{"id":6709,"date":"2008-10-01T10:47:22","date_gmt":"2008-10-01T08:47:22","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/wp.nenasilje.net\/?p=6709"},"modified":"2020-12-03T14:15:34","modified_gmt":"2020-12-03T13:15:34","slug":"dealing-with-the-past-in-the-context-of-ethnonationalism","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/en\/dealing-with-the-past-in-the-context-of-ethnonationalism\/","title":{"rendered":"Dealing with the Past in the Context of Ethnonationalism"},"content":{"rendered":"

 <\/p>\n

Dealing with the Past in the Context of Ethnonationalism. The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia\u00a0by Ivana Franovi\u0107. Berghof Occasional Paper No. 29, October 2008. (jezik: engleski)
\nDealing with the Past<\/strong>
\nin the Context of Ethnonationalism<\/strong><\/p>\n

The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

Author:<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

Ivana Franovi\u0107 is a peace\u00a0 activist from Belgrade. For the last decade she has been a team member of the Centre for Nonviolent Action, which has offices in Sarajevo and Belgrade. She is active in the field of peacebuilding, dealing with the past and nonviolent conflict transformation on the grass-root and middle levels of society in the region of former Yugoslavia. She holds an MA degree in Peace and Reconciliation Studies from Coventry University (UK). She has previously published
\nI cannot feel well if my neighbour\u00a0 does not (co-edited with Helena Rill, 2005) and contributes a chapter to Howard Clark, ed., forthcoming. Unarmed Resistance and Global Solidarity. London: Pluto Press, 2009.<\/p>\n

Berghof Occasional Paper Nr. 29
\nOctober 2008
\n\u00a9 Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management<\/p>\n

Copies can be ordered from:
\nBerghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management
\nAltensteinstra\u00dfe 48a
\n14195 Berlin
\nGermany<\/p>\n

Via Internet:
\nhttp:\/\/www.berghof-center.org\/<\/p>\n

ISSN 1432-4016
\nISBN 978-3-927783-92-8<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Preface<\/strong><\/p>\n

More than\u00a0 fifteen\u00a0 years\u00a0 ago\u00a0 the\u00a0 state\u00a0 of Yugoslavia broke\u00a0 apart\u00a0 and\u00a0 a cycle of organised violence,\u00a0 expulsions\u00a0\u00a0 and\u00a0 atrocities\u00a0\u00a0 started. Although\u00a0 different\u00a0 areas\u00a0\u00a0 were affected by different degrees of destruction \u2013 Bosnia-Herzegovina\u00a0 was exposed\u00a0 to a long and\u00a0 cruel\u00a0 war,\u00a0 which\u00a0 in\u00a0 other\u00a0 countries\u00a0\u00a0 (like\u00a0 Macedonia)\u00a0\u00a0 could\u00a0 be\u00a0 stopped in\u00a0 its beginnings \u2013 the entire region still suffers from the consequences and has\u00a0 to deal\u00a0 with the legacies of violence and human rights violations. Due to the presence of international organisations, engagement of civil society organisations and\u00a0 local initiatives\u00a0 the region has\u00a0 not suffered\u00a0 a relapse\u00a0 into war. But to say that\u00a0 a lasting\u00a0 peace\u00a0 has\u00a0 been\u00a0 achieved\u00a0 would be a euphemism. Societies\u00a0 in the\u00a0 region of former Yugoslavia still have\u00a0 to cope with numerous traumas. They have to follow through\u00a0 on the prosecution of war crimes, enhance social healing processes, and establish functioning mechanisms that guarantee the\u00a0 rights\u00a0 of minorities,\u00a0 co-existence, and\u00a0 participation of all\u00a0 citizens\u00a0 in\u00a0 democratic\u00a0 institutions.
\nIn all\u00a0 countries\u00a0\u00a0 of\u00a0 former\u00a0 Yugoslavia,\u00a0 civil society\u00a0 organisations\u00a0 have\u00a0 set\u00a0 up initiatives\u00a0 for\u00a0 fact-finding,\u00a0 awareness raising\u00a0 for\u00a0 the\u00a0 past,\u00a0\u00a0 reconciliation\u00a0\u00a0 and\u00a0 peace education.\u00a0 The Centre\u00a0 for\u00a0 Nonviolent\u00a0 Action
\n(CNA) has\u00a0\u00a0 been\u00a0\u00a0 actively\u00a0 involved\u00a0 in transnational peace\u00a0\u00a0 work since\u00a0 1997.\u00a0 CNA\u00a0 started out\u00a0 as\u00a0 a\u00a0 training\u00a0 organisation\u00a0 in Sarajevo. Since 2001, it has established a second office in Belgrade. It has contributed to creating\u00a0 an impressive\u00a0 cross-border network of experts\u00a0 from the\u00a0 education sector,\u00a0 the media\u00a0 and\u00a0 the\u00a0 NGO community\u00a0 from Bosnia,\u00a0 Croatia, Macedonia,\u00a0 Montenegro,\u00a0 Serbia and Kosovo.
\nCNA\u00a0 has\u00a0 helped\u00a0\u00a0 to\u00a0 transfer\u00a0 the\u00a0 concept\u00a0\u00a0 of\u00a0 nonviolence\u00a0 (\u201cnenasilje\u201d) into\u00a0 the regional context and spread it widely throughout the Balkans.\u00a0 In addition,\u00a0 the team has increasingly focused\u00a0 on activities\u00a0 that\u00a0 encourage people\u00a0 to actively face the\u00a0 past.\u00a0 The team has organised workshops\u00a0 and public discussion forums in which war veterans\u00a0 from different sides spoke about their personal\u00a0 experiences\u00a0 during the war. Beyond the public forums,\u00a0 all of CNA\u2019s educational\u00a0 materials\u00a0 \u2013 from books\u00a0 on reconciliation\u00a0 to recently published film documentaries \u2013 aim to motivate\u00a0 people\u00a0 to reflect critically on their role and their personal responsibility before, during and after the wars.
\nCNA\u2019s regional\u00a0 crossborder\u00a0 approach\u00a0 is\u00a0 quite\u00a0 unique.\u00a0\u00a0 So\u00a0 is\u00a0 its\u00a0 capacity\u00a0 and willingness\u00a0 to constantly\u00a0 revise\u00a0 and\u00a0 question their own work by undergoing\u00a0 individual and\u00a0 collective\u00a0 processes\u00a0 of\u00a0 self-reflection.\u00a0 One\u00a0 result\u00a0\u00a0 of\u00a0 such\u00a0\u00a0 a\u00a0 process\u00a0\u00a0 is\u00a0 Ivana Franovic\u2019s\u00a0\u00a0 text\u00a0 on\u00a0\u00a0 \u201cPeacebuliding\u00a0 and\u00a0\u00a0 Dealing\u00a0 with\u00a0 the\u00a0\u00a0 Past\u00a0\u00a0 in\u00a0 the\u00a0\u00a0 Context\u00a0 of Ethnonationalism\u201d.\u00a0 Ivana, who joined\u00a0 the\u00a0 team\u00a0 in 1999, lives and\u00a0 works with CNA in Belgrade. This text is based on a thesis\u00a0 that was presented at the Department\u00a0 of Peace
\nStudies\u00a0 at\u00a0 Coventry University, where\u00a0 she\u00a0 received\u00a0 her\u00a0 Master\u2019s\u00a0 degree\u00a0 in 2007.\u00a0 The thesis\u00a0 presents a range of efforts being undertaken by civil society groups in the region, highlighting the\u00a0 absence of initiatives\u00a0 on the\u00a0 part\u00a0 of the\u00a0 government(s)\u00a0 and\u00a0 the\u00a0 wider public sphere(s). It concludes with an appeal\u00a0 to form broader\u00a0 alliances,\u00a0 and to also seek partners beyond those\u00a0 groups\u00a0 already working in this field. This implies,\u00a0 however, that two\u00a0 frequently\u00a0 observed\u00a0\u00a0 tendencies among\u00a0 NGOs \u2013\u00a0 both\u00a0 the\u00a0 mutual\u00a0 suspicion with which\u00a0 they\u00a0 regard\u00a0 each\u00a0 other,\u00a0 and\u00a0 the\u00a0 widespread prejudice\u00a0 that\u00a0 all\u00a0 politicians\u00a0 are incurable\u00a0 ethnonationalists \u2013\u00a0 must first be\u00a0 overcome.\u00a0 Another\u00a0 problem\u00a0 that\u00a0 all civil society\u00a0 inititiatives\u00a0\u00a0 face\u00a0 is\u00a0 that\u00a0\u00a0 their\u00a0 activities\u00a0\u00a0 \u2013\u00a0 carried\u00a0 out\u00a0 with\u00a0 a\u00a0 high\u00a0 level\u00a0 of engagement \u2013 are not in the spotlight of the media.
\nWe have\u00a0 decided to publish\u00a0 the\u00a0 study\u00a0 as\u00a0 it gives a comprehensive overview of dilemmas\u00a0\u00a0 faced\u00a0 by practitioners in\u00a0 peacebuilding\u00a0 after\u00a0 violent\u00a0 conflict.\u00a0 Moreover, it raises\u00a0 questions which overlap\u00a0 with an issue\u00a0 area\u00a0 (the relevance\u00a0 of \u201cdealing\u00a0 with the past\u201d\u00a0 for\u00a0\u00a0 conflict\u00a0\u00a0 transformation)\u00a0 that\u00a0\u00a0 the\u00a0\u00a0 Berghof\u00a0 Research\u00a0\u00a0 Center\u00a0 has\u00a0\u00a0 recently established and intends\u00a0 to broaden by action research\u00a0 projects in the near future.<\/p>\n

Berlin, October 2008<\/p>\n

Martina Fischer<\/strong><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

1\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Introduction1<\/strong><\/p>\n

There are many theories\u00a0 and narratives about the reasons for the break-up of Yugoslavia, the\u00a0 war\u00a0 that\u00a0 accompanied it\u00a0 and\u00a0 the\u00a0 guilt\u00a0 and\u00a0 responsibility\u00a0\u00a0 for the\u00a0 slaughter\u00a0\u00a0 that happened. As Sabrina P. Ramet states, we all \u201cknow\u201d why the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) disintegrated and why the war(s) (1991-1995) broke out:
\nIt\u00a0 was\u00a0 all\u00a0 because\u00a0 of\u00a0 Milosevic\/\u00a0\u00a0 Tudjman\/ “the\u00a0\u00a0 Slovenes”\/\u00a0\u00a0 communists\/ organized\u00a0\u00a0 crime\/\u00a0\u00a0 Western\u00a0\u00a0 states\/\u00a0 the\u00a0\u00a0 Vatican-Comintern\u00a0 conspiracy,\u00a0\u00a0 who planned it all by himself\/\u00a0 themselves in order to advance\u00a0 his own personal\/ Serbian\/ Slovenian\/ American\/\u00a0 Vatican interests\u2014your\u00a0 choice.\u00a0 Or again\u2014it all happened because\u00a0 of\u00a0 local\u00a0 bad\u00a0 traditions\/\u00a0 economic\u00a0 problems\/ structural issues\/ system\u00a0 illegitimacy\/\u00a0 legitimate\u00a0 grievances\/ illegitimate grievances\/ the long shadow\u00a0 of the past.\u00a0 Or again\u2014it really started in 1389\/\u00a0 1463\/ 1878\/ 1918\/1941\/ 1986\/\u00a0 1987\/\u00a0 1989\/\u00a0 1990\/\u00a0 1991\u2014your pick. Of course,\u00a0 we all know that both\u00a0 the\u00a0 break-up\u00a0 and\u00a0 the\u00a0 war were completely\u00a0 avoidable\/ inevitable,\u00a0 don\u2019t we? And best of all, we all know that the real villain(s) in this drama can only be Milosevic\/\u00a0 Tudjman\/ “the Serbs”\/ “the Slovenes”\/ “the Croats”\/ “the Muslims”\/ Germany\/\u00a0 Balkan\u00a0 peoples\u00a0 generally\/\u00a0\u00a0 the\u00a0 Great\u00a0 Powers,\u00a0 who\u00a0 must\u00a0 be\u00a0 held (exclusively\/ jointly) responsible for most of the killing, though some of us also know that all parties\u00a0 were equally guilty. Well, maybe we all know what caused
\nthe Yugoslav troubles,\u00a0 but it seems that we “know” different things.2<\/p>\n

This is an authentic summary of how different the things we \u201cknow\u201d are. Narratives vary throughout the\u00a0 region.\u00a0 Some\u00a0 people\u00a0 might argue\u00a0 that\u00a0 we do not suffer from a lack of truth,\u00a0 but\u00a0 from the\u00a0 existence\u00a0 of too\u00a0 many\u00a0 \u2018truths\u2019\u00a0 and\u00a0 a lack of consistent efforts\u00a0 to debate them openly, to face and integrate\u00a0 them.3\u00a0\u00a0 There is almost no shared truth, and for many people\u00a0 it is still hard\u00a0 to accept\u00a0 that\u00a0 different\u00a0 people\u00a0 perceive\u00a0 different\u00a0 things\u00a0 as
\ntruths\u00a0 due\u00a0 to different\u00a0 experiences. Only our \u2018truth\u2019 is accepted as\u00a0 the truth, while the
\n(1\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0The first version of this paper was my dissertation for the degree\u00a0 of M.A. in Peace and Reconciliation Studies\u00a0\u00a0 at\u00a0 Coventry University, Coventry, UK. I\u00a0 am\u00a0 thankful\u00a0 to\u00a0 Dr Andrew\u00a0 Rigby,\u00a0 my supervisor,\u00a0 for his questions and comments. I am also thankful\u00a0 to Dr Martina Fischer and Beatrix Schmelzle\u00a0 from the Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management for crucial feedback, for encouragement to revise the paper and deepen it, and for all their effort and support.\u00a0 Special thanks\u00a0 go to my colleagues and friends from the Centre for Nonviolent Action (CNA) for all these years of immense\u00a0 support\u00a0 and learning from each other. This present paper\u00a0 is mainly based on peace\u00a0 activist experiences that I gained\u00a0 during the last decade with my CNA team.
\n2 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Sabrina\u00a0 P. Ramet, \u201cExplaining the Yugoslav meltdown,\u00a0 1. \u2018for a charm of pow’rful trouble, like a hell- broth boil and bubble\u2019: theories\u00a0 about the roots of the Yugoslav troubles,\u201d\u00a0 in Nationalities Papers 32 (2004):
\n731.
\n3 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Edin\u00a0 Hod\u017ei\u0107,\u00a0 \u201cKomisija\u00a0 za\u00a0 istinu\u00a0 i\u00a0 pomirenje:\u00a0\u00a0 Forum\u00a0 protiv\u00a0 mitova\u201d\u00a0 [Truth and\u00a0 Reconciliation Commission:\u00a0\u00a0 The\u00a0 Forum\u00a0 Against\u00a0\u00a0 the\u00a0\u00a0 Myths],\u00a0 Puls\u00a0\u00a0 demokratije,\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 September\u00a0\u00a0 1,\u00a0 2006,\u00a0\u00a0 available\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 at www.pulsdemokratije.net (accessed September 3, 2008).)<\/p>\n

