do 2017. u Njema\u010dku se doselilo oko 200.000 hrvatskih dr\u017eavljana, od kojih je gotovo 100.000 zaposlenih. Koliko je gra\u0111ana iz Hrvatske iselilo u posljednje dvije godine pak najbolje govore prazna slavonska i baranjska sela i gradovi. Da me\u0111u tim gra\u0111anima prevladavaju etni\u010dki Hrvati govori i to da su li\u010dka, banijska i kordunska sela, u kojima su ve\u0107inom \u017eivjeli hrvatski Srbi, prazna od 1995. te nije jasno zapravo protiv koga se to hrvatska desnica tako ogor\u010deno bori. Broj iseljenih znatno je ve\u0107i od onoga kojeg bilje\u017ei slu\u017ebena statistika, a osnovni su trendovi iseljavanja sljede\u0107i: \u201eve\u0107inom se iseljavaju mlade osobe izme\u0111u 20 i 40 godina, koje su prete\u017eito bile zaposlene te se u pravilu iseljavaju s cijelim obiteljima. Za razliku od prija\u0161njih iseljavanja glavninu iseljenih sada \u010dine mla\u0111i ljudi s visokom naobrazbom. Za ve\u0107inu ispitanika odgovornost za sada\u0161nju situaciju i masovno iseljavanje mladih iz zemlje snose nesposobni politi\u010dari, neu\u010dinkovito pravosu\u0111e i ratni profiteri. Nemoral politi\u010dkih elita, pravna nesigurnost, nepotizam i korupcija pri vrhu su motiva koji su pridonijeli iseljavanju. Istra\u017eivanje je potvrdilo da su politi\u010dka neizvjesnost i nestabilnost mnogima bile poticaj za odlazak. Na temelju rezultata istra\u017eivanja vidjeli smo da mladi Hrvati ne odlaze radi novca, odnosno da bi se obogatili. Bogatstvo nikome od njih nije klju\u010dna vrijednost. Oni su u Njema\u010dkoj spremni na puno vi\u0161e odricanja, trpljenja i patnje nego u domovini, naprosto zato \u0161to vjeruju da \u0107e im se taj trud u Njema\u010dkoj isplatiti, dok su u domovinu izgubili povjerenje\u201c[1]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>

Davorka Turk<\/p>

\"\"<\/a><\/p>

Kosovo: Predstavljanje na\u0161ih pri\u010da<\/h2>

\u00a0<\/p>

\u201cDede!<\/em>\u201d,<\/p>

ka\u017ee klinac koji u ruci dr\u017ei tablet: \u201cova \u0161kola do koje si ka\u017ee\u0161 pje\u0161a\u010dio 12,5 kilometara dnevno; Google mape ka\u017eu da je samo 1,7 kilometara daleko...<\/em>\u201d Ovaj vic ovih dana kru\u017ei me\u0111u mladima Kosova, izra\u017eavaju\u0107i njihovu superiornost u odnosu na starije, jer imaju ta\u010dne informacije, ovdje i sada.<\/p>

Neyse...,<\/p>

allpoetry.com ka\u017ee da ima ovaj jedan pjesnik koji je poha\u0111ao srpsku pravoslavnu osnovnu \u0161kolu, u\u010dio staroslavenski, ruski, gr\u010dki, latinski i francuski i upisao Pravoslavnu bogosloviju Sv. Jovana Bogoslova...<\/em> U pitanju je Millosh Gjergj Nikolla - Migjeni o kome \u0107ete na Wikipediji pro\u010ditati da je jedan od najplodnijih i najva\u017enijih pisaca albanske knji\u017eevnosti 20. vijeka<\/em>, a na nekom kosovskom portalu biste mogli pro\u010ditati da nijedan drugi pjesnik albanske nacije nije se tako isticao po realisti\u010dnim opisima dru\u0161tvenog stanja u Albaniji<\/em>.<\/p>

Ali, znate,<\/p>

ako ste Albanac, dobijete epitet \u201cEsat Pash\u00eb<\/em>\u201d, \u0161to bi zna\u010dilo da ste najgori me\u0111u izdajnicima. E, pa, nije vi\u0161e tako; to je bio narativ koji su oblikovali njegovi politi\u010dki protivnici u to doba. Ina\u010de, Esat Pasha Toptani (1863\u20131920) bio je osmanski vojni oficir i albanski zastupnik u osmanskom parlamentu, sara\u0111ivao je s Balkanskom ligom nakon Balkanskih ratova i utemeljio Republiku Centralnu Albaniju<\/em> sa sjedi\u0161tem u Dra\u010du. Odnedavno, niz nau\u010dnika iz Albanije rasvjetljuje ovu zanimljivu li\u010dnost iz albanske pro\u0161losti.<\/p>

Predstavljanje na\u0161ih pri\u010da?<\/p>

Da! Apsolutno sam uvjeren da uvijek postoji pravi trenutak kada je potrebno odmaknuti se, rekapitulirati pro\u0161le narative i razumjeti ih na na\u010din koji je koristan za nas danas, ovdje i sada. Sredstva se stalno mijenjaju, ali trenutak je uvijek pravi. Ne radi se o suprotstavljanju narativa iz pro\u0161losti, ve\u0107 o dodavanju ne\u010dega boljega. Za dana\u0161nje dru\u0161tvo Kosova, a i za cijelu regiju (sada nas nazivaju WB6; cool!<\/em>), ovo je postalo od klju\u010dnog zna\u010daja kako bismo krenuli naprijed. A jedino dopustivo kretanje u univerzumu je naprijed<\/em>. Takvo kretanje naprijed omogu\u0107ilo bi nam da istra\u017eimo i saznamo vi\u0161e o ovim \u201cEsat Pashama\u201d iz na\u0161ih pro\u0161losti, na nastavimo osje\u0107ati poeziju u \u017ealost zavijenog Migjenija na albanskom tako \u0161to \u0107emo poznavati njegovo srpsko porijeklo. A usudio bih se re\u0107i i da bi nam takvo kretanje naprijed omogu\u0107ilo da razumijemo za\u0161to je onih 1,7 kilometara za klinca dana\u0161njice njegovom Dedi iz gore navedenog vica predstavljalo desetine kilometara. Ali ni u kom slu\u010daju nam ne\u0107e dati za pravo da osu\u0111ujemo tog starca, niti ta pro\u0161la vremena. Mora postojati ne\u0161to \u0161to jo\u0161 uvijek ne znamo. A to je uzbudljivo!<\/p>

umjesto biografije:<\/p>

Od maja 2018. autor ovog \u010dlanka pozvan je da bude \u010dlan Pripremnog tima za uspostavljanje Komisije za istinu i pomirenje Kosova<\/em>, na inicijativu Kancelarije predsjednika Kosova. Takva inicijativa, kao i svaka druga, lako mo\u017ee biti oteta, obzirom na sada\u0161nji establi\u0161ment, kako na Kosovu tako i \u0161irom WB6. Mo\u017eda trebamo nau\u010diti kako da dodamo ne\u0161to bolje<\/em> ne samo na\u0161im pro\u0161lostima, ve\u0107 i na\u0161im ovdje-i-sada u kojima djelujemo ili koja na nas djeluju. Ve\u0107 \u017eivimo i uslovljeni smo nizom dobrih i ne tako dobrih poduhvata iz pro\u0161losti i njihovim posljedicama. Komisija za istinu i pomirenje Kosova predstavlja jo\u0161 jednu priliku, koja se jo\u0161 uvijek oblikuje, za doprinos smislenoj transformaciji i Kosova i \u0161ire regije.<\/p>

i post.scriptum<\/p>

Po\u0161to je ovaj \u010dlanak zami\u0161ljen kao analiza situacije na Kosovu u periodu od septembra 2018. do septembra 2019. godine, dozvolite mi samo da ka\u017eem da je \u201cdiplomatski tango\u201d nastavljen u i oko pitanja granice, dijaloga, 100% carinskih tarifa Kosova za srbijanske proizvode itd. \u0160to se ti\u010de pro\u0161losti, dosta energije je ulo\u017eeno u iznala\u017eenje na\u010dina da se kazni, okrivi, o\u0161teti i pridobije \u201conaj drugi\u201d. Glasno. Tihi su samo glasovi onih manje vidljivih; 14. marta 2019. UN-ov Specijalni izvjestilac o toksi\u010dnim materijama izjavio je da \u201cod\u0161teta treba biti pla\u0107ena kosovskim Romima koji su zadobili trovanje olovom dok su godinama \u017eivjeli u UN-ovim kampovima u blizini rudnika nakon rata na Kosovu<\/strong>.\u201d Ako ova od\u0161teta uistinu bude pla\u0107ena, to \u0107e mnogo zna\u010diti za pre\u017eivjelu populaciju kosovskih Roma, a i za pravdu na Kosovu. Ako je ova izjava odraz UN-ovog odgovornog stava prema vlastitoj pro\u0161losti, onda su pred nama bolja vremena.<\/em><\/p>

Abdullah B. Ferizi<\/p>

\"\"<\/a><\/p>

Sjeverna Makedonija: Ni ovde ni tamo<\/h2>

\u201c\u017divot za sve\u201d na sjeveru<\/h4>

Nakon savjetodavnog\/neuspjelog referenduma 30. septembra 2018. i dugog procesa pregovora, amnestije i podmi\u0107ivanja, Republika Makedonija postala je Republika Sjeverna Makedonija i otpo\u010dela svoj put ka pristupanju NATO savezu.<\/p>

Koaliciona vlada Sjeverne Makedonije, pod vodstvom Socijaldemokratskog saveza Makedonije (SDSM), koji je izbornu kampanju vodio pod sloganom \u201c\u017eivot za sve\u201d, sa Demokratskom unijom za integraciju (DUI) i polovicom nove albanske stranke BESA, ove protekle godine u\u010dinila je velike iskorake u vanjskim odnosima, ali i ozbiljne propuste u rje\u0161avanju najva\u017enijih doma\u0107ih problema koji jo\u0161 traju.<\/p>

Uz veliki teret nade koja se pola\u017ee u post-re\u017eimsku vladu, veliko razo\u010darenje je mo\u017eda bilo za o\u010dekivati, ali nije pretjerano re\u0107i da je nova vlada na\u010dinila previ\u0161e propusta, previ\u0161e puta je lagala, previ\u0161e puta se la\u017eno izvinjavala, a nije uspjela ostvariti neophodne reforme, da bi od nekih \u010dak i u potpunosti odustala, \u010dime je razo\u010darala ve\u0107inu ljudi koji su \u017eeljeli promjene ili su se aktivirali da ih postignu. To je dovelo do frustracija kod tolikog broja ljudi da je izreka \u201csvi su isti\u201d postala politi\u010dki uvrije\u017eena \u010dak i me\u0111u politi\u010dki osvje\u0161tenijim gra\u0111anima i gra\u0111ankama, umanjuju\u0107i ozbiljnost kriminala i nepravde VMRO-DPMNE re\u017eima i nose\u0107i sa sobom rizik da se VMRO-DPMNE vrati na vlast. Isti onaj VMRO-DPMNE, nereformisan i pun nacionalista i kriminalaca. Istovremeno, druga polovina, ili tre\u0107ina pomenutog re\u017eima, DUI, jo\u0161 uvijek je na vlasti, pretvara se da zemlju gura na njenom evroatlantskom putu, pa ipak koristi svaku priliku da nastavi svoje korumpirane prakse i odr\u017ei etni\u010dke podjele u zemlji.<\/p>