\u2018truths\u2019 of others\u00a0 are perceived\u00a0 as\u00a0 manipulation and\u00a0 propaganda. And in many cases, \u2018our truth\u2019 is that we are the victims, while the others are perpetrators.
\nThe countries\u00a0 of former Yugoslavia still suffer from the legacy of the 1990s war(s). This legacy seriously affects the present and endangers the future of societies in Bosnia- Herzegovina, Serbia\u00a0 and\u00a0 Croatia. In 2007, on the twelfth anniversary\u00a0 of the genocide\u00a0 in Srebrenica,\u00a0\u00a0 the\u00a0 radical nationalist magazine\u00a0\u00a0 Pravda [Justice] in\u00a0 Serbia\u00a0 published an article\u00a0 by a notorious\u00a0 nationalist where\u00a0 he\u00a0 stated: \u201cIt is exactly twelve years\u00a0 since\u00a0 in Srebrenica nothing has happened.\u201d He then continued\u00a0 to claim that it was \u201cwarmongers\u201d who turned \u201cSrebrenica\u2019s nothing\u201d into \u201csomething huge and horrible\u201d.4
\nIf\u00a0 a\u00a0 paper\u00a0\u00a0 in\u00a0 Germany\u00a0 published\u00a0 a\u00a0 text\u00a0 where\u00a0 Auschwitz\u00a0 was\u00a0 denied,\u00a0\u00a0 those responsible for such an act would feel the consequences. But in Serbia so far, past\u00a0 war crimes\u00a0 and\u00a0 atrocities\u00a0 can still be denied,\u00a0 which is often justified\u00a0 by recourse\u00a0 to a so- called \u2018freedom of speech\u2019.\u00a0 At the same time, peace\u00a0 and human rights groups who speak\u00a0 out about\u00a0 responsibility for crimes cannot\u00a0 make use of such \u2018freedom\u2019. For example, just a few days\u00a0 after the\u00a0 above\u00a0 mentioned newspaper article was published, a peace\u00a0 and human\u00a0 rights activist in Serbia, Maja Stojanovi\u0107, was sentenced to ten days in prison for displaying\u00a0 posters in an\u00a0 \u201cunauthorised\u00a0 place.\u201d5\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The posters contained an\u00a0 appeal to Serbian\u00a0 authorities to arrest\u00a0 the\u00a0 fugitive war criminal Ratko Mladi\u0107 and\u00a0 transfer\u00a0 him to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.6\u00a0 He was the Chief of Staff of the\u00a0 Army of Republika\u00a0 Srpska,\u00a0 and\u00a0 is,\u00a0 besides\u00a0 other\u00a0 misdeeds, connected with the massacre\u00a0 of\u00a0 more\u00a0 than\u00a0\u00a0 8,000\u00a0\u00a0 Muslim\u00a0 men\u00a0 and\u00a0\u00a0 boys\u00a0 in\u00a0 Srebrenica\u00a0\u00a0 in\u00a0 July 1995. Stojanovi\u0107 stated to journalists\u00a0 that the judge told her that his house\u00a0 in Kosovo had been burnt by those\u00a0 same Muslims, and that they deserved everything that happened to them. Attacks\u00a0 on\u00a0 and\u00a0\u00a0 defamation\u00a0 of\u00a0 human\u00a0\u00a0 rights\u00a0 activists\u00a0\u00a0 and\u00a0 journalists\u00a0\u00a0 are\u00a0 frequent occurrences in Serbia.\u00a0 The situation is not\u00a0 different\u00a0 in Republika\u00a0 Srpska,\u00a0 where\u00a0 it is almost impossible to hear\u00a0 different\u00a0 voices,\u00a0 and\u00a0 those\u00a0 who are trying to raise\u00a0 them\u00a0 are under strong pressure.
\nA narrative\u00a0 that\u00a0 can frequently be heard\u00a0 in Sarajevo\u00a0 says\u00a0 that\u00a0 it is a multicultural
\ncity, as Bosniaks are the most tolerant, although they are the main victims of the war. But<\/p>\n

(4 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Miroslav Toholj, Pravda, 17 July 2007.
\n5 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Maja Stojanovi\u0107 displayed the posters\u00a0 in an unauthorised place, indeed, although\u00a0 she put them over posters that were already displayed there by others, also without authorisation, but no one was sentenced because of them. Maja refused to pay a fine imposed on her, thus she was sentenced to prison. After a number of appeals sent to Serbian authorities, the President of Serbia expressed his support\u00a0 and she was not imprisoned. But the fine had to be paid, so NGO activists collected the amount needed (see B92, July 23,
\n2007). Further information available at www.b92.net\/info\/vesti\/index.php?yyyy=2007&mm=07&dd=23&nav_id=256478&nav_category=11 (accessed August 25, 2008).
\n6 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established in 1993 in The Hague. Ratko Mladi\u0107 is indicted\u00a0 on charges\u00a0 of genocide,\u00a0 war crimes and crimes against\u00a0 humanity\u00a0 by ICTY. Further information available at www.un.org\/icty\/cases-e\/index-e.htm (accessed August 25, 2008).)<\/p>\n

reality often turns out to be different. One of the events that run counter to this narrative is what happened at the\u00a0 \u201cKids\u2019 Festival\u201d. It has\u00a0 been\u00a0 organised every year in Sarajevo since\u00a0\u00a0 2004,\u00a0\u00a0 and\u00a0\u00a0 gathers\u00a0\u00a0 children\u00a0\u00a0 from\u00a0 Bosnia-Herzegovina\u00a0\u00a0 from\u00a0 different\u00a0\u00a0 \u2018ethnic communities\u2019.\u00a0 During the festival, they are engaged\u00a0 in different programmes. The idea is a good\u00a0 one,\u00a0 as\u00a0 those\u00a0 kids\u00a0 usually\u00a0 do\u00a0 not\u00a0 have\u00a0 a chance\u00a0 to meet\u00a0 each\u00a0 other.\u00a0 At\u00a0 the opening\u00a0 of one of the\u00a0 programmes this year, the\u00a0 master\u00a0 of ceremonies was recounting the towns where the kids came from, and each name was accompanied by applause from the\u00a0 audience. When\u00a0 it\u00a0 was\u00a0 the\u00a0 turn\u00a0 of the\u00a0 towns\u00a0 in\u00a0 Republika\u00a0 Srpska,\u00a0 kids\u00a0 in\u00a0 the audience were shouting\u00a0 \u201cboo\u201d. Obviously, kids from those\u00a0 places\u00a0 were very scared.7\u00a0 It is worrying how the childhoods of all those kids are afflicted with a post-war atmosphere.
\nThe situation in Croatia is no more rosy. Croatia keeps\u00a0 on celebrating anniversaries of the military action \u201cOluja\u201d [Storm] carried out in 1995, still denying the war crimes that accompanied\u00a0 it.\u00a0 At that\u00a0 time\u00a0 between\u00a0\u00a0 150,000\u00a0 and\u00a0 200,000 ethnic\u00a0 Serbs\u00a0 fled\u00a0 from Croatia, but the mainstream narrative says that it was their choice to do so.
\nAll this is a legacy of war. And something\u00a0 needs to be done about\u00a0 it. This text will explore\u00a0 what\u00a0 can\u00a0 and\u00a0 should\u00a0 be\u00a0 done\u00a0 in the\u00a0 former Yugoslav region,\u00a0 so\u00a0 that\u00a0 these societies develop constructive\u00a0 ways to deal with the past and take a path towards lasting peace.\u00a0 I\u00a0\u00a0 will\u00a0 argue\u00a0\u00a0 that\u00a0\u00a0 constructive\u00a0\u00a0 dealing\u00a0\u00a0 with\u00a0 the\u00a0\u00a0 past\u00a0\u00a0 is\u00a0 an\u00a0\u00a0 indispensable prerequisite for accompanying peacebuilding processes.
\nMy interest\u00a0 in this topic is not purely academic. It is also driven by very personal experiences and\u00a0 the\u00a0 need\u00a0 to reflect on them.\u00a0 The disintegration of former Yugoslavia, which was accompanied by bloody wars, meant that my home country fell apart. The fact that one federal state\u00a0 disintegrated is not even such a big deal \u2013 what is horrifying is how it was done,\u00a0 what we were able to do to each\u00a0 other, how we treated\u00a0 and still treat each other. In contrast\u00a0 to many of my friends, relatives and millions of other people,\u00a0 I had that kind of luck to live in Belgrade where I was born.\u00a0 So I was a few hundreds kilometres\u00a0 away from any of the\u00a0 front-lines,\u00a0 and\u00a0 I\u00a0 did not experience the\u00a0 war directly.8\u00a0\u00a0 However, since the war was not happening \u201conly at the front, but everywhere and to us all,\u201d9\u00a0 I did experience it on many levels:\u00a0 through\u00a0 friends,\u00a0 relatives\u00a0 and\u00a0 other\u00a0 people\u00a0 close\u00a0 to me throughout the\u00a0 region; through\u00a0 war propaganda and horrifying news; through\u00a0 lost\u00a0 and destroyed lives; through the fact that war was going on and the helpless feeling that we cannot\u00a0 do anything to stop it; through the poverty that a war brings along as it is terribly costly and ordinary citizens have to pay for it; through scary drunk men in camouflaged uniforms who came to spend a weekend\u00a0 away from the front-line (despite the narrative<\/p>\n

(7\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Dani, 15 June 2007.
\n8 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0With the exception of NATO’s \u2018humanitarian bombs\u2019 in 1999.
\n9 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Slavenka Drakuli\u0107, The Balkan Express. Fragments from the Other Side of War (New York: W. W. Norton
\n& Company, 1993), 3.)<\/p>\n

that Serbia was not at war); through hiding close friends from mobilization;\u00a0 through raids where policemen,\u00a0 like dog-catchers, were hunting\u00a0 young men, refugees\u00a0 from Croatia or Bosnia, to send them back to the front-lines; through sending\u00a0 food parcels\u00a0 to relatives in crisis areas,\u00a0 even if we did not have enough\u00a0 for ourselves. And last but not least,\u00a0 I have experienced war through\u00a0 the very fact that\u00a0 I am from Belgrade,\u00a0 where most\u00a0 of the war- creators were safely situated \u2013 a marker that goes with me wherever I go.
\nThis paper\u00a0 will focus on the potentials and obstacles for peacebuilding processes in\u00a0 the\u00a0 triangle\u00a0\u00a0 Serbia\u00a0\u00a0 \u2013\u00a0 Bosnia-Herzegovina\u00a0\u00a0 \u2013\u00a0 Croatia.\u00a0 People\u00a0\u00a0 face\u00a0 very\u00a0 different situations in these\u00a0 three\u00a0 countries.\u00a0 But at the\u00a0 same\u00a0 time, these\u00a0 situations are related, affecting each other. And to avoid any misunderstanding, when the paper refers to \u2018us\u2019, it refers to people in the region of the former Yugoslavia, no matter what their ethnic prefix is. First, the paper will give a brief overview of the issue that needs to be faced foremost: the suffering that human beings endured during the war (chapter\u00a0 2). This second chapter\u00a0 will address the role of ethnonationalism in our tragedy. I will argue that for analysing the causes of war we should\u00a0 not look at \u2018ancient\u00a0 hatreds\u2019 between\u00a0 the\u00a0 tribes\u00a0 or at ethnic differences.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 We\u00a0 should\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 look\u00a0\u00a0 at\u00a0\u00a0 the\u00a0\u00a0 essence\u00a0 of\u00a0\u00a0 patriarchy\u00a0\u00a0 (not\u00a0\u00a0 forgetting\u00a0\u00a0 that ethnonationalism is one of the incarnations of patriarchy): namely power over others,\u00a0 no matter who they are and which group they belong to. I remain convinced that as long as we are dedicated to ethnonationalism, our chances for building lasting peace are low.10
\nThe\u00a0 third\u00a0\u00a0 chapter\u00a0\u00a0 focuses\u00a0\u00a0 on\u00a0 reconciliation\u00a0\u00a0 and\u00a0\u00a0 peacebuilding.\u00a0 It\u00a0 explores\u00a0\u00a0 what reconciliation\u00a0 could mean\u00a0 in our context, and\u00a0 it looks at concepts for \u201cdealing\u00a0 with the past\u201d in\u00a0 a\u00a0 constructive\u00a0 way. The fourth chapter\u00a0 gives an\u00a0 overview of mechanisms for transitional justice and dealing\u00a0 with the past\u00a0 applied\u00a0 in the region of former Yugoslavia and\u00a0 outlines\u00a0 what\u00a0 should\u00a0 be\u00a0 done\u00a0 in addition\u00a0 to these,\u00a0 in order\u00a0 to establish lasting peace. The fifth and\u00a0 final chapter\u00a0 identifies\u00a0 actors\u00a0 whose\u00a0 duty is and\/or should\u00a0 be\u00a0 to
\ntake an active role in peacebuilding processes.<\/p>\n

(10\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Due to the scope\u00a0 and thematic\u00a0 focus of this paper,\u00a0 I will not be able to discuss or even give a short overview of the overwhelming research\u00a0 work done by feminist and gender-oriented scholars\u00a0 and activists\u00a0 in the region of former Yugoslavia who during the last two decades have been\u00a0 disclosing\u00a0 the relation between\u00a0 patriarchal\u00a0 hegemony\u00a0 and (ethno)nationalism. The critique of patriarchy that underlies\u00a0 my thesis\u00a0 will not be the subject\u00a0 of theoretical\u00a0 examination. It rather reflects\u00a0 my personal convictions,\u00a0 and\u00a0 marks the position\u00a0 I take\u00a0 in a\u00a0 still\u00a0 male-dominated\u00a0 society.\u00a0 Regarding\u00a0 subject-related references see\u00a0 Marina\u00a0 Blagojevi\u0107, ed., Mapiranje mizoginije u Srbiji : diskursi\u00a0 i prakse I [Mapping misogyny\u00a0 in Serbia: discourses and practice I], (Beograd: A\u017dIN, 2000);\u00a0 Marina Blagojevi\u0107, ed. Mapiranje mizoginije\u00a0 u Srbiji : diskursi\u00a0 i prakse II [Mapping misogyny\u00a0 in Serbia: discourses and practice II], (Beograd: A\u017dIN, 2005);\u00a0 Darija \u017dili\u0107, \u201cGender essentialisms, politicalisation and\u00a0 peace\u00a0 activism\u00a0 in the\u00a0 region\u00a0 of former Yugoslavia\u201d in\u00a0 Helena\u00a0 Rill et\u00a0 al., eds.,\u00a0 Twenty Pieces\u00a0 of Encouragement\u00a0 for Awakening\u00a0 and\u00a0 Change.\u00a0 Peacebuilding\u00a0 in the\u00a0 Region\u00a0 of Former Yugoslavia (Belgrade: Centre for Nonviolent Action, 2007): 267-281. Biljana Ka\u0161i\u0107, ed., Women and the Politics of Peace. Contributions to a Women\u2019s Culture of Resistance (Zageb: Centar za \u017eenske\u00a0 studije,\u00a0 1996); Ru\u017eica Rosandi\u0107 and Vesna Pe\u0161i\u0107, ed., Warfare, patriotism, patriarchy. The analysis of elementary\u00a0 school textbooks (Belgrade: Centre\u00a0 for Antiwar Action, 1994);\u00a0 Nirman Moranjak-Bambura\u0107,\u00a0 Vodi\u010d kroz studij\u00a0 roda,\u00a0 ideologije,\u00a0 kulture, [Introduction\u00a0 into\u00a0 Gender\u00a0 Studies, ideology\u00a0 and\u00a0 culture],\u00a0 (Sarajevo:\u00a0 Centar\u00a0 za\u00a0 interdisciplinarne studije Univerziteta u Sarajevu, 2006); Sta\u0161a\u00a0 Zajovi\u0107, ed., Women for Peace (Belgrade: Women in Black, 2003); Rada Ivekovi\u0107, \u201cWomen, nationalism and war: ‘Make love, not war’,\u201c in Hypata 8\/4 (1993): 113-126, et al.)<\/p>\n