Pored toga, NATO propagandom se normalizira militarizacija na\u0161eg dru\u0161tva koja prodire \u010dak i u \u0161kole kako bi dospjela do najmla\u0111ih. U isto vrijeme, javni zvani\u010dnici, uklju\u010duju\u0107i i premijera i predsjednika vlade, doprinose normalizaciji govora mr\u017enje, iako se nakon njegove upotrebe ogra\u0111uju povr\u0161nim i neiskrenim izvinjenjima.<\/p>

Jedan va\u017ean pozitivan doga\u0111aj bila je Povorka ponosa u Skopju, prva Povorka ponosa u zemlji. Odr\u017eana je 29. juna bez ozbiljnih incidenata i uz zna\u010dajnu, iako povr\u0161nu, podr\u0161ku vlade.<\/p>

Roditelj nacije<\/h4>
  1. aprila 2019. imali smo predsjedni\u010dke izbore, prve izbore nakon propalog\/savjetodavnog referenduma o promjeni imena zemlje. Predstavljali su stvarni izazov za SDSM koji je preuzeo rizik promjene imena iako je njihovo pona\u0161anje na vlasti u najmanju ruku problemati\u010dno.<\/li><\/ol>

    Izbori su nam na izvjestan na\u010din pokazali izgledniji i ta\u010dniji rezultat referenduma, odnosno rezultat kakav bi bio da se opozicija nije opredijelila za bojkot, imaju\u0107i u vidu to da su cijela predizborna kampanja i politi\u010dki diskurs bili fokusirani i zaglavljeni oko pitanja imena i razo\u010darenja novom vladom po mnogim pitanjima. Posebno je u drugom i posljednjem krugu zemlja bila podijeljena gotovo isto kao i za vrijeme referenduma.<\/p>

    Tri kandidata u\u010destvovala su u utrci za polo\u017eaj \u201croditelja\u201d nacije. Stevo Pendarovski iz SDSM-a (koji je pobijedio) vodio je kampanju koja je te\u0161ko prenosila svoje poruke jer se morala osvrtati na sve nedostatke vlade. Druga kandidatkinja bila je Gordana Siljanovska, profesorica koju je nominovao VMRO-DPMNE iako ranije nije bila njihova \u010dlanica, a koja je vodila nacionalisti\u010dku kampanju, tragikomi\u010dnu i punu la\u017ei i iracionalnog populizma tipi\u010dnog za VMRO-DPMNE, ali ne i za nju li\u010dno.\u00a0 Tre\u0107i kandidat bio je Blerim Reka, Albanac i profesor koji je vodio osvje\u017eavaju\u0107e nenacionalisti\u010dku kampanju, ali je imao problema s dosljedno\u0161\u0107u u obra\u0107anju medijima, Makedoncima i \u0161iroj javnosti u odnosu na obra\u0107anja svojim albanskim pristalicama na predizbornim skupovima.<\/p>

    Najsmje\u0161nije je bilo insistiranje kod sve troje kandidata da nisu strana\u010dki kandidati. Siljanovska je nakon izbora za kandidatkinju VMRO-DPMNE na njihovom strana\u010dkom kongresu skupljala potpise od gra\u0111ana (\u010dlanova VMRO) kako bi dokazala da je nestrana\u010dka kandidatkinja. Pendarovski je odgovorio istom mjerom i insistirao da predstavlja nadstrana\u010dkog konsenzualnog kandidata iako ga je izabrao SDSM i ostatak stranaka u vlasti. Blerim Reka je pak insistirao da je on nezavisni kandidat iako je u\u017eivao podr\u0161ku dvije albanske nacionalisti\u010dke stranke iz opozicije koje su aktivno pomagale njegovu kampanju i navodile svoje glasa\u010de da glasaju za njega.<\/p>

    Predizborna kampanja bila je problemati\u010dna i zbog mizoginije i vrlo, vrlo povr\u0161nog feminizma s patrijarhalnim tendencijama. Feminizam Siljanovske, posebno u njenoj predizbornoj retorici, nije bio ni\u0161ta drugo do neiskreno podila\u017eenje, ali istovremeno su pristalice Pendarovskog i Reke \u010desto iznosili mno\u0161tvo seksisti\u010dkih i mizoginih komentara i napada na ra\u010dun njenog spola, roda i godina (64), koje Pendarovski nikad nije po\u0161teno osudio. Mislim da \u0107e zbog Smiljanovskine grozne kampanje i gubitka predsjedni\u010dke utrke politi\u010dke stranke u budu\u0107nosti biti jo\u0161 manje spremne nominovati \u017eene kandidatkinje, \u0161to \u0107e im sad samo biti lak\u0161e opravdati, a poslu\u017eit \u0107e im i kao izgovor za nerje\u0161avanje strana\u010dkih patrijarhalnih struktura koje stavljaju \u017eene u zna\u010dajno nepovoljniji polo\u017eaj.<\/p>

    Nekad izme\u0111u prvog i drugog kruga izbora odigrao se nacionalisti\u010dki incident na tvr\u0111avi u Ohridu. Neko iz jedne albanske folklorne grupe (ne iz zemlje) postavio je ogromnu albansku zastavu na zidine tvr\u0111ave okrenute gradu, \u0161to je dovelo do dosta velikih nacionalisti\u010dkih i anti-nacionalisti\u010dkih reakcija. Doti\u010dni je uhap\u0161en, oglobljen i protjeran iz zemlje, ali s obzirom na to da su se u Ohridu za vrijeme predsjedni\u010dkih izbora odr\u017eavali i lokalni izbori (zbog smrti gradona\u010delnika), ovo je i\u0161lo na ruku samo kandidatu VMRO-DPMNE, koji je, me\u0111utim, na kraju ipak izgubio. Usput budi re\u010deno, jedno od osnovnih pitanja na lokalnim izborima (a pojavljivalo se i u kontekstu predsjedni\u010dke kampanje) ticalo se izgradnje navodno nezakonitog minareta d\u017eamije u Ohridu. Odr\u017eani su \u010dak i protesti koji su se silno trudili uvjeriti sve da se radi o (ne)zakonitosti procedure, a ne o vjerskoj i etni\u010dkoj pripadnosti, u \u010demu su bili komi\u010dno neuspje\u0161ni.<\/p>