2 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0The wars of the early 1990s and their consequences<\/strong>
\n2.1\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0War against civilians: the legacy of human suffering<\/strong><\/p>\n

The \u201cfirst round\u201d of wars in former Yugoslavia (in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina) took\u00a0 place\u00a0 from 1991 to 1995.11\u00a0 There were numerous\u00a0 international efforts\u00a0 to reach\u00a0 a cease-fire\u00a0 and peace\u00a0 agreement from the very beginning,\u00a0 without much success. Finally, the war ended\u00a0 with the Dayton Agreement, signed on 14 December 1995.
\nWe still, 13 years after the ceasefire,\u00a0 do not know the exact number\u00a0 of casualties, as\u00a0 all\u00a0 \u201cthe\u00a0 sides\u201d\u00a0\u00a0 manipulate the\u00a0 figures.\u00a0 Most\u00a0 frequently\u00a0 cited\u00a0 estimates say\u00a0 that between\u00a0 200,000 and\u00a0 250,000\u00a0\u00a0 persons were\u00a0 killed,\u00a0 and\u00a0 a\u00a0 similar\u00a0 number\u00a0 held\u00a0 in detention camps, that 2.5 to 3 million had to leave their homes,12\u00a0\u00a0 and that a few hundred\u00a0 thousand people\u00a0 were part of military and\u00a0 paramilitary\u00a0 formations\u00a0 (although,\u00a0 according to some estimations, this figure goes to more than a million).
\nOne of the\u00a0 serious\u00a0 attempts to establish the\u00a0 facts\u00a0 about\u00a0 the\u00a0 casualties is being made\u00a0 by\u00a0 the\u00a0 Sarajevo-based Research\u00a0 and\u00a0 Documentation Centre.\u00a0 According to their ongoing\u00a0 research,\u00a0 the\u00a0 number\u00a0 of dead\u00a0 in the\u00a0 war in Bosnia\u00a0 is 97,207.13\u00a0\u00a0 The level of knowledge concerning\u00a0 these\u00a0 kind of facts is worst in Serbia,\u00a0 where no concrete\u00a0 figures are\u00a0 known. The\u00a0 reason\u00a0 is most\u00a0 probably\u00a0 that\u00a0 Serbia\u00a0 officially was\u00a0 not\u00a0 at\u00a0 war \u2013 thus, officially, there could be no casualties.
\nThe war was\u00a0 a\u00a0 horrifying slaughter\u00a0 and\u00a0 marked\u00a0 by extraordinary\u00a0 human\u00a0 rights violations\u00a0 such\u00a0 as\u00a0 ethnic\u00a0 cleansing,\u00a0 torture,\u00a0 rape\u00a0 and\u00a0 humiliating\u00a0 people\u00a0 in detention camps. Soldiers suffered a lot, but the main targets of this war were civilians. In Bosnia, 40.82\u00a0 percent\u00a0 of those\u00a0 killed and\u00a0 missing\u00a0 are civilians.14\u00a0\u00a0 Very often,\u00a0 the\u00a0 \u201cbattlefields\u201d were streets and houses, so for many people\u00a0 the war was not happening somewhere on<\/p>\n

(11\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0The war in Croatia started in 1991, and the war in Bosnia in 1992. Due to the limited space,\u00a0 in this paper I will not deal\u00a0 with the war in Kosovo (1998-1999), the NATO \u2018humanitarian\u2019 intervention\u00a0 (1999), the war in Macedonia (2001), or the war in Slovenia (1991).
\n12\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0UNHCR figures from December 1995: 1,493,000\u00a0 refugees,\u00a0 1,300,000\u00a0 internally displaced persons. For details, see Appendix, Figure 1.
\n13\u00a0\u00a0 See\u00a0\u00a0 Research\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 and\u00a0\u00a0 Documentation\u00a0\u00a0 Centre.\u00a0\u00a0 www.idc.org.ba\/project\/populationlosses.html#thetime (accessed August 25, 2008).\u00a0 Their estimate is that the figure may rise to up to 110,000 by the completion\u00a0 of the research. The date of the completion depends on the availability of financial support.
\n14\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Research\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 and\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Documentation\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Centre,\u00a0\u00a0 Human\u00a0\u00a0 Losses\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 in\u00a0\u00a0 Bosnia\u00a0\u00a0 and\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Herzegovina\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 91-95, www.idc.org.ba\/presentation\/Bosnia%20and%20Herzegovina.zip, slide 6 (accessed September 2008).)<\/p>\n

the front-line, but it \u201ccame under their window\u201d.15\u00a0 Some realised\u00a0 in time what was going to happen and fled to a more secure\u00a0 place, but many did not realise it, or did not want to believe.
\nOne of the characteristics of the war was ethnic cleansing,\u00a0 defined\u00a0 as \u201crendering an area\u00a0 ethnically\u00a0 homogenous by using\u00a0 force or intimidation\u00a0 to remove from a given area\u00a0 persons\u00a0 from\u00a0 another\u00a0\u00a0 ethnic\u00a0 or\u00a0 religious\u00a0 group.\u201d16\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 According to\u00a0 the\u00a0 Bassiouni Report, all sides\u00a0 were\u00a0 engaged\u00a0\u00a0 in ethnic\u00a0 cleansing\u00a0 (against\u00a0 the\u00a0 other\u00a0 two);\u00a0 in most reported\u00a0 cases it was committed\u00a0 by Serb forces, Croat forces did it \u201con a more restricted\u00a0 scale\u201d\u00a0 and\u00a0 Bosniak forces \u201cin some\u00a0 limited areas\u201d\u00a0 and\u00a0 did not have it as a policy. The means\u00a0\u00a0 applied\u00a0 were\u00a0 \u201cmass\u00a0 killing of\u00a0 civilians,\u00a0 rape\u00a0 and\u00a0 sexual\u00a0 assault, torture,\u00a0 the bombardment of cities,\u00a0 the\u00a0 destruction of\u00a0 mosques and\u00a0 churches, the\u00a0 confiscation\u00a0 of private\u00a0 property,\u00a0 unlawful\u00a0 detention\u00a0 of\u00a0 civilians\u00a0 in\u00a0 harsh\u00a0\u00a0 and\u00a0 sometimes\u00a0 inhuman conditions, and other unlawful practices\u2026\u201d17
\nThe invention\u00a0 of this\u00a0 crime cannot\u00a0 be ascribed\u00a0 to torturers\u00a0 from this\u00a0 part\u00a0 of the Balkans, they were just able to implement\u00a0 a \u201cwell-working\u201d recipe.18\u00a0\u00a0 Many of them have exercised\u00a0\u00a0 it\u00a0 throughout\u00a0\u00a0 our\u00a0 history,\u00a0 as\u00a0 Jackson\u00a0 Preece\u00a0 argues,\u00a0\u00a0 with\u00a0 the\u00a0 goal\u00a0 of\u00a0 an \u201cethnically homogeneous or pure\u00a0 (cleansed of minority ethnic\u00a0 groups)\u00a0 nation-state.\u201d19
\nShe\u00a0 rightly observes that\u00a0 although\u00a0 \u201cethnic\u00a0 cleansing\u00a0 affects\u00a0 people,\u00a0 what\u00a0 is really at stake is territory.\u201d20
\nThose\u00a0 acts\u00a0 of\u00a0 torture\u00a0 and\u00a0 the\u00a0 suffering\u00a0\u00a0 of\u00a0 the\u00a0 tortured\u00a0 are\u00a0 unspeakable and unbelievable. Those who experienced the disaster of being detained in a detention camp were\u00a0\u00a0 exposed\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 to\u00a0\u00a0 brutal\u00a0\u00a0 mistreatment,\u00a0 humiliation\u00a0\u00a0 and\u00a0\u00a0 torture:\u00a0\u00a0 food\u00a0\u00a0 and\u00a0\u00a0 water deprivation; ice-cold water showers;\u00a0 subjection to extreme temperatures; being forced to remain\u00a0 in one position for several\u00a0 hours;\u00a0 being forced to watch the torture\u00a0 or killing of<\/p>\n

(15\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Adnan Hasanbegovi\u0107,\u00a0 \u201cFour views; How I found myself in war ?; How to reach\u00a0 sustainable peace?\u201d, English\u00a0\u00a0 translation\u00a0\u00a0 of\u00a0\u00a0 the\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 supplement\u00a0\u00a0 in\u00a0\u00a0 Vreme,\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 no.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 600,\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 July\u00a0\u00a0 4,\u00a0\u00a0 2002.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Available\u00a0\u00a0 also\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 at www.nenasilje.org\/publikacije\/pdf\/4pogleda\/4views-02-sr-vreme.pdf, p. 6 (accessed October 10, 2008).
\n16\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Final\u00a0 Report of the United Nations Commission\u00a0 of Experts Established\u00a0 Pursuant to Security Council Resolution\u00a0 780\u00a0 (1992),\u00a0 S\/1994\/674, Annex IV: The\u00a0 policy\u00a0 of\u00a0 ethnic\u00a0 cleansing, prepared\u00a0 by\u00a0 M. Cherif Bassiouni, www.ess.uwe.ac.uk\/comexpert\/report_toc.htm (accessed August 25, 2008).
\n17\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Ibid.
\n18 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0See, for example,\u00a0 Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, \u201cA Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing,\u201d\u00a0 in Foreign Affairs 72\/3 (1993):\u00a0 110-121; Jennifer\u00a0 Jackson\u00a0 Preece,\u00a0 \u201cEthnic\u00a0 Cleansing\u00a0 as\u00a0 an\u00a0 Instrument\u00a0\u00a0 of\u00a0 Nation-State\u00a0 Creation: Changing\u00a0 State\u00a0 Practices\u00a0 and\u00a0 Evolving Legal Norms,\u201d\u00a0 in\u00a0 Human\u00a0 Rights\u00a0 Quarterly\u00a0 20\u00a0 (1998):\u00a0 817-842; Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002).
\n19\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Jennifer Jackson Preece, Ethnic Cleansing, 821. The author\u00a0 of the article refers to 1.5 million Greeks banished from Turkey; 400,000 Turks and around 100,000 Bulgarians banished from Greece; 35,000 Greeks,
\n67,000\u00a0 Turks and 110,000 Romanians\u00a0 banished from Bulgaria; 62,000 Bulgarians banished from Romania. Skipping\u00a0 out\u00a0 the\u00a0 figures\u00a0 from World War II, after\u00a0 that\u00a0 45,000\u00a0 Turkish Cypriots were\u00a0 banished from Greek Cyprus;\u00a0 160,000\u00a0\u00a0 Greek\u00a0 Cypriots\u00a0 were\u00a0 banished from\u00a0 the\u00a0 Turkish part;\u00a0 more\u00a0 than\u00a0 300,000 Turks were banished from Bulgaria. See Jackson Preece,\u00a0 ibid., 817-818. And all these misdeeds were done\u00a0 in the 20th century only (excluding WW II).
\n20 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Ibid.)<\/p>\n

others;\u00a0 beatings with a rifle-butt, whip, belt, stick, etc; choking and suffocating; beatings on the soles\u00a0 of the feet; being forced to bark, dance,\u00a0 sing, repeat\u00a0 certain sentences over and over again, or behave\u00a0 in other humiliating ways; staying naked;\u00a0 forced hard labour; mock execution; presence of family or friends during a person\u2019s\u00a0 torture; being forced to participate in torturing or killing of others;\u00a0 being forced to watch or listen to sexual abuse of others;\u00a0 being forced to rape another\u00a0 person;\u00a0 being forced to watch or listen to sexual abuse of family members; castration and mutilation of sex organs; being forced to decide who would\u00a0 be\u00a0 killed\u00a0 or tortured;\u00a0 mutilation\u00a0 and\u00a0 breaking\u00a0 the\u00a0 person\u2019s\u00a0 bones; being thrown\u00a0 from\u00a0 high\u00a0 altitude;\u00a0\u00a0 burns\u00a0\u00a0 inflicted\u00a0 by\u00a0 cigarettes;\u00a0 electrical\u00a0\u00a0 shocks;\u00a0\u00a0 forcible extraction\u00a0 of teeth;\u00a0 hanging\u00a0 by toes,\u00a0 hands or feet;\u00a0 pulling\u00a0 out\u00a0 of nails;\u00a0 sticking\u00a0 of needles under the nails; being used for mine-field clearing\u202621
\nThese acts\u00a0 were not committed\u00a0 by a few madmen.\u00a0 Camps were established and
\norganised as\u00a0 a part\u00a0 of a conscious policy. The Bassiouni\u00a0 Report, written in May 1994 (more than a year before the end of the war), mentions\u00a0 956 reported\u00a0 places\u00a0 of detention in Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia (although officially Serbia \u201cwas not at war\u201d).
\n[C]amps were maintained and\u00a0 operated by a mix of military personnel, former army officers and soldiers,\u00a0 various paramilitaries, local volunteers,\u00a0 members\u00a0 of civilian police forces, or politicians.\u00a0 There were also many reports\u00a0 of situations where\u00a0 there\u00a0 was\u00a0 movement\u00a0 in and\u00a0 out\u00a0 of camps\u00a0 by visitors,\u00a0 including\u00a0 local civilians, paramilitary forces, and\u00a0 the\u00a0 army, who perpetrated abuses upon\u00a0 the prison population.22
\nDetainees were mostly members\u00a0 of the\u00a0 other\u00a0 two ethnic\u00a0 groups,\u00a0 civilians\u00a0 rather\u00a0 than prisoners of war, but\u00a0 also\u00a0 political\u00a0 opponents and\u00a0 deserters (young and\u00a0 old; men and women).\u00a0 Even some\u00a0 refugees\u00a0 became detainees. In 1994\u00a0 and\u00a0 1995 police\u00a0 in Serbia arrested\u00a0 and\u00a0 conscripted male\u00a0 refugees\u00a0 from Bosnia\u00a0 and\u00a0 Croatia, and\u00a0 also\u00a0 those\u00a0 who were born\u00a0 in\u00a0 one\u00a0 of\u00a0 those\u00a0\u00a0 places\u00a0\u00a0 but\u00a0 were\u00a0 residents of Serbia.\u00a0 Those\u00a0 people\u00a0 were handed over to Serb military authorities in Croatia or Bosnia and they were incorporated into the armies there.23<\/p>\n