    Mje\u0161avina ucjenjivanja i podmi\u0107ivanja<\/h4>

    U proteklih nekoliko mjeseci Makedoniju potresa afera ucjenjivanja\/korupcije u Specijalnom javnom tu\u017eila\u0161tvu (koje je uspostavljeno radi postupanja u predmetima krivi\u010dnih djela proisteklih iz snimaka nezakonitog prislu\u0161kivanja biv\u0161eg premijera Nikole Gruevskog i njegovog ro\u0111aka, biv\u0161eg direktora Uprave za bezbjednost i kontraobavje\u0161tavanje, Sa\u0161e Mijalkova). Nakon po\u010detka rada na preko 150 predmeta s potencijalnom podizanja krivi\u010dnih optu\u017enica, i to zna\u010dajnog broja optu\u017enica, ugled SJT-a upropastila je njegova glavna tu\u017eiteljica Katica Janeva.<\/p>

    Skandal je izbio kada je jedan italijansko-slovena\u010dki desni\u010darski novinar na web stranici italijanskih novina La Verita<\/em> objavio niz video i audio snimaka u kojima, navodno, dvoje ucjenjiva\u010da obe\u0107ava biznismenu Orcetu Kam\u010devu \u2013 jednom od najbogatijih ljudi u zemlji, usko povezanim s prethodnim vlastima i osumnji\u010denim u nekoliko krivi\u010dnih predmeta koje je otvorio SJT \u2013 da \u0107e biti oslobo\u0111en ili da \u0107e mu kazna biti znatno smanjena za krivi\u010dna djela zlo\u010dina\u010dkog udru\u017eivanja, pronevjere, pranja novca i druga srodna djela. Ucjenjiva\u010di su obe\u0107anje zasnivali na svojim bliskim vezama s glavnom tu\u017eiteljicom SJT-a Katicom Janevom.<\/p>

    Janeva je nakon jedva zakonitog bolovanja i nestanka iz javnosti na neko vrijeme, naravno, porekla svoje u\u010de\u0161\u0107e, navode\u0107i da je jedan od ucjenjiva\u010da zloupotrijebio njeno ime. Ali (navodno) se u jednom od audio snimaka \u010duje njen glas kako potvr\u0111uje da \u0107e biti onako kako je dogovoreno s ucjenjiva\u010dem; odnosno govori \u201csve \u0107e biti okej\u201d.<\/p>

    Ovu istragu vodi redovno Javno tu\u017eila\u0161tvo, nakon \u0161to se Kam\u010dev obratio premijeru Zoranu Zaevu koji je prijavio slu\u010daj Javnom tu\u017eila\u0161tvu. To, naravno, nije sprije\u010dilo opoziciju da od Zaeva tra\u017ei ostavku i nove izbore te da ga optu\u017ei da je on taj koji je naru\u010dio ucjenjivanje. Specifi\u010dni razlozi zbog kojih se Kam\u010dev odlu\u010dio obratiti premijeru, a ne Javnom tu\u017eila\u0161tvu (kako je zakonski obavezan) nisu jasni, ali \u010dini se da je htio i njega inkriminirati. Naro\u010dito s obzirom na to da su video snimci iz njegove ku\u0107e dospjeli u ruke desni\u010darskog anti-EU novinara Larisa Gaisera koji je u predsjedni\u0161tvu Paneuropske unije zajedno s biv\u0161im savjetnikom Gruevskog, Andrejem Lepavcovim.<\/p>

    Bez ula\u017eenja u previ\u0161e detalja, dosad je u okviru istrage zna\u010dajan broj tu\u017eilaca iz SJT-a, kao i ljudi iz SDSM-a blisko povezanih s jednim od ucjenjiva\u010da dao izjave Javnom tu\u017eila\u0161tvu, a dvoje ucjenjiva\u010da i Katica Janeva su uhap\u0161eni. Dosad nisu podignute optu\u017enice protiv bilo koga drugog iz SJT-a i SDSM-a.<\/p>

    U svakom slu\u010daju, ovaj skandal je paralizovao Specijalno javno tu\u017eila\u0161tvo i u neku ruku nalikuje organizovanom naporu da se ono rasformi\u0161e i da se obore sve istrage na visokom nivou i podignute optu\u017ebe. Zbog toga je jedina institucija s kredibilitetom i obavezom tra\u017eenja i dono\u0161enja pravde za zlo\u010dine zvani\u010dnika VMRO-DPMNE re\u017eima i njihovih bogatih prijatelja ne samo upropa\u0161tenog ugleda, ve\u0107 joj prijeti i to da njene istrage preuzme redovno Javno tu\u017eila\u0161tvo koje nije u potpunosti reformisano nakon \u0161to je vi\u0161e od 11 godina slu\u017eilo tom re\u017eimu. A javnost je jo\u0161 vi\u0161e obeshrabrena i podijeljena.<\/p>

    Pitanje je da li je Katica Janeva podlegla pohlepi ili je bila toliko naivna da padne u zamku namje\u0161taljke i da li je Orce Kam\u010dev ucjenjivan ili je poku\u0161ao podmititi ljude kako bi izbjegao krivi\u010dnu odgovornost (i jedno i drugo je mogu\u0107e i nije uzajamno isklju\u010divo), ipak, dok je Katica uhap\u0161ena, a SJT se polako rasformi\u0161e, Orce Kam\u010dev je na slobodi i \u017eivi svoj bogata\u0161ki \u017eivot.<\/p>

    Voli partnera svog<\/h4>

    U pro\u0161logodi\u0161njem izvje\u0161taju<\/a>\u00a0pisao sam o tome kako SDSM i DUI nastavljaju tradiciju VMRO-DPMNE i DUI u smislu \u201cDUIng business\u201d u skladu sa zakonom, ali uz ozbiljne sumnje o korupciji. Sad s pouzdanjem mogu re\u0107i da je tradicija uistinu nastavljena i da su u nju uvu\u010deni i drugi koalicioni partneri.\u00a0 DUI je oti\u0161ao i korak dalje, pri \u010demu strana\u010dki zvani\u010dnici bezo\u010dno kr\u0161e zakon, ali bez posljedica.<\/p>

    Ova zemlja ve\u0107 decenijama kuburi s korupcijom \u2013 nije to ni\u0161ta novo. Ali s novom vladom je postojala nova nada da \u0107e kona\u010dno bar oni koji su bili korumpirani prethodnih 11 godina sada biti izvedeni pred lice pravde i da \u0107emo ostvariti napredak na tom planu. Ne mora se posebno isticati da se to nije desilo. Sve je po\u010delo relativno skoro nakon \u0161to su do\u0161li na vlast, a postalo je posebno jasno kada je Fond za inovacije dodijelio velike grantove kompanijama me\u0111u kojima su bile i kompanije zamjenika premijera, milionera Ko\u010de Angju\u0161eva. Nakon \u0161to je izbio skandal, on je umjesto ostavke povukao svoje kompanije i odrekao se grantova. Javno tu\u017eila\u0161tvo otvorilo je krivi\u010dnu istragu, ali do danas, koliko sam ja upoznat, nema informacija o nalazima te istrage.<\/p>

    Strana\u010dki zvani\u010dnici DUI su u protekloj godini proizveli vi\u0161e skandala. Jedan takav skandal korupcije i kra\u0111e pokrenulo je Ministarstvo za socijalne poslove koje je otkrilo da iz penzionog fonda nedostaje nekoliko miliona eura; da je novac predvi\u0111en za drugi penzioni fond nestao. Direktore nadle\u017ene institucije ve\u0107 godinama imenuje DUI, a ovo je malo protreslo koalicione odnose, a zatim ponovo nekako nestalo iz javnosti \u2013 nema vijesti, nema informacija, nema krivi\u010dnih optu\u017enica.<\/p>

    U drugim kriminalnim aferama zvani\u010dnici DUI-a nezakonito grade objekte, fizi\u010dki napadaju ljude, ugovaraju javne radove s vlastitim firmama, zloupotrebljavaju svoje polo\u017eaje, kupuju luksuzno vozilo za potrebe op\u0107ine (na\u010delnika) nakon \u0161to je vlada otplatila ve\u0107inu ogromnog op\u0107inskog duga... \u201cVlasnik\u201d pomenutog vozila, na\u010delnik Struge Ramiz Merko iz DUI-a, pravdao se govore\u0107i kako bi bilo sramotno da se na\u010delnik vozi autom koje nije dovoljno dobro. Mnogo je jo\u0161 primjera, ali nisu svi vezani samo za DUI.<\/p>

    Uzgred, va\u017eno je napomenuti da ovi slu\u010dajevi ukazuju na jo\u0161 jednu tu\u017enu realnost makedonske politike i me\u0111uetni\u010dkih odnosa: \u0161ira javnost, a posebno makedonski nacionalisti, oportunizam i nezakonite radnje zvani\u010dnika DUI-a vide kao albanski pristup politici i kao albanski nacionalizam, ali ne vide da je ovo pona\u0161anje prvenstveno \u0161tetno za Albance izvan DUI-evih politi\u010dkih struktura. To su oni Albanci koji su ostavljeni bez za\u0161tite dr\u017eave na milost i nemilost DUI-a. Na primjer, dva mu\u0161karca koje je napao Nafi Useini, gradski vije\u0107nik Ohrida i \u010dlan DUI-a, obojica su Albanci.<\/p>

    Nedavno je na internetu procurio audio snimak na kojem se \u010duje kako na\u010delnik ve\u0107inski romske op\u0161tine Suto Orizare iz stranke SDSM, Kurto Dudush, tako\u0111er Rom, nekoga vrije\u0111a i tu\u010de. U toku je istraga, ali izgleda da \u0107e i ovaj slu\u010daj nestati kao i oni vezani za DUI. Ovo ho\u0107e re\u0107i da su i romski gra\u0111ani i gra\u0111anke prepu\u0161teni sami sebi i svojim lokalnim siled\u017eijama, dok makedonski nacionalisti pravdaju zlostavljanje kao ne\u0161to kulturolo\u0161ko, a ne problem dr\u017eavne strukture i nebrige.<\/p>

    Zvani\u010dnici SDSM-a sve ovo toleri\u0161u dijelom zato \u0161to su usmjereni na vlastite interese i korupciju, dijelom kako ne bi pogor\u0161ali koalicione odnose i partnerstva, a dijelom zato \u0161to ve\u0107e makedonske stranke smatraju kako ne-makedonska etni\u010dka pitanja trebaju biti prepu\u0161tena tim drugim etni\u010dkim grupama. Bez obzira na posljedice po te zajednice.<\/p>

    U svakom slu\u010daju, Republika Sjeverna Makedonija sa svojom beskrajnom naivnom nadom nastavlja na svom putu ka EU; svakodnevni problemi obi\u010dnih gra\u0111ana i gra\u0111anki jednostavno \u0107e zasad morati pri\u010dekati.<\/p>