(21\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0See\u00a0 Vladimir Jovi\u0107 and\u00a0 Goran Opa\u010di\u0107,\u00a0 \u201cVrste mu\u010denja\u201d\u00a0 [Types of Torture], in IAN,\u00a0 Tortura u ratu, posledice\u00a0\u00a0 i\u00a0 rehabilitacija:\u00a0 Jugoslovensko\u00a0\u00a0 iskustvo\u00a0 [Torture\u00a0 in\u00a0 War:\u00a0 Consequences and\u00a0 Rehabilitation\u00a0 of Victims. Yugoslav\u00a0 Experience], (Belgrade:\u00a0 International Aid Network, 2003).\u00a0 See also\u00a0 the Bassiouni\u00a0 Report, Annex VIII: Prison camps, 27 May 1994.
\n22 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Final\u00a0 Report of the United Nations Commission\u00a0 of Experts Established\u00a0 Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), S\/1994\/674\/Add. 2(Vol. IV), Annex VIII: Prison camps, under the direction of M. Cherif Bassiouni.\u00a0 According to this\u00a0 report,\u00a0 466\u00a0 camps\u00a0 were operated\u00a0 by Bosnian\u00a0 Serbs\u00a0 or forces\u00a0 of FRY; 121 by Bosnian Croats or the Government of Croatia and the Croatian Army; 84 by the Government and Army of BiH or Bosnian Muslims; 32 jointly by Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats; 9 as private prisons\u00a0 by individuals\u00a0 or groups; and 244 (25.4 per cent) by unidentified forces.
\n23 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0A number\u00a0 of them were first sent\u00a0 to the “training” camp Erdut in Eastern Slavonia (Croatia), held by the\u00a0 notorious\u00a0 paramilitary\u00a0 group\u00a0 of pre-war\u00a0 criminal\u00a0 \u017deljko Ra\u017enatovi\u0107\u00a0 Arkan. As the\u00a0 Humanitarian\u00a0 Law Center (Belgrade) has\u00a0 reported:\u00a0 \u201cOn arrival, they had to run a gauntlet\u00a0 of Arkan\u2019s \u201cTigers\u201d and were beaten for not staying in Croatia to defend\u00a0 the Serb Krajina. Their heads were shaved and they were made to carry a rock weighing between\u00a0 25 and 30 kilograms on which the word \u201cDiscipline\u201d was inscribed\u00a0 around the camp. One man, whose rifle slipped\u00a0 off his shoulder,\u00a0 was stripped\u00a0 to the waist and tied by the paramilitaries to a tree for 24 hours.\u00a0 Another, who complained that his hearing was impaired, was tied half-naked\u00a0 to a tree on the mosquito-infested bank of the Danube River for two days.\u201d Humanitarian\u00a0 Law Centre (HLC), Refugees\u00a0 vs. Serbia\u00a0 trial\u00a0 continues\u00a0\u00a0 before\u00a0 first\u00a0 municipal\u00a0 court\u00a0 in\u00a0 Belgrade,\u00a0 November\u00a0 30,\u00a0 2000,\u00a0\u00a0 www.hlc-rdc.org (accessed April 2007; no longer available online in August 2008). The HLC filed law suits against\u00a0 the state\u00a0 on behalf of 686 refugees.\u00a0 For personal testimonies, see\u00a0 Drinka Gojkovi\u0107 et al., eds.,\u00a0 Ljudi u ratu \u2013 Ratovanja I [People in War \u2013 Warfares I], (Beograd: Dokumentacioni centar Ratovi 1991-99, 2003).<\/p>\n

During the war, organised\u00a0 rape was another\u00a0 widespread atrocity committed.\u00a0 There were\u00a0 even\u00a0 special\u00a0 camps\u00a0 for women,\u00a0 or\u00a0 detention camps\u00a0 had\u00a0 special\u00a0 buildings\u00a0 for women for \u2018special treatment\u2019. Most of those women endured\u00a0 horrible torture and sexual abuse, and\u00a0 were often raped\u00a0 by a group of men.\u00a0 Rapes\u00a0 of men are not so well known, since victims and witnesses in this patriarchal\u00a0 world are not very willing to speak\u00a0 about that.24\u00a0 Women were not\u00a0 only raped\u00a0 in detention camps,\u00a0 it could\u00a0 happen anywhere.\u00a0 It seems that it was a practice after the \u201ccleaning\u201d of a village or a town to look for women and \u2018have some\u00a0 fun\u2019. It was not perceived as a crime, but rather as a reward. Estimates\u00a0 say\u00a0 that\u00a0 tens\u00a0\u00a0 of\u00a0 thousands of\u00a0 women\u00a0 were\u00a0 raped,\u00a0\u00a0 which\u00a0 indicates\u00a0 that\u00a0 rape\u00a0 was systematically\u00a0 applied in this war by a large number of men.25
\nThe list of examples of human\u00a0 suffering and agony in these\u00a0 wars does\u00a0 not have an
\nend.\u00a0 There are\u00a0 millions of people\u00a0 who endured the\u00a0 lengthy\u00a0 siege\u00a0 and\u00a0 shelling\u00a0 of their towns and living spaces, who survived (or did not) the razing of their town to the ground, who\u00a0 lost\u00a0 their\u00a0 dear\u00a0 ones,\u00a0 who\u00a0 still\u00a0 do\u00a0 not\u00a0 know\u00a0 where\u00a0 the\u00a0 remains\u00a0 of their\u00a0 family members\u00a0 are, who died of hunger, who became permanently\u00a0 disabled and those\u00a0 whose fate\u00a0 is\u00a0 not\u00a0 known.\u00a0 Everybody\u00a0 who\u00a0 has\u00a0 been\u00a0 directly\u00a0 exposed\u00a0\u00a0 to\u00a0 war has\u00a0 their\u00a0 own wounds.\u00a0 Even those\u00a0\u00a0 of us\u00a0 who\u00a0 were\u00a0 not\u00a0 exposed\u00a0\u00a0 directly\u00a0 have\u00a0 them,\u00a0 although\u00a0\u00a0 the experiences are incomparable. Many people\u00a0 in the region still ask themselves: how is it possible that\u00a0 we did all of this to each\u00a0 other? How is it possible that we split, following ethnic paths,\u00a0 and started to behave\u00a0 like monsters?<\/p>\n

(24 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0See\u00a0 Dubravka\u00a0 Zarkov, \u201cThe\u00a0 Body\u00a0 of\u00a0 the\u00a0 Other\u00a0 Man.\u00a0 Sexual\u00a0 Violence\u00a0 and\u00a0 the\u00a0 Construction\u00a0 of Masculinity, Sexuality and\u00a0 Ethnicity in Croatian Media,\u201d in Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence, eds.\u00a0 Caroline O. N. Moser and Fiona C. Clark (London: Zed Books, 2001), 69-
\n82.
\n25 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0See,\u00a0 for example,\u00a0 Vesna Kesi\u0107, Vesna Jankovi\u0107 and\u00a0 Biljana Bijeli\u0107, eds.,\u00a0 \u017dene obnavljaju\u00a0 sje\u0107anje: Centar za \u017eene \u017ertve rata deset\u00a0 godina poslije [Women recollecting memories:\u00a0 Center for Women War Victims Ten Years Later], (Zagreb: Centar za \u017eene \u017ertve rata, 2003); \u017denska strana rata [The women\u2019s way to the war], (Beograd:\u00a0 \u017dene u crnom,\u00a0 2008);\u00a0 Jasna\u00a0 Bak\u0161i\u0107-Mufti\u0107, \u201cZlo\u010din\u00a0 silovanja\u00a0 u Bosni i Hercegovini \u2013\u00a0 lokalna\u00a0 i me\u0111unarodna dimenzija\u201d [Crimes of rape in Bosnia-Herzegovina \u2013 the local and international dimension],\u00a0 in Izazovi feminizma,\u00a0 eds.\u00a0 Jasminka\u00a0 Babi\u0107-Avdispahi\u0107\u00a0 et\u00a0 al.\u00a0 (Sarajevo:\u00a0 Forum Bosna,\u00a0 2004):\u00a0 49-54;\u00a0 Patricia Weitsman, Women, War, and Identity: Policies of Mass Rape in Bosnia and Rwanda, paper\u00a0 presented at the Annual meeting of the International Studies\u00a0 Association, Town & Country Resort and Convention Center, San Diego,\u00a0 California,\u00a0 USA, 22\u00a0 March\u00a0 2006),\u00a0\u00a0 available\u00a0\u00a0 at\u00a0\u00a0 www.allacademic.com\/meta\/p98059_index.html (accessed\u00a0 October\u00a0 10, 2008);\u00a0 Lisa Sharlach,\u00a0 \u201cRape as\u00a0 Genocide:\u00a0 Bangladesh, the\u00a0 Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda,\u201d\u00a0 in New Political Science,\u00a0 22\/1\u00a0 (2000):\u00a0 89-102;\u00a0 Alexandra\u00a0 Stiglmayer,\u00a0 ed.,\u00a0 Mass\u00a0 Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina, trans. Marion Faber, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992).)<\/p>\n

2.2 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0War and ethnonationalism: the significance of myths<\/strong><\/p>\n

Michael Lapsley, a priest who supported the struggle against\u00a0 the apartheid regime in South Africa, once made a remarkable observation :
\nI was born in New Zealand and came to South Africa as an adult. When I reflect back on my arrival here I think that\u00a0 was when I stopped being a human\u00a0 being and\u00a0 became a\u00a0 white\u00a0 man.\u00a0 Whiteness\u00a0\u00a0 became\u00a0\u00a0 like\u00a0 leprosy,\u00a0 something\u00a0\u00a0 that would not wash off.26<\/p>\n

One of the consequences of the war in the region of former Yugoslavia is that we stopped being\u00a0 human\u00a0 beings\u00a0 and\u00a0 started to\u00a0 be\u00a0 recognised\u00a0\u00a0 instead only as\u00a0 \u2018Serbs\u2019,\u00a0 \u2018Croats\u2019,
\n\u2018Bosniaks\u2019, \u2018Albanians\u2019, \u2018Macedonians\u2019.\u00a0 It was of no importance whether we felt this way or whether\u00a0 we actually had those\u00a0 kinds of identities. Others knew better\u00a0 than\u00a0 ourselves who we were – and Serbness, Croatness,\u00a0 Bosniakness started to be something\u00a0 that would not\u00a0 wash\u00a0 off.\u00a0 At\u00a0 the\u00a0 same\u00a0\u00a0 time,\u00a0 some\u00a0 of\u00a0 us\u00a0 have\u00a0 been\u00a0\u00a0 bearing\u00a0 that\u00a0 marker\u00a0 with awkwardness and even shame\u00a0 due to the crimes and misdeeds of some members\u00a0 of the group that we (are supposed to) belong to. The awkwardness and the shame\u00a0 seem\u00a0 even harder\u00a0 to wash off. Some, however, willingly embraced only one single of our numerous identities, the one of belonging\u00a0 to a tribe. During the war that identity became a marker for whether one was going to live or die, to be spared or tortured.\u00a0 Because\u00a0 of that, many people\u00a0 started to feel it as being the most important\u00a0 of all of their identities. Thus, what we have now in the region is a lack of \u2018human beings\u2019, and a flood of \u2018Serbs\u2019, \u2018Croats\u2019 and
\n\u2018Bosniaks\u2019.
\nAnother legacy of the wars are the ethnocracies established after the disintegration of SFRY \u2013 new states and borders\u00a0 that were organised along ethnopolitical lines. Bosnia today is a quasi-state.27 It is split into the Republika Srpska (RS, 49% of the territory) and the Federation\u00a0 of\u00a0 Bosnia-Herzegovina\u00a0 (FBiH, 51%).28\u00a0\u00a0 This creation\u00a0 is fixed within the Dayton Agreement.\u00a0 The Federation\u00a0 should\u00a0 stand\u00a0 for a federation\u00a0 between\u00a0 \u2018Croats\u2019 and
\n\u2018Bosniaks\u2019, while\u00a0 Republika\u00a0 Srpska\u00a0 (RS) is\u00a0 \u2018Serb\u2019. The RS was\u00a0 \u201cthe\u00a0 cleanest\u201d in the neighbourhood, with some 3% of ethnic minorities.29\u00a0 Since Bosnia is a protectorate still under strong international pressure,\u00a0 the RS was, however, forced to accept\u00a0 the return of those\u00a0 who had\u00a0 been\u00a0 banished. Croatia \u201csuccessfully\u00a0 cleansed\u201d ethnic\u00a0 Serbs\u00a0 down to 4.54 percent of its population.30<\/p>\n

(26 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0In Alex Boraine, Janet Levy and Ronel Scheffer, eds., Dealing with the Past. Truth and Reconciliation in
\nSouth Africa, 2nd ed. (Cape Town: IDASA, 1997), 26.
\n27 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Boris Buden has\u00a0 remarked\u00a0 that\u00a0 Bosnia is neither\u00a0 a state,\u00a0 nor a nation:\u00a0 “it is a crime scene”.\u00a0 Boris Buden,\u00a0 Kaptolski\u00a0 kolodvor.\u00a0 Politi\u010dki eseji\u00a0 [The\u00a0 Capitol\u2019s\u00a0 Station.\u00a0 Political\u00a0 Essays],\u00a0 (Beograd:\u00a0 Centar\u00a0 za savremenu umetnost, 2002), xi.
\n28 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Overall, there\u00a0 exists\u00a0 an ultra-complicated state\u00a0 structure\u00a0 with some\u00a0 14 governments, including\u00a0 the international Office of the High Representative on top. See Figure 2 in the appendix for the map of division of Bosnia.
\n29 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Before the war, more than 40% of the people living there belonged\u00a0 to ethnic groups other than Serb.<\/p>\n

30 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Republic of Croatia \u2013 Central Bureau of Statistics,\u00a0 www.dzs.hr (accessed August 25, 2007). According to the pre-war census in 1991, there were 580,762 ethnic Serbs, while the 2001 census records 201,631.)<\/p>\n

In those\u00a0 places\u00a0 where no \u2018agreement\u2019\u00a0 was achieved,\u00a0 we see\u00a0 the\u00a0 phenomenon of divided\u00a0 cities.\u00a0 Authorities,\u00a0 but\u00a0 also\u00a0 citizens,\u00a0 make\u00a0 their\u00a0 best\u00a0 effort not\u00a0 to\u00a0 confuse\u00a0 a passer-by – it is\u00a0 easy\u00a0 to recognise\u00a0 who the\u00a0 territory supposedly belongs\u00a0 to by various symbols all around. This kind of marking is one of the outcomes of the war. While Bosnia is clearly divided\u00a0 by the\u00a0 \u201cethnic key\u201d, whose\u00a0 legal document is the Dayton Agreement, Croatia defines\u00a0 itself as\u00a0 \u201cthe\u00a0 national state\u00a0 of the\u00a0 Croatian nation\u00a0 and\u00a0 the\u00a0 state\u00a0 of the members\u00a0\u00a0 of\u00a0 autochthonous\u00a0 national\u00a0 minorities\u201d31\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 (while naming\u00a0 them),\u00a0 and\u00a0 Serbia recently\u00a0 defined\u00a0 itself as\u00a0 \u201ca state\u00a0 of Serbian\u00a0 people\u00a0 and\u00a0 all citizens\u00a0 who live in it.\u201d32
\nHowever, in all cases we can talk about ethnocracies.
\nAs political psychologists have outlined,\u00a0 ethnonationalism is not driven by mental illness.33\u00a0 Psychologist\u00a0 Ervin Staub\u00a0 states, for example,\u00a0 that\u00a0 belonging\u00a0 to groups\u00a0 is of profound significance\u00a0 for human\u00a0 beings.\u00a0 It fulfils deep\u00a0 needs by providing satisfaction inherent in connections and\u00a0 provides\u00a0 a feeling of security: \u201c[T]he self gains\u00a0 values\u00a0 and significance\u00a0 through\u00a0\u00a0 identification\u00a0\u00a0 with\u00a0 groups\u00a0\u00a0 and\u00a0\u00a0 the\u00a0\u00a0 connection\u00a0 to\u00a0 others\u00a0\u00a0 that membership provides.\u201d34\u00a0 Michael Ignatieff also\u00a0 observes: \u201cWhere you belong\u00a0 is where you are safe, and where you are safe is where you belong.\u201d35
\nYet, would we need\u00a0 so desperately to feel safe if we did not have enemies that we
\nhad\u00a0 constructed in the\u00a0 first place?\u00a0 Of course,\u00a0 many ethnonationalists would not agree that\u00a0 either\u00a0 enemies or our\u00a0 ethnies\u00a0 are\u00a0 our\u00a0 constructions, they\u00a0 are\u00a0 inherited,\u00a0 as\u00a0 the ethnicity is. According to ethnonationalistic reasoning,\u00a0 ethnicity is a biological question, it is in our blood:\u00a0 we are all connected by those\u00a0 blood ties and,\u00a0 together\u00a0 with the land where we live, we make one organism.
\nBut I will argue\u00a0 that\u00a0 those\u00a0 communities are constructed. Smith rightly points\u00a0 out
\nthat\u00a0 \u201c[e]thnicity is not\u00a0 about\u00a0 blood\u00a0 or genes\u00a0 as\u00a0 such,\u00a0 but\u00a0 about\u00a0 myths\u00a0 and\u00a0 beliefs\u00a0 in<\/p>\n