    Emrah Rexhepi<\/p>

    \"\"<\/a><\/p>

    \u00a0<\/p>

    Srbija: Ko je slede\u0107i?<\/h2>

    Prvo pitanje kad ujutru otvorim o\u010di, ve\u0107 nekoliko meseci je: \u201cKako \u0107u na posao?\u201c Moj iznajmljeni stan se nalazi u Beogradu, u samom centru grada, kancelarija Centra za nenasilnu akciju, tako\u0111e je u centru. \u0160ta je problem? Problem je \u0161to Beograd, kao grad sa vi\u0161e od dva miliona stanovnika ima veliki centar, i \u0161to se sa jednog do drugog oboda ne sti\u017ee brzo. Poslednjih nekoliko meseci \u2013 ni brzo, ni jednostavno. Svako kretanje kroz u\u017ei centar grada je zatvoreno, promenjeno, izme\u0161teno. Beograd izgleda kao velika gra\u0111evinska parcela, na kojoj je ambiciozni vlasnik sumnjivog novca \u201990-ih po\u010deo da gradi zamak, a onda ga je stigla ruka pravde ili konkurencija u podzemlju, te su radovi zauvek ostavljeni, a naslednicima zave\u0161tane megalomanske \u017eelje i ogromni dugovi. Na kapiji ispred zamka stoje dva gipsana lava. Takva je i estetika Beograda. Megalomanska, ki\u010derajska, jeftina po izgledu, preskupa po utro\u0161enom novcu. I onda, kad nekako, uglavnom pe\u0161ice, stignem na Trg Republike, zbog \u010dije sanacije je ve\u0107 godinu dana zatvoren najpose\u0107eniji deo Beograda \u2013 na primer, kao kada bi godinu dana bio zatvoren Crveni trg u Moskvi, ili Trafalgar skver u Londonu, na tom izrovanom betonu i radovima u stajanju \u2013 ne zati\u010dem nikoga. Ponekad, u nekom \u0107o\u0161ku 2-3 radnika pu\u0161e, ili rade ne\u0161to sitno. Uglavnom, ne de\u0161ava se ni\u0161ta. To ni\u0161ta se napla\u0107uje iz gradskog bud\u017eeta grada, u vrednosti od blizu 8 miliona evra (922 miliona dinara). Gradski prevoz ne funkcioni\u0161e. Ju\u010de sam u\u0161la u autobus, imao je klimu, i mesta za sedenje. Pomislila sam, pa eto, desi se da ne\u0161to i radi u dr\u017eavi u kojoj se sve raspada, mo\u017eda ima neke nade, ne treba biti cinik. Posle dve stanice, autobus je stao. Pokvario se, i svi putnici morali su da nastave put pe\u0161ice. Toliko o nadi.<\/p>

    Za\u0161to ovaj tekst po\u010dinjem za \u0161iru javnost naizgled potpuno neva\u017enom pri\u010dom o svojim jutarnjim brigama? Godinama unazad, pi\u0161em ili \u010ditam ovakve tekstove, i iz godine u godinu, situacija u Srbiji je sve lo\u0161ija, i pogor\u0161ava se u svakom segmentu dru\u0161tva. Te\u0161ko je u relativno kratkom tekstu objasniti \u0161ta je sve gore u odnosu na pro\u0161lu godinu, spisak je jako dug, a ljudski mozak ima tu dobru osobinu da bri\u0161e iz se\u0107anja lo\u0161e stvari. I onda, kad krenem da se prise\u0107am \u0161ta se sve dogodilo, sudaram se sa lavinom fa\u0161izma, neslobode, pritisaka, ucena, ubistava, korupcije, laganja, targetiranja ljudi i poziva na lin\u010d, nasilja nad ljudima koji druga\u010dije misle ili govore, diskriminacija po svim osnovama, siroma\u0161tva, nezaposlenosti, odliva mozgova, odliva radno sposobnih i rada \u017eeljnih ljudi svih stepena obrazovanja\u2026 Razmi\u0161ljam, ako krenem od li\u010dnog, od onog \u0161to nam je zajedni\u010dko, i objasnim koliko je to u Srbiji druga\u010dije nego na drugim mestima, mo\u017eda to mo\u017ee da bude ilustracija? Mo\u017eda se tako lak\u0161e shvati sa kojim se problemima sre\u0107emo i sa \u010dim \u017eivimo svakodnevno.<\/p>

    Tenk<\/h4>

    A \u017eivimo u atmosferi straha, napetosti, pod optu\u017ebama da smo izdajnici, nazivaju nas drugosrbijancima (prvi su oni, nacionalisti, a mi smo \u201edrugi\u201c, \u201eostali\u201c, oni koji nisu \u201emi\u201c, izrodi, \u0161kart neki), i svako iole logi\u010dno pitanje postavljeno bilo kome ko je u vlasti, ili vladaju\u0107oj partiji (mada izme\u0111u ova dva ne postoji razlika, ovde vladaju\u0107a partija jeste vlast, institucije ne postoje, kontrola ne postoji, sve je podre\u0111eno jednoj partiji i jednom \u010doveku) smatra se destabilizacijom dr\u017eave i neprijateljskom aktivno\u0161\u0107u.<\/p>

    Ispred najve\u0107eg (za sada, predsednik je obe\u0107ao izgradnju novog, grandioznog, \u201enacionalnog\u201c) stadiona u zemlji, poznatog kao \u201eMarakana\u201c, na kojem igra FK \u201eCrvena Zvezda\u201c, krajem avgusta, pred utakmicu sa ekipom iz \u0160vajcarske \u201eJang Bojs\u201c, postavljen je tenk. Tenk iz Vukovara. Da li je ba\u0161 taj tenk bio ba\u0161 u Vukovaru, niko sa sigurno\u0161\u0107u ne mo\u017ee da tvrdi, ali taj tenk jeste simbol ratova \u201990. i razaranja Vukovara, koje se u srpskom govoru tih godina i u govoru nacionalista danas naziva i \u201eosloba\u0111anje Vukovara\u201c. Simbol ratova ispred fudbalskog stadiona ne nosi nikakvu drugu poruku, ve\u0107 pretnju. Koliko sutradan, ispred stadiona \u201eDinama\u201c iz Zagreba postavljen je traktor \u2013 simbol akcije \u201eOluja\u201c, etni\u010dkog \u010di\u0161\u0107enja Srba iz Hrvatske, koji su izbegli na traktorima u Srbiju. Ministar policije je izjavio da to \u201enije tenk, ve\u0107 maketa tenka\u201c, i da \u201ene razume one kojima je maketa tenka ispred stadiona simbol devedesetih\u201c.<\/p>