(31\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0The Constitution\u00a0 of the\u00a0 Republic\u00a0 of Croatia, updated\u00a0 2001,\u00a0 www.constitution.org\/cons\/croatia.htm
\n(accessed August 17, 2008).
\n32 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0The\u00a0 Constitution\u00a0 of\u00a0 the\u00a0 Republic\u00a0 of\u00a0 Serbia,\u00a0 2006,www.parlament.sr.gov.yu\u00a0 (accessed\u00a0 August\u00a0 17,
\n2008).\u00a0 It is not clear in this definition what Serbia is: are “Serbian people” also citizens; and also if someone prefers to be a citizen, does it mean that she\/he does not belong to the Serbian people?
\n33 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0See, for example,\u00a0 Du\u0161an Kecmanovi\u0107, Etni\u010dka vremena\u00a0 [Times of ethnicity], (Beograd: Biblioteka XX
\nvek, 2001).
\n34 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Ervin Staub,\u00a0 The\u00a0 Roots\u00a0 of\u00a0 Evil. The Origins\u00a0 of\u00a0 Genocide\u00a0 and\u00a0 Other\u00a0 Group Violence\u00a0 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
\n35 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging.\u00a0 Journeys into the New Nationalism (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1994), 10.)<\/p>\n

common\u00a0 origins.\u201d36\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Moreover, that\u00a0 land\u00a0 is neither\u00a0 my leg nor my arm. One can\u00a0 even choose if he\/she is going to belong to such a group or not. Nevertheless, as Hobsbawm noted, using Anderson\u2019s phrase: \u201can imagined community\u201d is \u201cnot the less real for being imagined.\u201d37\u00a0 In my opinion,\u00a0 it would not be a problem\u00a0 if ethnie\u00a0 would stay\u00a0 within its cultural\u00a0 frame.\u00a0 But the politicisation\u00a0 of ethnic\u00a0 identity,\u00a0 grounded\u00a0 on nationalism as\u00a0 its guiding ideology, creates a time bomb. Smith puts it well:
\nBy invoking the idea of \u2018the nation\u2019, nationalists are able to mobilize, unify, and legitimate the goals of different sub-elites in their quest\u00a0 for power. [\u2026] Politics is about\u00a0 capturing\u00a0\u00a0 and\u00a0 holding\u00a0 power\u00a0 in\u00a0 the\u00a0 state\u00a0\u00a0 \u2013\u00a0 and\u00a0 nationalism\u00a0 is\u00a0 an argument\u00a0 for\u00a0 doing\u00a0 so.\u00a0 Nationalism\u00a0 is therefore\u00a0 a political\u00a0 movement,\u00a0 not\u00a0 a question of culture and identity.38<\/p>\n

Some\u00a0 western\u00a0 politicians\u00a0 and\u00a0 analysts\u00a0 have\u00a0 argued\u00a0 that\u00a0 the\u00a0 reasons for the\u00a0 wars\u00a0 in former\u00a0 Yugoslavia\u00a0 lay\u00a0 in\u00a0 ancient\u00a0\u00a0 hatreds between\u00a0\u00a0 the\u00a0 tribes.\u00a0 It is\u00a0 one\u00a0 of the\u00a0 most widespread\u00a0 theories,\u00a0 supported by many local but\u00a0 also\u00a0 international actors\u00a0 who were dealing\u00a0 with\u00a0 this\u00a0 region,\u00a0 that\u00a0 the\u00a0 hatred\u00a0\u00a0 between\u00a0\u00a0 Bosniaks,\u00a0\u00a0 Serbs\u00a0 and\u00a0 Croats\u00a0 has generated conflicts for centuries.39\u00a0 But this observation is not an appropriate approach to the reality in our region, and it reflects another myth.
\nThere are,\u00a0 in fact,\u00a0 two myths.\u00a0 One\u00a0 is\u00a0 that\u00a0 we always\u00a0 hated\u00a0 each\u00a0 other\u00a0 (to\u00a0 be precise, it actually goes this way: \u201cthey always hated\u00a0 us\u201d) and that ethnic division always existed. The other one is about interethnic\u00a0 harmony, and the \u2018brotherhood and unity\u2019 that we lived in, when\u00a0 war suddenly\u00a0 broke\u00a0 out.\u00a0 In fact,\u00a0 in former Yugoslavia we did\u00a0 live together\u00a0 (although\u00a0 cities\u00a0 were\u00a0 more\u00a0 \u2018mixed\u2019\u00a0 than\u00a0 villages),\u00a0 we shared jobs,\u00a0 schools,\u00a0 hobbies,\u00a0 caf\u00e9s,\u00a0 even\u00a0 families.\u00a0 At\u00a0 the\u00a0 same\u00a0\u00a0 time,\u00a0 ethnonationalists always\u00a0 existed. Ethnonationalists were\u00a0 frequently\u00a0 warning\u00a0 us\u00a0 that\u00a0 we\u00a0 should\u00a0 not\u00a0 marry each\u00a0 other, because it is not natural,\u00a0 that\u00a0 we should\u00a0 never forget how many members\u00a0 of our family they\u00a0 threw in a pit (in the\u00a0 past),\u00a0 that\u00a0 it is all right if we are friendly with them,\u00a0 but we should\u00a0 be careful, as they should\u00a0 not be trusted,\u00a0 and so on. Under the \u2018communist fist\u2019, they were not so loud, but when the\u00a0 fist started\u00a0 to slacken\u00a0 they started to occupy and poison\u00a0 the public space\u00a0 with stories\u00a0 about\u00a0 atrocities\u00a0 that\u00a0 they committed against\u00a0 us in the past.<\/p>\n

(36 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Anthony D. Smith, \u201cThe Ethnic Sources of Nationalism,\u201d in Survival 35\/1 (1993): 50.
\n37 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Eric Hobsbawm, \u201cIdentity Politics and the Left,\u201d in New Left Review I\/217 (May-June 1996): 45.
\n38 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Anthony D. Smith, \u201cCulture, Community and\u00a0 Territory: the Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism,\u201d\u00a0 in
\nInternational Affairs 72\/3 (1996): 448.
\n39 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0For an\u00a0 overview of international actors\u00a0 (politicians,\u00a0 media,\u00a0 academic circles)\u00a0 who\u00a0 supported this theory\u00a0 see\u00a0\u00a0 David\u00a0 Campbell,\u00a0 Nacionalna\u00a0 dekonstrukcija:\u00a0\u00a0 Nasilje,\u00a0 identitet\u00a0\u00a0 i\u00a0 pravda\u00a0 u\u00a0 Bosni\u00a0 [National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia], trans. Dra\u017een Pehar, (Sarajevo: Me\u0111unarodni\u00a0 Forum Bosna, 2003), 63-95.)<\/p>\n

But war did not start because all \u2018Serbs\u2019 hated\u00a0 all \u2018Bosniaks\u2019 and \u2018Croats\u2019 and vice versa. I do not deny that there were people\u00a0 who were filled with hatred.\u00a0 But hatred\u00a0 itself does\u00a0 not lead to large-scale\u00a0 violence, and a war never suddenly\u00a0 breaks\u00a0 out like a natural catastrophe. It is planned and\u00a0 prepared much in advance. As King notes,\u00a0 reasons why people\u00a0 hate\u00a0 each\u00a0 other\u00a0 ought\u00a0 to concern\u00a0 psychologists and\u00a0 marriage\u00a0 counsellors, but why they kill en mass\u00a0 has\u00a0 to do\u00a0 with statesmen.40\u00a0 King rightly raises\u00a0 the\u00a0 question of \u201cwhether\u00a0 a\u00a0 thing\u00a0 called\u00a0 \u2018ethnic\u00a0 war\u2019\u00a0 even\u00a0 exists.\u201d41\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 He argues\u00a0 that\u00a0 myths\u00a0 and\u00a0 fears \u201cmight\u00a0 be\u00a0 a good\u00a0 recipe\u00a0 for a pogrom,\u00a0 but\u00a0 they rarely lead\u00a0 to large-scale,\u00a0 sustained violence.\u00a0 For that,\u00a0 you need\u00a0 the\u00a0 same\u00a0 kinds\u00a0 of\u00a0 forces\u00a0 that\u00a0 sustain any war, whether
\n\u2018ethnic\u2019 or otherwise:\u00a0 entrepreneurs who benefit\u00a0 from the\u00a0 violence,\u00a0 arms\u00a0 supplied, by foreign powers, charismatic\u00a0 leadership, and plenty of bored young men.\u201d42
\nSmith, in his criticism of \u201cgroup aggression\u201d theory, which is a parallel to \u201cancient
\nhatred\u00a0 as the cause\u00a0 of war theory\u201d, points out that \u201cmost wars can be attributed to other factors\u00a0\u00a0 like\u00a0\u00a0 mass\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 migrations,\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 religious\u00a0\u00a0 or\u00a0\u00a0 other\u00a0\u00a0 movements,\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 natural\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 disasters, colonisation and, above all, state\u00a0 formation.\u201d43
\nAnd our wars were about\u00a0 creating\u00a0 pure ethnic\u00a0 states, because ethnonationalists
\ncould maintain\u00a0 their\u00a0 power perfectly\u00a0 and\u00a0 easily\u00a0 in such\u00a0 constructions. It can\u00a0 be\u00a0 said, then,\u00a0 that\u00a0 ethnonationalists do not act according\u00a0 to their sentiments but according\u00a0 to rational\u00a0\u00a0 choice.\u00a0\u00a0 Ethnonationalism\u00a0\u00a0 is\u00a0\u00a0 not\u00a0\u00a0 primarily\u00a0\u00a0 a\u00a0\u00a0 phenomenon\u00a0\u00a0 created\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 by psychological conditions\u00a0 but a tool for securing power.
\n(40 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Charles King, \u201cThe Myth of Ethnic Warfare,\u201d in Foreign Affairs 80\/6 (2001): 168.
\n41\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Ibid., 167.
\n42 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Ibid., 169-170.
\n43 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Anthony D. Smith, \u201cWar and ethnicity: the role of warefare in the formation, self-images\u00a0 and cohesion of the ethnic communities,\u201d\u00a0 in Ethnic and Racial Studies 4\/4 (1981): 376.)<\/p>\n

2.3 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Summary: prerequisites for lasting\u00a0 peace<\/strong><\/p>\n

The war of the\u00a0 early 1990s\u00a0 was a slaughter\u00a0 whose\u00a0 targets\u00a0 were mainly civilians. Most of those\u00a0 who were in detention camps\u00a0 were civilians. Women tortured\u00a0 and\u00a0 raped were civilians.\u00a0 Towns that\u00a0 were bombed\u00a0 and\u00a0 razed\u00a0 to\u00a0 the\u00a0 ground\u00a0 were inhabited by civilians. Most of these did not torture or slaughter\u00a0 anyone (there are some who did, but their number\u00a0 is limited). The vast majority of combatants was conscripted. Some joined the\u00a0 army to defend\u00a0 something. But\u00a0 the\u00a0 vast\u00a0 majority of soldiers\u00a0 did not commit such terrible\u00a0 crimes.\u00a0 Nevertheless,\u00a0\u00a0 many\u00a0 people\u00a0 in\u00a0 the\u00a0 region\u00a0 are\u00a0 used\u00a0\u00a0 to\u00a0 shifting\u00a0 the responsibility\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 onto\u00a0\u00a0 entire\u00a0\u00a0 ethnic\u00a0\u00a0 groups:\u00a0\u00a0 if\u00a0\u00a0 thousands\u00a0 of\u00a0 Serbs\/Croats\/Bosniaks committed\u00a0 those\u00a0 horrors – that means\u00a0 that all Serbs\/Croats\/Bosniaks did it. But the fact is that in the Balkans millions of people\u00a0 did suffer, no matter what their ethnic identity is or was. When we acknowledge that fact, we will make a big step towards a lasting peace. This is certainly not to say that all sides have to be blamed equally. But it is to say that all suffering has to be acknowledged, no matter whose responsibility it was.
\nThe current\u00a0 reality, though,\u00a0 is that\u00a0 all three\u00a0 groups\u00a0 blame\u00a0 each\u00a0 other for the\u00a0 war and suffering, while not accepting\u00a0 that others\u00a0 also suffered.\u00a0 In Croatia and FBiH the war is mainly seen as aggression by Serbia\u00a0 with a goal of establishing \u2018Great Serbia\u2019, while among \u2018Serbs\u2019 it is perceived\u00a0 as a civil war whose roots are in an ancient\u00a0 hatred\u00a0 between\u00a0 the\u00a0 ethnic\u00a0 groups.\u00a0 Many\u00a0 refugees\u00a0 have\u00a0 still not returned\u00a0 to their homes,\u00a0 and\u00a0 many of those\u00a0 who did have actually sold their property and moved to a place where \u2018their group\u2019 is in the majority. Those who returned, if not feeling threatened, usually do feel insecure – they cannot\u00a0 find jobs\u00a0 and\u00a0 provide\u00a0 for their families,\u00a0 because ethnic\u00a0 minorities\u00a0 are not accepted by many employers.\u00a0 Many families\u00a0 still\u00a0 do\u00a0 not\u00a0 know the\u00a0 fate\u00a0 of their\u00a0 loved ones.44\u00a0 War criminals are celebrated as heroes\u00a0 and protectors by the mainstream of the group that they belong to, and it is largely denied\u00a0 that they committed\u00a0 any crime, even if undeniable facts exist. This is why the levels of mistrust\u00a0 and even fear of each other are so high.
\nToday, nearly thirteen years after the Dayton agreement, the situation in the former Yugoslav region cannot\u00a0 be defined\u00a0 as peace. It is not war, we have stopped shooting\u00a0 at each other, but neither\u00a0 is it peace. One of the reasons for this is a lack of peacebuilding efforts.\u00a0 Lederach\u00a0 claims\u00a0 that\u00a0 \u201cpeace\u00a0\u00a0 is\u00a0 both\u00a0 ending\u00a0 something\u00a0\u00a0 that\u00a0 is\u00a0 destructive, painful, and inhumane and building something\u00a0 that is dynamic, feeding people\u00a0 and their<\/p>\n