    Nastavio je: \u201eO\u010digledno je da je ovo trebalo da poslu\u017ei kao politi\u010dka igra za neku vrstu napada pre svega na predsednika Aleksandra Vu\u010di\u0107a, jer sada je on kriv i za ovo, jer je kriv za sve \u0161to se desi. To je o\u010digledno politikanstvo jednog dela opozicije koji na\u017ealost nema \u0161ta drugo da poka\u017ee\u201c.<\/p>

    Sve \u0161to se desi u dr\u017eavi je zasluga Vu\u010di\u0107a, a sve \u0161to je pogre\u0161no je podmetanje Vu\u010di\u0107u. Sve se vrti oko njegovog lika i dela, a on u svakom segmentu prekora\u010duje svoja ustavna ovla\u0161\u0107enja, biva i tu\u017eilac, i policija, i predsednik vlade, i ministar, i nezavisna tela, za sve se pita i sve on re\u0161ava. U politi\u010dkom vokabularu to se zove diktatura, no u Srbiji ne postoji snaga koja bi je nazvala pravim imenom i oduprla joj se.<\/p>

    To \u0161to ministar policije naziva \u201epolitikanstvom jednog dela opozicije\u201c zapravo je podela opozicije na \u201edobru\u201c i \u201elo\u0161u\u201c po vladaju\u0107u Srpsku naprednu stranku. Dobra opozicija, ideolo\u0161ki bliska, su Vojislav \u0160e\u0161elj, osu\u0111eni ratni zlo\u010dinac, a sada predsednik parlamentarne stranke i narodni poslanik i njegova Srpska radikalna stranka, ishodi\u0161te Aleksandra Vu\u010di\u0107a i ve\u0107eg dela SNS koji su 2008. iza\u0161li iz nje i osnovali SNS. Njihovi biv\u0161i strana\u010dki partneri su ta \u201edobra\u201c opozicija. Onaj drugi deo, \u201elo\u0161a\u201c opozicija, to su svi ostali na politi\u010dkoj sceni: od krajnjeg desni\u010dara Bo\u0161ka Obradovi\u0107a (Dveri), preko Vuka Jeremi\u0107a (Narodna stranka), centra u kojem su Demokratska stranka i Pokret slobodnih gra\u0111ana, do levo orjentisanih gra\u0111anskih pokreta Ne davimo Beograd i Lokalni front. Ta opozicija je slomljena i slaba, iz dva razloga: prvi je \u0161to je potpuno satanizovana od vladaju\u0107e garniture na \u010delu sa Aleksandrom Vu\u010di\u0107em koji ne propu\u0161ta priliku, ma kako ona bila banalna i nemala nikakve veze sa temom, da popljuje te partije i njihove lidere, dok im je u isto vreme potpuno onemogu\u0107eno pojavljivanje na televizijama sa nacionalnom frekvencijom i naj\u010ditanijim novinama. Drugi razlog je \u0161to tu opoziciju najve\u0107im delom (osim Lokalnog fronta i Ne davimo Beograd) \u010dine ljudi iz prethodne vlasti, koji su zaslu\u017eni \u0161to je ona izgubila na izborima i uvela nas u ko zna koliko dugo razdoblje vladavine presvu\u010denih radikala.<\/p>

    Kako Srbiju ve\u0107 2020. \u010dekaju redovni parlamentarni izbori (naglasi\u0107u da su redovni, jer su prethodni izbori za parlament bivali 2012, 2014. i 2016. godine) nije izvesno da \u0107e se pod ovim izbornim uslovima i u ovako neure\u0111enoj dr\u017eavi desiti bilo kakva promena vlasti. I ako se desi, mogu\u0107e je da \u0107e se praviti \u201eprirodna koalicija\u201c SNS i SRS, umesto dosada\u0161nje saradnje sa SPS-om, partijom koja je verni koalicioni saveznik.<\/p>

    Nada<\/h4>

    Iako izbori kao \u0161ansa za promenu mogu izdaleka da izgledaju kao onaj moj autobus sa po\u010detka teksta \u2013 u ovakvoj postavci mo\u0107i, koja je potpuno u rukama nekolicine ljudi, promene nisu \u010dak ni nada. Eventualno mogu biti ma\u0161tarija.<\/p>

    Nada se pojavila krajem 2018. godine, kada su po\u010deli, najpre u Beogradu, pa potom i \u0161irom Srbije, gra\u0111anski protesti, kao reakcija na brutalno prebijanje opozicionog politi\u010dara Borka Stefanovi\u0107a od strane vlastima bliskih huligana. \u201eStop krvavim ko\u0161uljama\u201c bio je po\u010detni naziv protesta, koje je imao inkluzivni potencijal da prikupi sve ljude koji su protiv nasilja, bez obzira kojoj politi\u010dkoj frakciji pripadali. Iako na po\u010detku neorganizovano, bez jasne vizije i cilja, ovi protesti su svake subote u 18h okupljali sve ve\u0107i broj ljudi. Jedan od najimpozantnijih skupova bio je 16.1.2019. na dan ubistva Olivera Ivanovi\u0107a, politi\u010dara sa Kosova, za koje postoji sumnja da iza zlo\u010dina stoje pojedinci bliski vlasti u Srbiji, koja i pru\u017ea za\u0161titu nekolicini osumnji\u010denih: Zvonku Veselinovi\u0107u i Milanu Radoi\u010di\u0107u. Predvo\u0111eni Lokalnim frontom, udru\u017eenjem gra\u0111ana iz Kraljeva, koji su 12. januara pe\u0161ice krenuli put Beograda i tako prevalili put od 170 kilometara, gra\u0111ani su glasnom \u0107utnjom pitali:\u201cKo je ubio Ivanovi\u0107a?\u201c<\/p>