(44 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0According to the International Commission on Missing Persons\u00a0 (ICMP), 24,088\u00a0 people were reported\u00a0 as missing during these wars, and around\u00a0 7,000 people\u00a0 have still not been found. See ICMP, www.ic-mp.org (accessed August 17, 2008).)<\/p>\n

relationships.\u201d45\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 And\u00a0 we\u00a0 have\u00a0\u00a0 not\u00a0 yet\u00a0 stopped\u00a0 with\u00a0 the\u00a0\u00a0 destructive,\u00a0 painful\u00a0\u00a0 and inhumane behaviour.\u00a0 Signing\u00a0 a\u00a0 ceasefire\u00a0 agreement was\u00a0 important\u00a0 to\u00a0 stop\u00a0 the\u00a0 war, shooting and killing. But there is still a long road ahead in order to achieve lasting peace\u00a0 in the region.<\/p>\n

3 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Peacebuilding and Reconciliation<\/strong><\/p>\n

Based\u00a0 on years\u00a0 of peace\u00a0 activism\u00a0 in the\u00a0 region, it is my impression that\u00a0 most\u00a0 people\u00a0 want\u00a0 to\u00a0 live in peace. Nevertheless,\u00a0 warmongering\u00a0 can\u00a0 be\u00a0 heard\u00a0 from some\u00a0 political groups\u00a0 whenever they need\u00a0 to gain political votes.\u00a0 Thus, peacebuilding in general\u00a0 is an accepted term in our region. At the same\u00a0 time, reconciliation is not such a popular term. Some are at best\u00a0 reluctant\u00a0 to use it. Different voices can be heard throughout the region, from those\u00a0 absolutely\u00a0 in favour of reconciliation;\u00a0 via those\u00a0 saying that they personally do not need\u00a0 it because they did not quarrel with anyone;\u00a0 and\u00a0 those\u00a0 saying that\u00a0 truth and justice\u00a0 is\u00a0 more\u00a0 important;\u00a0\u00a0 to\u00a0 those\u00a0\u00a0 who\u00a0 do\u00a0 not\u00a0 want\u00a0 to\u00a0 reconcile\u00a0 with\u00a0 \u201cthose\u00a0\u00a0 who slaughtered us\u201d because they should\u00a0 be punished. Very different understandings of the notion\u00a0 certainly exist.\u00a0 Even peace\u00a0 activists\u00a0 rarely use\u00a0 the\u00a0 term\u00a0 to\u00a0 describe\u00a0 their work. Thus it is necessary to clarify the term reconciliation,\u00a0 and to explore how useful it is for peacebuilding.<\/p>\n

3.1\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Reconciliation as a multidimensional process<\/strong><\/p>\n

Reconciliation is not a very new concept,\u00a0 since\u00a0 it has\u00a0 existed\u00a0 for centuries\u00a0 and in almost\u00a0 all religions.\u00a0 Thus, it would seem\u00a0 logical for it to be quite\u00a0 well developed and widespread, so that it is relatively clear what it is and how it is done, at least half as clear as what war is and how to start one. But partly due to the fact that religious institutions
\nhave\u00a0 not\u00a0 been\u00a0 very helpful\u00a0 in developing\u00a0 this\u00a0 concept46 , as\u00a0 maintaining\u00a0 the\u00a0 militant<\/p>\n

(45 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0John\u00a0 Paul\u00a0 Lederach,\u00a0 \u201cCivil Society\u00a0 and\u00a0 Reconciliation,\u201d\u00a0\u00a0 in\u00a0 Turbulent\u00a0 Peace:\u00a0 The\u00a0 Challenges\u00a0 of
\nManaging International Conflict , eds. C. A. Crocker et al. (Washington D.C.: USIP, 2001), 853.
\n46 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Taking\u00a0 a\u00a0\u00a0 very\u00a0 critical\u00a0 stance\u00a0\u00a0 towards\u00a0\u00a0 religious\u00a0\u00a0 communities,\u00a0 their\u00a0\u00a0 representatives\u00a0\u00a0 and\u00a0\u00a0 their problematic role in public does not imply that I diminish all the positive and peace-oriented initiatives within the religious communities or started by interreligious\u00a0 and ecumenical groups. My critique is mainly based on public acts and speeches given by religious representatives. Concerning the role of religious institutions in “heating up the atmosphere”, see Vjekoslav Perica, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States (New York: Oxford\u00a0 University Press,\u00a0 2002);\u00a0 Milorad Tomani\u0107, Srpska\u00a0 crkva u ratu i ratovi u njoj [The Serb Church at war and the wars within it], (Beograd: Medijska knji\u017eara Krug, 2001); Mitja Velikonja et al., \u201cThe Role of Religions and Religious Communities in the Wars in ex-Yugoslavia 1991-1999,\u201d trans. R. Obradovi\u0107- \u0110ur\u0111evi\u0107 et al., in Religion in Eastern Europe XXI\/4 (August 2003):\u00a0 1-42; Vjekoslav Perica, \u201cUloga crkava u konstrukciji\u00a0 dr\u017eavotvornih\u00a0 mitova\u00a0 Hrvatske i Srbije,\u201d in Historijski mitovi na Balkanu (Sarajevo: Institut\u00a0 za
\nIstoriju, 2003).)<\/p>\n

patriarchal\u00a0 concept\u00a0 of the \u2018other\u2019 and\u00a0 the role of sole victim seemed more important\u00a0 to them47\u00a0 (at least in this region), there is considerable confusion about what reconciliation\u00a0 is supposed to be.
\nReconciliation as a secular notion is much newer, and there is still no consensus in academic and\u00a0 peacebuilding circles on how to define\u00a0 it. It is mostly considered as\u00a0 an important multi-dimensional concept\u00a0 without\u00a0 one\u00a0 easy\u00a0 recipe\u00a0 to follow.48\u00a0\u00a0 In Galtung\u2019s words:\u00a0 \u201cReconciliation\u00a0 is\u00a0 a\u00a0 theme\u00a0 with deep\u00a0 psychological,\u00a0 sociological,\u00a0 theological, philosophical,\u00a0\u00a0 and\u00a0\u00a0 profoundly\u00a0\u00a0 human\u00a0\u00a0 roots\u00a0\u00a0 \u2013\u00a0 and\u00a0\u00a0 nobody\u00a0\u00a0 really\u00a0 knows\u00a0\u00a0 how\u00a0 to successfully\u00a0 achieve it.\u201d49
\nMost scholars\u00a0 agree\u00a0 that\u00a0 reconciliation\u00a0 is a process\u00a0 aiming to improve relations between\u00a0 human\u00a0 beings\u00a0 or groups:\u00a0 to\u00a0 restore\u00a0 broken\u00a0 relationships,50\u00a0\u00a0 to change\u00a0 and redefine51\u00a0\u00a0 or redesign52\u00a0\u00a0 them,\u00a0 to\u00a0 prepare\u00a0 the\u00a0 parties\u00a0 for \u201crelations\u00a0 with justice\u00a0 and<\/p>\n

(47 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Editors\u2019 note: For a feminist and gender-orieneted critique on a militant partriarchal discourse based on religious\u00a0 fundamentalism, see\u00a0 \u0160ta svaka\u00a0 gra\u0111anka\u00a0 i gra\u0111anin\u00a0 treba\u00a0 da\u00a0 zanju o SPC [What\u00a0 all citizens should\u00a0 know about\u00a0 the Serb Orthodox Chruch], (Beograd: Koalicija za sekularnu dr\u017eavu, 2007);\u00a0 Nada Ler- Sofroni\u0107,\u00a0 \u201cFa\u0161izam\u00a0 danas: \u017eene\u00a0 izme\u0111u\u00a0 vjerskog\u00a0 i\u00a0 tr\u017ei\u0161nog\u00a0 fundamentalizma\u201d [Fascism\u00a0 today:\u00a0 women between\u00a0 religious\u00a0 and trade fundamentalism], in Zeni\u010dke sveske\u00a0 \u2013 \u010casopis za dru\u0161tvenu\u00a0 fenomenologiju i kulturnu dijalogiku 7 (2008): 135-150. Jasminka Avdispahi\u0107-Babi\u0107, \u201cFeminizam i diskurs o pravima\u201d, in Forum Bosna: Religija i javni \u017eivot 19 (2002):\u00a0 286-297;\u00a0 \u017denska\u00a0 mre\u017ea Hrvatske, \u201cKatoli\u010dka crkva \u0161tetno\u00a0 utje\u010de na polo\u017eaj\u00a0 \u017eena\u00a0 u Hrvatskoj\u201d [The damaging\u00a0 influence\u00a0 of the\u00a0 Catholic Church onto the position of women in Croatia], www.zamirzine.net\/spip.php?article3461 (accessed\u00a0 October\u00a0 10, 2008).\u00a0 For a more\u00a0 moderate, yet critical and\u00a0 profound\u00a0 analysis\u00a0 of the\u00a0 relation\u00a0 between\u00a0 religion, civil\u00a0 society\u00a0 and\u00a0 gender\u00a0 see\u00a0 Zilka Spahi\u0107- \u0160iljak, \u017dene, religija i politika: analiza utjecaja interpretativnog religijskog\u00a0 naslije\u0111a\u00a0 judaizma\u00a0 kr\u0161\u0107anstva\u00a0 i islama na anga\u017eman\u00a0 \u017eene u javnom \u017eivotu i politici u BiH [Women, religion and politics: an analysis\u00a0 of the influence of the interpretative religious inheritage of Judaism, Christianity and Islam in public and political life in BiH] (Sarajevo: IMIC, 2007).
\n48 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0For models\u00a0 on reconciliation\u00a0 and\u00a0 truth proposed and\u00a0 discussed in the region of former Yugoslavia, see\u00a0 Vesna Nikoli\u0107-Ristanovi\u0107, \u201cSpecifi\u010dnost\u00a0 dru\u0161tveno-istorijskog konteksta i viktimizacija u Srbiji i njihov zna\u010daj\u00a0 za\u00a0 koncipiranje\u00a0\u00a0 modela\u00a0\u00a0 istine\u00a0 i\u00a0 pomirenja\u201d\u00a0\u00a0 [The\u00a0 specificity\u00a0 of\u00a0 the\u00a0 social-historical context\u00a0 and victimisation in Serbia and their meaning for conceptualising a model of Truth and Reconciliaiton], in Temida
\n4 (2002):\u00a0 55-66. English version\u00a0 available\u00a0 at www.vds.org.yu\/File\/VesnaNikolic-Ristanovic1.doc\u00a0 (accessed August 28, 2008);\u00a0 Vesna Nikoli\u0107-Ristanovi\u0107, \u201cTruth and reconciliation\u00a0 experience in Serbia:\u00a0 the process\u00a0 so far,\u201d paper presented at the XI International Symposium of the World Society of Victimology New horizons in victimology,\u00a0 Stellenbosch (South\u00a0 Africa), 13-18 July\u00a0 2003;\u00a0 Jelena\u00a0 To\u0161i\u0107, \u201cKoji model\u00a0 istine\u00a0 i pomirenja odgovara biv\u0161oj\u00a0 Jugoslaviji? Razmi\u0161ljanja\u00a0 na osnovu\u00a0 zavr\u0161ne\u00a0 panel\u00a0 diskusije\u201d\u00a0 [Which model\u00a0 of Truth and Reconciliation suits former Yugoslavia? Reflections based on the final panel discussion], paper presented at the\u00a0 Austrian\u00a0 Academy\u00a0 of\u00a0 Science\u00a0\u00a0 for\u00a0 the\u00a0 the\u00a0 Commission\u00a0\u00a0 for\u00a0 Social\u00a0 Anthropology\u00a0 Research\u00a0\u00a0 Fund\u00a0 \u2013 Wittgenstein\u00a0\u00a0 2000;\u00a0\u00a0 Dejan\u00a0\u00a0 \u0110oki\u0107,\u00a0 \u201cUnutaretni\u010dko\u00a0\u00a0 pomirenje\u00a0\u00a0 i\u00a0 nacionalna\u00a0 homogenizacija:\u00a0\u00a0 diskurs\u00a0\u00a0 o pomirenju\u00a0 u\u00a0 Srbiji\u00a0 i\u00a0 Hrvatskoj\u201d\u00a0 [Intraethnical\u00a0 reconciliation\u00a0\u00a0 and\u00a0 national\u00a0 homogenisation: dicourse\u00a0\u00a0 on Reconciliation\u00a0 in\u00a0 Serbia\u00a0 and\u00a0 Croatia],\u00a0 in\u00a0 Re\u010d 7\/16\u00a0\u00a0 (2003):\u00a0 109-127;\u00a0 Vjeran\u00a0 Katunari\u0107,\u00a0 \u201cOblici\u00a0 mira\u00a0 u multietni\u010dkim\u00a0 sredinama\u201d [Forms of peace\u00a0 in\u00a0 multiethnical communities],\u00a0 in Migracijske\u00a0 i etni\u010dke\u00a0 teme\u00a0 4 (2007):\u00a0 391-408;\u00a0 Goran Milas,\u00a0 Ivan Rimac and\u00a0 Nenad\u00a0 Karaji\u0107, \u201cSpremnost na\u00a0 oprost\u00a0 i pomirenje\u00a0 nakon domovinskog rata u Hrvatskoj\u201d [The willingness to forgive and reconcile after the homeland war in Croatia], in Dru\u0161tvena istra\u017eivanja \u2013 \u010casopis za op\u0107a dru\u0161tvena\u00a0 pitanja 6 (2007): 1151-1173; et al.
\n49 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Johan Galtung, \u201cAfter Violence, Reconstruction,\u00a0 Reconciliation,\u00a0 and\u00a0 Resolution.\u00a0 Coping with Visible and Invisible Effects of War and Violence,\u201d in Reconciliation, Justice and Coexistence. Theory and Practice , ed. Mohammed Abu-Nimer (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2001), 4.
\n50 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Andrew Rigby, “Twenty Observations on\u00a0 \u2018Post-settlement\u2019 Reconciliation,\u201d\u00a0 paper\u00a0 presented at\u00a0 the
\nReconciliation Expert Network seminar, Stockholm, 15-17 March 2006), 1.
\n51\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Lederach, Civil Society, 847.)<\/p>\n

peace,\u201d53\u00a0 to build\u00a0 and\u00a0 heal\u00a0 \u201cthe\u00a0 torn fabric of interpersonal and\u00a0 community\u00a0 lives and relationships.\u201d54\u00a0\u00a0 Thus, it is the\u00a0 concerned parties\u00a0 who should\u00a0 create\u00a0 and\/or recreate relationships that\u00a0 suit\u00a0 them\u00a0 both;\u00a0 they should\u00a0 put\u00a0 effort into making\u00a0 a first step\u00a0 and starting to change.\u00a0 Reconciliation\u00a0 refers to the\u00a0 future and,\u00a0 as\u00a0 Rigby says,\u00a0 \u201crequires\u00a0 the active participation of those\u00a0 who were divided by enmity. At the core of any reconciliation\u00a0 process is the preparedness of people\u00a0 to anticipate a shared future.\u201d55
\nYet although\u00a0 the process\u00a0 of reconciliation\u00a0 focuses\u00a0 on the future, it does\u00a0 not imply
\nthat\u00a0\u00a0 atrocities\u00a0\u00a0 and\u00a0\u00a0 human\u00a0\u00a0 rights\u00a0\u00a0 abuses\u00a0 from\u00a0 the\u00a0\u00a0 past\u00a0\u00a0 should\u00a0\u00a0 be\u00a0 forgotten\u00a0\u00a0 and neglected, but\u00a0 serves\u00a0 \u201cprecisely\u00a0 to ensure\u00a0 that\u00a0 the\u00a0 past\u00a0 does\u00a0 not return.\u201d56\u00a0\u00a0 Thus, the process of reconciliation also has to deal with the past, or as Lederach puts it:
\nIts primary goal and key contribution\u00a0 is to seek innovative ways to create a time and\u00a0\u00a0 place,\u00a0\u00a0 within\u00a0 various\u00a0\u00a0 levels\u00a0\u00a0 of\u00a0 the\u00a0\u00a0 affected\u00a0\u00a0 population,\u00a0 to\u00a0 address, integrate, and embrace\u00a0 the\u00a0 painful\u00a0 past\u00a0 and\u00a0 the\u00a0 necessary shared future as\u00a0 a means\u00a0 of dealing with the present.57<\/p>\n

Scholars often define reconciliation\u00a0 as a multidimensional process\u00a0 that\u00a0 encompasses a number\u00a0\u00a0 of\u00a0 elements.\u00a0 For\u00a0 Lederach,\u00a0\u00a0 these\u00a0\u00a0 are\u00a0 truth,\u00a0\u00a0 mercy,\u00a0 justice\u00a0\u00a0 and\u00a0\u00a0 peace.58
\nBloomfield,\u00a0 considering\u00a0\u00a0 reconciliation\u00a0\u00a0 as\u00a0\u00a0 an\u00a0\u00a0 \u201cumbrella\u00a0\u00a0 term\u201d,\u00a0\u00a0 defines\u00a0\u00a0 four\u00a0 main
\ninstruments: a justice process,\u00a0 truth-seeking and truth-telling, a process\u00a0 of healing, and a process\u00a0 of reparation.59\u00a0\u00a0 According to\u00a0 Rigby, there\u00a0 are\u00a0 five necessary conditions\u00a0\u00a0 for constructive dealing\u00a0 with the past\u00a0 and\u00a0 thus\u00a0 reconciliation:\u00a0 truth, security (personal\u00a0 and collective), justice, time and culture.60
\nIn this region people\u00a0 usually discuss the notion of reconciliation\u00a0 in connection with
\ntruth, justice and forgiveness.\u00a0 Some perceive these\u00a0 concepts as being in collision, others see them as complementary or even as synonyms.\u00a0 It therefore\u00a0 seems necessary here to clarify what connections there\u00a0 are,\u00a0 and\u00a0 what\u00a0 importance truth,\u00a0 justice\u00a0 and\u00a0 forgiveness have for the processes of reconciliation\u00a0 and peacebuilding.<\/p>\n

(52 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0David\u00a0 Bloomfield,\u00a0 \u201cReconciliation:\u00a0\u00a0 An\u00a0 Introduction,\u201d\u00a0\u00a0 in\u00a0 Reconciliation\u00a0 After\u00a0 Violent\u00a0\u00a0 Conflict: A Handbook, eds. Bloomfield et al. (Stockholm: IDEA, 2003), 12.
\n53 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Galtung, After Violence, 3.
\n54 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Lederach, Civil Society, 842.
\n55 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Rigby, Andrew, Justice and Reconciliation after the Violence (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001),
\n12.
\n56 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Bloomfield, Reconciliation, 15.
\n57\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0John\u00a0 Paul\u00a0 Lederach,\u00a0\u00a0 Building\u00a0 Peace:\u00a0 Sustainable\u00a0 Reconciliation\u00a0 in\u00a0 Divided\u00a0 Societies,\u00a0 2nd\u00a0\u00a0 ed.
\n(Washington: United States Institute for Peace, 1998), 35.
\n58 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Lederach, Civil Society, 849.
\n59 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0David Bloomfield, On Good Terms: Clarifying Reconciliation. Berghof Report No. 14 (Berlin: Berghof
\nForschungszentrum f\u00fcr konstruktives Konfliktmanagment, October 2006), 12.
\n60 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Rigby, Twenty Observations, 8.)<\/p>\n

Truth<\/strong><\/p>\n

The most\u00a0 permanent request by those\u00a0 who have\u00a0 endured violence,\u00a0 families\u00a0 of victims\u00a0 and\u00a0 those\u00a0 who struggle\u00a0 for political and\u00a0 social\u00a0 change\u00a0 is the\u00a0 request\u00a0 for truth about\u00a0 past misdeeds to be known and publicly acknowledged. Some voices say that too much\u00a0 truth\u00a0 can\u00a0 be\u00a0 counterproductive, and\u00a0 that\u00a0 it is\u00a0 better\u00a0 to\u00a0 try to\u00a0 let\u00a0 bygones\u00a0 be bygones.\u00a0 But those\u00a0 who suffered\u00a0 cannot\u00a0 forget, and\u00a0 if society\u00a0 does\u00a0 not recognise\u00a0 and acknowledge that terrible things were done to them, they will not have trust and will not feel safe\u00a0 in such\u00a0 a society,\u00a0 they\u00a0 will\u00a0 not\u00a0 feel a part\u00a0 of it. One can\u00a0 argue\u00a0 that\u00a0 not\u00a0 to acknowledge what\u00a0 has\u00a0 happened, to deny\u00a0 it,\u00a0 to close\u00a0 one\u2019s\u00a0 eyes\u00a0 to it amount\u00a0 to not taking care and supporting\u00a0 wrongdoing.61\u00a0\u00a0 It also implies that there is no guarantee that the\u00a0\u00a0 past\u00a0\u00a0 will\u00a0 not\u00a0\u00a0 return,\u00a0\u00a0 and\u00a0\u00a0 that\u00a0\u00a0 our\u00a0 societies\u00a0\u00a0 accept\u00a0\u00a0 atrocities\u00a0\u00a0 as\u00a0\u00a0 a\u00a0 \u2018normal phenomenon\u2019.\u00a0\u00a0 In\u00a0\u00a0 such\u00a0\u00a0 an\u00a0\u00a0 atmosphere\u00a0 reconciliation\u00a0\u00a0 is\u00a0\u00a0 not\u00a0 possible.\u00a0 As\u00a0 Bleeker emphasized, \u201ctruth\u00a0 is\u00a0 the\u00a0 centrepiece of successful\u00a0 conflict\u00a0 transformation and\u00a0 of a future lasting peace.\u201d62
\nTruth is important\u00a0 with respect\u00a0 to\u00a0 three\u00a0 dimensions: \u201cwhat\u00a0 happened?\u201d, \u201cwhat made it possible?\u201d and \u201cwho did it?\u201d. Many voices express\u00a0 many truths, but there is only one\u00a0 truth\u00a0 about\u00a0 human\u00a0 suffering: the\u00a0 facts\u00a0 about\u00a0 what people\u00a0 endured, an answer\u00a0 to what has happened. And this truth has priority in being acknowledged, no matter\u00a0 which identity\u00a0 group\u00a0 those\u00a0 who\u00a0 suffered\u00a0 belong\u00a0 to. This dimension\u00a0 of truth\u00a0 must\u00a0 not\u00a0 be\u00a0 an object of disputes.
\nOf course\u00a0 there\u00a0 is a variety of interpretations about\u00a0 causes and\u00a0 roots of violence due\u00a0\u00a0 to\u00a0 competing\u00a0\u00a0 narratives\u00a0\u00a0 and\u00a0\u00a0 myths\u00a0 (and\u00a0\u00a0 myths\u00a0 are\u00a0 \u201cstrangely\u00a0\u00a0 impervious\u00a0\u00a0 to facts\u201d).63\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 This\u00a0 is the\u00a0 hardest task,\u00a0 as\u00a0 it raises\u00a0 questions about\u00a0 responsibility,\u00a0 and\u00a0 all parties,\u00a0 of course, see themselves as righteous\u00a0 ones.\u00a0 Instead\u00a0 of asking why, one should ask what made it possible? Mapping the ideology that lies behind\u00a0 the conflict is a crucial task\u00a0 (at least\u00a0 in the\u00a0 region of\u00a0 former Yugoslavia).64\u00a0\u00a0 Only when we become\u00a0 absolutely aware of what led us to large-scale\u00a0 violence, then we can know what we have to change.\u00a0 And building peace is about making change.
\nThe third dimension\u00a0 of truth is about who committed\u00a0 a crime. The main reason\u00a0 why this is important\u00a0 is to give a name to a perpetrator, so that the perpetrator\u00a0 is not \u2018them\u2019, the other group, but a number of individuals.<\/p>\n

(61\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Stanley\u00a0 Cohen, Stanje\u00a0 poricanja: Znati za zlodela\u00a0 i patnje\u00a0 [original title:\u00a0 States\u00a0 of\u00a0 Denial.\u00a0 Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering], trans. S. Gli\u0161i\u0107, (Beograd: Samizdat B92, 2003), 413.
\n62 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0M\u00f4 Bleeker Massard, \u201cIntroduction and Recommendations,\u201d in Dealing with the Past: Critical Issues, Lessons Learned and Challenges for Future Swiss Policy, eds. M\u00f4 Bleeker and Jonathan Sisson, Swisspeace Working Paper 2, KOFF Series, 2004, available at www.swisspeace.ch\/typo3\/fileadmin\/user_upload\/pdf\/KOFF\/KOFF_DealingWithThePast.pdf, p. 5 (accessed August 17, 2008).
\n63 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Ignatieff, \u201cArticles of Faith,\u201d in Index on Censorship 5 (1996), 116.
\n64 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Ignatieff claims that truth cannot not lie somewhere \u201cin between\u201d. It cannot result from a compromise\u00a0 between two competing versions of events: \u201ceither the siege of Sarajevo was a deliberate attempt to terrorize and subvert\u00a0 the elected\u00a0 government\u00a0 of an internationally recognized state\u00a0 or it was a legitimate\u00a0 preemptive\u00a0 defence\u00a0 of the Serbs’\u00a0 homeland from Muslim attack. It cannot be both\u201d (Ignatieff, ibid., 114). Yet, sometimes a truth can consist\u00a0 of a number of individual truths.\u00a0 For a militaristic mind a siege of a city is legitimate\u00a0 pre- emptive defence. So we should\u00a0 not focus on the question of which truth is a true one, but on the ideology, in this case militaristic ethnonationalism, that lies behind\u00a0 it.)<\/p>\n

Justice<\/strong><\/p>\n

It can\u00a0 be\u00a0 often\u00a0 heard,\u00a0 especially\u00a0 from those\u00a0 who have\u00a0 endured\u00a0 misdeeds, that there is no peace\u00a0 and reconciliation\u00a0 without justice. For many people\u00a0 justice means\u00a0 first and\u00a0 foremost\u00a0 punishing\u00a0\u00a0 wrongdoers.\u00a0 Vjera, whose\u00a0 young\u00a0 daughter was\u00a0 killed,\u00a0 most probably\u00a0 because she was born in a \u2018mixed\u2019 marriage,\u00a0 points\u00a0 out that\u00a0 there\u00a0 will be no reconciliation,
\n[u]ntil [the] justice system brings justice to all, regardless of their nationality, for all war victims[\u2026] Until I find out who has killed my daughter and why. How can someone\u00a0 walk\u00a0 freely\u00a0 after\u00a0 murdering\u00a0 100\u00a0 people?\u00a0 How? I\u00a0 know\u00a0 that\u00a0 Serbs slaughtered, but by God, the Croats did also, very much so.65<\/p>\n

But\u00a0 there\u00a0 is\u00a0 a\u00a0 dilemma\u00a0\u00a0 about\u00a0\u00a0 justice,\u00a0\u00a0 according\u00a0 to\u00a0 Judge\u00a0 Goldstone,\u00a0\u00a0 former\u00a0 chief prosecutor\u00a0 at the\u00a0 ICTY. He argues\u00a0 that\u00a0 \u201cin a perfect\u00a0 society\u00a0 victims are entitled\u00a0 to full justice, namely trial of the\u00a0 perpetrator and,\u00a0 if found\u00a0 guilty, adequate punishment. That ideal\u00a0 is not\u00a0 possible in the\u00a0 aftermath\u00a0 of massive\u00a0 violence.\u00a0 There are simply too many victims and too many perpetrators. Even the most sophisticated criminal justice system would be completely overwhelmed.\u201d66\u00a0 As Rigby says,\u00a0 \u201c[a]t the\u00a0 heart\u00a0 of most\u00a0 common- sense notions\u00a0 of justice\u00a0 is\u00a0 the idea\u00a0 of \u2018making things\u00a0 right\u2019.\u201d67\u00a0\u00a0 But even\u00a0 if we could punish\u00a0 all the perpetrators, we would not complete\u00a0 the process\u00a0 of \u201cmaking things right\u201d. That would not\u00a0 bring us\u00a0 to a lasting\u00a0 peace,\u00a0 because changing\u00a0 the\u00a0 unjust\u00a0 system\u00a0 and giving up a militant ideology is what is crucial if lasting peace is the goal.
\nA minimum that could be done is the acknowledgment of crimes committed,\u00a0 public condemnation of those\u00a0 acts,\u00a0 and\u00a0 a demonstration that\u00a0 such\u00a0 crimes\u00a0 are\u00a0 unacceptable. Instead of treating war criminals as heroes,\u00a0 especially\u00a0 those\u00a0 who do not show any regret and\u00a0 remorse, their own \u2018communities\u2019\u00a0 should\u00a0 shame\u00a0 them.\u00a0 And turn their heads away from them\u00a0 as\u00a0 Edin says,\u00a0 whose\u00a0 father,\u00a0 brother\u00a0 and\u00a0 a number\u00a0 of relatives\u00a0 disappeared
\nafter being detained in a concentration camp.68<\/p>\n

(65 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Vjera Solar, interview in Nenad\u00a0 Vukosavljevi\u0107, Svi bi rado bacili kamen\u00a0 [All wish\u00a0 to cast\u00a0 a stone], (Belgrade-Sarajevo: CNA, 2007), DVD.
\n66 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Richard J. Goldstone, \u201cForeword,\u201d in Minow, Between Vengeance, ix-xx.
\n67 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Andrew\u00a0 Rigby, \u201cThree\u00a0 Contrasting\u00a0 Approaches\u00a0\u00a0 for\u00a0 \u2018Dealing\u00a0 with\u00a0 the\u00a0 Past\u2019:\u00a0 Collective\u00a0 Amnesia, Retributive Justice and Prioritising Truth,\u201d in CCTS Newsletter 18 (Autumn 2002).
\n68 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Edin\u00a0 Ramuli\u0107,\u00a0 interview\u00a0 in\u00a0 Aldin\u00a0 Arnautovi\u0107\u00a0 and\u00a0 Refik Hod\u017ei\u0107,\u00a0 Slijepa\u00a0 pravda\u00a0 [Justice\u00a0 Unseen], (Sarajevo: XY Films Produkcija, 2004), DVD.)<\/p>\n