    Odmah sutradan, i Vu\u010di\u0107 je organizovao svoj skup \u2013 iskoristiv\u0161i posetu predsednika Rusije Vladimira Putina, upotrebiv\u0161i sve dr\u017eavne privilegije, po\u010dasti i institucije, taj do\u010dek bio je zapravo po\u010detak kampanje \u201eBudu\u0107nost Srbije\u201c u kojoj je megalomanskim skupovima, skupim spotovima i svim dr\u017eavnim povlasticama vladaju\u0107e stranka predstavila kako vidi Srbiju \u2013 nekada. Nikada zapravo nije postalo jasno za\u0161to se ta kampanja odvijala u zimu i prole\u0107e, osim ako je bila odgovor na opozicione skupove. Sa jedne strane je vlast autobusima prevozila svoje stvarne i prisiljene simpatizere (prisiljene i ucenjene radnim mestom, u Srbiji je na snazi zakon o zabrani zapo\u0161ljavanja u dr\u017eavnim institucijama, te niko od 2014. do danas ne mo\u017ee da zasnuje radni odnos na neodre\u0111eno vreme, a zaposlenima na odre\u0111eno je lako manipulisati, pretiti im i ucenjivati ih) iz grada u grad, pod skupom scenografijom i populisti\u010dkim govorima, dok su se, sa druge strane, u brojnim gradovima, svakog petka ili subote okupljali gra\u0111ani koji nisu pristalice ove vlasti. Dobrovoljno, po snegu, zimi, bez ozvu\u010denja i naj\u010de\u0161\u0107e \u2013 u spontanoj organizaciji.<\/p>

    U prole\u0107e je, posle poku\u0161aja opozicije da u\u0111e u Radio televiziju Srbije, kao znak protesta \u0161to javni servis ne izve\u0161tava o opoziciji, i posle skupa 13. aprila, na koji su pozvani i gra\u0111ani iz drugih gradova, i taj vid pobune polako po\u010deo da se smanjuje. Jo\u0161 uvek svake subote uve\u010de gra\u0111ani se okupljaju u Beogradu i Kragujevcu.<\/p>

    Meta<\/h4>

    Problem neslobode medija je mo\u017eda i najve\u0107i problem: zbog toga gra\u0111ani kojima nisu dostupne online informacije ili jedina nevu\u010di\u0107evska kablovska televizija \u2013 N1, ne mogu da saznaju da li je ministar policije kupio la\u017ene diplome i osnovnih i doktorskih studija, da li je funkcioner SNS i direktor Koridora Srbije upravljao autom koji je neprilago\u0111enom brzinom na naplatnoj rampi udario u auto koji je bio u redu ispred i usmrtio jednu \u017eenu, kako je mogu\u0107e da je sin medijskog tajkuna i vlasnika najgledanije televizije u Srbiji \u017deljka Mitrovi\u0107a osu\u0111en na godinu dana ku\u0107nog pritvora po\u0161to je na pe\u0161a\u010dkom prelazu vozilom usmrtio devojku, pa pobegao sa lica mesta, ko, kako i \u010dijim parama organizuje ljude da brane (daju podr\u0161ku i pravnu pomo\u0107) predsednika op\u0161tine Brus koji je svojoj sekretarici poslao 15.000 (nije gre\u0161ka u nulama, sve su na broju \u2013 15.000) sms poruka kojima ju je seksualno uznemiravao, ko je i za\u0161to postavio tenk ispred stadiona, ali va\u017enije: ko \u0107e da ga skloni, ko i kako gradi mini-hidroelektrane i uni\u0161tava reke Srbije, za\u0161to je pose\u010deno gotovo svo drve\u0107e u centru Beograda, i kada \u0107e ovaj grad normalno da funkcioni\u0161e\u2026 Za svako od ovih pitanja, ako ih glasno postavite, bi\u0107ete optu\u017eeni da ste neprijatelj dr\u017eave. Drugosrbijanac. Auto\u0161ovinista. Mete na \u010delu nosimo svi koji o tome, makar i samo na svojim nalozima na dru\u0161tvenim mre\u017eama pi\u0161emo. I svi do\u017eivljavamo pretnje od bot tima SNS, koji \u010dine zaposleni u javnim preduze\u0107ima, i koji u radno vreme progone protivnike ove vlasti i pi\u0161u o njenim veli\u010danstvenim uspesima. (Bot je po definiciji robot koji imitira ljudsko bi\u0107e, Vu\u010di\u0107 je okrenuo i tu igricu \u2013 on je od ljudi napravio robote. A roboti, pa ni ovi pla\u0107eni, ljudskog oblika, nemaju minimum ose\u0107anja ili empatije, pa crtaju mete, targetiraju, prete\u2026)<\/p>

    Podseti\u0107u vas, o tome da je meta, pri\u010dao je Oliver Ivanovi\u0107 u tekstu o kontekstu Kosova za 2017 . godinu<\/a>. U vreme kada je na\u0161 izve\u0161taj bio od\u0161tampan, Ivanovi\u0107 je ve\u0107 bio ubijen. Kako o njegovom ubistvu i naru\u010diocima ne znamo ni\u0161ta, mo\u017eemo samo da se pitamo: ko je slede\u0107i?<\/p>

    Katarina Mili\u0107evi\u0107<\/p>

    \"\"<\/a><\/p>

    [1]<\/a> Navedeni podaci rezultat su istra\u017eivanja \u201eSuvremeno iseljavanje Hrvata u Njema\u010dku: karakteristike i motivi\u201c; Migracije i etni\u010dke teme, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2017. Istra\u017eivanje je dostupno OVDE<\/a><\/p>","_et_gb_content_width":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[553,79],"tags":[285,138,2323,380,2596,147,2008,1847],"class_list":["post-226107","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-contexts","category-blog-en","tag-bosnia-and-herzegovina","tag-croatia","tag-kosovo-eng","tag-montenegro","tag-north-macedonia","tag-serbia","tag-socio-political-context","tag-working-context"],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/226107","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=226107"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/226107\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":236454,"href":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/226107\/revisions\/236454"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/226140"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=226107"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=226107"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=226107"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}

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