Forgiveness<\/strong><\/p>\n

The reason\u00a0 why many people\u00a0 feel reluctant\u00a0 towards the concept of reconciliation\u00a0 in this region is that\u00a0 in many discussions it is directly linked to forgiveness.\u00a0 Many people,\u00a0 especially those\u00a0 who experienced violence themselves or saw it done to their close ones, feel resistance\u00a0 towards\u00a0 the\u00a0 concept\u00a0 of forgiveness,\u00a0 since\u00a0 it is mainly understood as\u00a0 a \u201cmoral issue\u201d:\u00a0 that it is a duty to forgive for the sake of peace. Due to this understanding, people\u00a0 may feel under pressure\u00a0 to forgive, that there is the expectation for them to make the\u00a0 first step\u00a0 and\u00a0 thus\u00a0 make\u00a0 a compromise that\u00a0 would not lead\u00a0 them\u00a0 to their so badly desired\u00a0 justice. As Minow observes: \u201cTo expect survivors to forgive is to heap yet another\u00a0 burden on them. To forgive without a good reason is to accept\u00a0 the violation and devalua- tion of the self.\u201d69
\nForgiveness is a very personal\u00a0 process\u00a0 and an act that cannot be demanded. It is a choice\u00a0 of the\u00a0 individual\u00a0 who has\u00a0 endured a misdeed \u2013 only she\/he has\u00a0 the\u00a0 power to decide.\u00a0 Anyone\u00a0 who\u00a0 has\u00a0\u00a0 suffered\u00a0\u00a0 should\u00a0\u00a0 keep\u00a0\u00a0 that\u00a0\u00a0 power\u00a0 and\u00a0 right,\u00a0 disregarding moralistic\u00a0 sermonising. If people\u00a0 are able\u00a0 to forgive, that\u00a0 does\u00a0 not mean\u00a0 that\u00a0 they are going to forget, or to annul or accept the misdeed\u00a0 done to them. If they do not want to or cannot forgive, it is not decisive in the process\u00a0 of peacebuilding.<\/p>\n

3.2 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Reconciliation by and with whom?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Rigby defines\u00a0 two dimensions of the reconciliation\u00a0 process: 1) reconciliation to the pain and loss,\u00a0 and\u00a0 2) reconciliation with former enemies for the\u00a0 sake\u00a0 of future coexis- tence. The first dimension, in transcending the desire to avenge the loss, is important\u00a0 for \u201cricher\u201d forms of coexistence between\u00a0 those\u00a0 divided by enmity.70\u00a0 As much as this is also important\u00a0 for the society, it is important\u00a0 for individuals\u00a0 so that\u00a0 they become\u00a0 capable of moving on with their lives.
\nThe dimension\u00a0 reconciliation with raises\u00a0 the difficult question: who should\u00a0 recon- cile\u00a0 with\u00a0 whom?71\u00a0\u00a0 A\u00a0 victim of a\u00a0 crime\u00a0 might\u00a0 reconcile\u00a0 with the\u00a0 perpetrator (in some circumstances), but this\u00a0 is not decisive\u00a0 in the\u00a0 process of peacebuilding in the\u00a0 society. They\u00a0 may\u00a0 never\u00a0 reconcile\u00a0 and\u00a0 forgive, many acts\u00a0 are\u00a0 not\u00a0 forgivable at\u00a0 all, but\u00a0 if they overcome the need for revenge, there is still a real chance to build lasting peace. Here we are talking about reconciliation\u00a0 on the level of individuals.<\/p>\n

(69 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Minow, Between Vengeance, 17.
\n70 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Rigby, Twenty Observations,\u00a0 5. For the three forms of coexistence that Rigby defined,\u00a0 see Table 1 in the Appendix.
\n71\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0I am thankful to my friend and colleague Tamara \u0160midling for insisting on this question.)<\/p>\n

It is of much\u00a0 greater\u00a0 importance for lasting\u00a0 peace\u00a0 in a society\u00a0 to address what happens in public\u00a0 disourse at\u00a0 a\u00a0 group\u00a0 level.\u00a0 And it is there\u00a0 that\u00a0 the\u00a0 question \u201cwho should\u00a0 reconcile\u00a0 with whom\u201d becomes a tricky one.\u00a0 Scholars\u00a0 usually\u00a0 refer to \u201cformer enemies\u201d, \u201cgroups\u00a0 that\u00a0 were once\u00a0 adversaries\u201d, those\u00a0 \u201cdivided\u00a0 by enmity\u201d, \u201cparties\u00a0 to the\u00a0 conflict\u201d,\u00a0 \u201csides\u201d,\u00a0 etc.\u00a0 In my own work, the\u00a0 question then\u00a0 arises\u00a0 who the\u00a0 former enemies are in the context\u00a0 of former Yugoslavia. Are these\u00a0 enemies actually Serbs\u00a0 and Croats (or other combinations)? As I have outlined in the previous chapter, the war of the early 1990s\u00a0 was not an\u00a0 \u201cethnic\u00a0 war\u201d that\u00a0 suddenly\u00a0 exploded\u00a0 due\u00a0 to so-called\u00a0 \u201cethnic hatred\u201d. The enmity of the\u00a0 ethnic\u00a0 groups\u00a0 is a constructed myth that\u00a0 was exploited\u00a0 for waging war, and it perfectly covered up the real underlying reasons.
\nIf the only meaning of \u201cethnic conflict\u201d is that all sides are ethnically distinct, \u201cthen all we have is a superficial\u00a0 description, not a useful\u00a0 concept\u201d,\u00a0 as Gilley argues.72\u00a0 From the peace activist\u2019s perspective, I can say that the concept may even be a dangerous one, feeding\u00a0\u00a0 and\u00a0\u00a0 strengthening\u00a0 ethnonationalist\u00a0 ideology.\u00a0 But\u00a0 it\u00a0 may\u00a0 also\u00a0\u00a0 lead\u00a0\u00a0 those concerned with the peacebuilding onto a wrong path.\u00a0 As Gilley says, \u201cOnce we decide to devote ourselves to the concerns\u00a0 of ethnicity, we may ignore the gross deprivations faced by the wretched peasant who either has no minority neighbours or who (as is mostly the case)\u00a0 lives peaceably with them.\u201d73\u00a0\u00a0 Esma, a\u00a0 woman\u00a0 who endured three\u00a0 years\u00a0 under siege\u00a0 in\u00a0 Sarajevo\u00a0 and\u00a0 frequent\u00a0 grenading,\u00a0 clearly\u00a0 stated: \u201cIt\u2019s them\u00a0 over\u00a0 there\u00a0 who should\u00a0 reconcile, those\u00a0 politicians,\u00a0 those,\u00a0 excuse\u00a0 my language,\u00a0 pieces\u00a0 of shit! Who am I to reconcile with, I never argued with anyone to begin with.\u201d74
\nThus, peace\u00a0 activists\u00a0 should\u00a0 not fall into the trap of looking at ethnicity as the ele- ment that divides people.\u00a0 Otherwise they may not recognise\u00a0 the root causes of conflict in our region.\u00a0 Peace\u00a0 activists\u00a0 should\u00a0 not\u00a0 focus\u00a0 primarily on ethnicity,\u00a0 but\u00a0 on structures, cultures\u00a0 and ideologies\u00a0 that\u00a0 are the basis\u00a0 for violent conflict. They should\u00a0 offer people\u00a0 space\u00a0 for taking a rest from the overwhelming and pressing\u00a0 ethnic label, and they should offer them other ways to perceive reality and to act.
\nIn our region it seems that an approach with the goal of reconciling large groups or peoples is not a useful one. It is individuals\u00a0 who can reconcile to and with. Rigby rightly notes\u00a0 that for the \u201crichest\u201d level of coexistence – where the level of reconciliation\u00a0 is deep \u2013 the\u00a0 key actors\u00a0 are everyday people\u00a0 at the\u00a0 grassroots level.75\u00a0\u00a0 This is not to say that nothing can be done with ethnonationalist public discourse. If many individuals\u00a0 were to change\u00a0 their\u00a0 attitudes and\u00a0 behaviour\u00a0\u00a0 towards\u00a0 members\u00a0\u00a0 of\u00a0 other\u00a0 group(s),\u00a0 it\u00a0 would influence change\u00a0 in the main public discourse. That would be a \u201cbottom-up\u201d approach. Again, though, it starts with reconciliation on personal level.<\/p>\n

(72 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Bruce Gilley, \u201cAgainst the Concept of Ethnic Conflict\u201d in Third World Quarterly 25\/6 (2004): 1158.
\n73 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Ibid, 1163.
\n74 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Esma, interview in Helena Rill and Ivana Franovi\u0107, \u201cNe mo\u017ee meni bit dobro ako je mom susjedu\u00a0 lo\u0161e\u201c [\u201cI cannot feel well if my neighbour\u00a0 does not\u201c], (Belgrade: Centre for Nonviolent Action, 2005). 42. See also www.nenasilje.org (accessed August 18, 2008). The English version of the book is forthcoming in early 2009.
\n75\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Rigby, Twenty Observations, 13. See Table 1 in the Appendix.)<\/p>\n

But a bottom-up\u00a0 approach alone\u00a0 is not enough,\u00a0 thus\u00a0 it is important\u00a0 to develop\u00a0 a more\u00a0 political\u00a0 view on\u00a0 reconciliation\u00a0\u00a0 and\u00a0 its\u00a0 significance\u00a0 for conflict\u00a0 transformation. Bloomfield\u00a0 suggests\u00a0 that\u00a0\u00a0 reconciliation\u00a0\u00a0 is\u00a0 \u201can\u00a0\u00a0 essential\u00a0 (and\u00a0\u00a0 essentially\u00a0 political) ingredient\u00a0 in\u00a0 peacebuilding, just\u00a0 as\u00a0 central\u00a0 and\u00a0 just\u00a0 as\u00a0 necessary as\u00a0 economic\u00a0 recon- struction,\u00a0\u00a0 legal\u00a0\u00a0 reform,\u00a0\u00a0 and\u00a0\u00a0 all\u00a0 other\u00a0\u00a0 post-violence\u00a0\u00a0 reconstructive\u00a0 and\u00a0\u00a0 preventive measures.\u201d76\u00a0 He argues that\u00a0 in the\u00a0 political\u00a0 practice\u00a0 of rebuilding\u00a0 post-war\u00a0 structures, \u201cpeacebuilding and\u00a0 democracy-building will benefit\u00a0 significantly in their\u00a0 efficacy from paying\u00a0 more\u00a0 overt attention\u00a0 to the\u00a0 nature\u00a0 of the\u00a0 relations\u00a0 that\u00a0 are\u00a0 built during\u00a0 these\u00a0 processes. In developing\u00a0 [\u2026] a \u2018fair\u2019 society after violence, political institutions must be designed\u00a0 so\u00a0 that\u00a0\u00a0 not\u00a0 only\u00a0 do\u00a0 they\u00a0 further\u00a0 fairness,\u00a0\u00a0 representation,\u00a0 accountability,\u00a0 inclusiveness, etc., and the ability to manage difference without recourse\u00a0 to violence, but that\u00a0 they\u00a0 also\u00a0 pay\u00a0 conscious and\u00a0 ongoing\u00a0 attention\u00a0 to\u00a0 the\u00a0 relations\u00a0\u00a0 contained and developed by and within them.\u201d77
\nFollowing this\u00a0 understanding of reconciliation,\u00a0 however, there\u00a0 remains\u00a0 the\u00a0 same open question: who should\u00a0 reconcile with whom? And this question should\u00a0 be seriously considered by those\u00a0 who are devoted\u00a0 to peacebuilding and\u00a0 reconciliation\u00a0 work. Never- theless, even\u00a0 if there\u00a0 is\u00a0 reluctance\u00a0 about\u00a0 the\u00a0 concept\u00a0\u00a0 of\u00a0 reconciliation\u00a0\u00a0 (and\u00a0 peace\u00a0 activists\u00a0 in the region rarely use that\u00a0 term to describe\u00a0 their work), I do find it useful for peacebuilding in our region.\u00a0 It is important\u00a0 that\u00a0 individuals\u00a0 reconcile to pain\u00a0 and\u00a0 loss and\u00a0 overcome\u00a0 the desire\u00a0 for revenge,\u00a0 and thus\u00a0 prevent\u00a0 a new cycle of violence.\u00a0 People might be\u00a0 able\u00a0 to reconcile with direct\u00a0 perpetrators,\u00a0 but\u00a0 that\u00a0 is not\u00a0 decisive\u00a0 in peace- building (overcoming the desire for revenge is crucial). In this case\u00a0 it is more important that\u00a0 the\u00a0 rest\u00a0 of the\u00a0 society\u00a0 does\u00a0 not support\u00a0 or deny\u00a0 the\u00a0 acts\u00a0 of perpetrators. This is about\u00a0 reconciliation\u00a0 on\u00a0 a\u00a0 personal level.\u00a0 \u201cPolitical\u00a0 reconciliation\u201d\u00a0 could\u00a0 be\u00a0 all those\u00a0 processes and acts on the level of society that contribute\u00a0 to and encourage reconciliation\u00a0 on\u00a0\u00a0 an\u00a0\u00a0 individual\u00a0\u00a0 level\u00a0\u00a0 to\u00a0\u00a0 happen,\u00a0 that\u00a0\u00a0 encourage\u00a0\u00a0 broken\u00a0\u00a0 relationships\u00a0 to\u00a0\u00a0 be (re)established, that\u00a0 promote\u00a0 peaceful\u00a0 and\u00a0 respectful\u00a0 relations.\u00a0 Political\u00a0 reconciliation\u00a0 means\u00a0 processes that\u00a0 contribute\u00a0 to\u00a0 peacebuilding and\u00a0 lower the\u00a0 chances for\u00a0 peace\u00a0 degrading.\u00a0 Sustainable peace\u00a0 in our region cannot\u00a0 be\u00a0 reached\u00a0 without\u00a0 serious\u00a0 effort being\u00a0 put\u00a0 into\u00a0 political\u00a0 reconciliation.\u00a0\u00a0 But neither\u00a0 political\u00a0 reconciliation\u00a0 nor\u00a0 lasting peace is possible without facing our violent past in a constructive\u00a0 way.<\/p>\n

(76 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Bloomfield, On Good Terms, 9.
\n77\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Ibid., 30.)<\/p>\n

3.3 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Facing the Past as a precondition for sustainable peace<\/strong><\/p>\n

The past\u00a0 is a heavy burden for the present and future if inappropriately\u00a0 dealt with. It is the past\u00a0 that we remember,\u00a0 not so much historical facts, but rather strong emotions, pain,\u00a0 loss,\u00a0 victimisation,\u00a0\u00a0 injustice,\u00a0\u00a0 myths\u00a0 and\u00a0 narratives\u00a0\u00a0 that\u00a0\u00a0 developed\u00a0 around\u00a0\u00a0 it. Because\u00a0 there\u00a0 is so much pain associated with it, it is quite difficult to deal\u00a0 with it in a constructive\u00a0\u00a0 manner,\u00a0 and\u00a0 that\u00a0 is\u00a0 why peacebuilding and\u00a0 reconciliation\u00a0 are\u00a0 not\u00a0 easy processes at all. If it is a distant past,\u00a0 we can even have the case\u00a0 of \u201cchosen\u00a0 trauma\u201d\u00a0 \u2013 trauma\u00a0 not as\u00a0 a consequence of\u00a0 something\u00a0 upsetting that\u00a0 we experienced, but\u00a0 some- thing\u00a0 that\u00a0 previous\u00a0 generations\u00a0 endured.78\u00a0\u00a0 Almost every large group\u00a0 has\u00a0 this\u00a0 kind of past,\u00a0 and if many group members\u00a0 are not reconciled to it, if the desire\u00a0 to avenge\u00a0 is not relinquished,\u00a0 this\u00a0 past\u00a0\u00a0 may\u00a0 be\u00a0 easily\u00a0 mobilized\u00a0 and\u00a0 abused\u00a0 for\u00a0 different\u00a0 political purposes. As Giordano describes, in most cases, \u201cintellectual\u00a0 and political elites manage\u00a0 the past and produce both the histories and the memories of a society, and consequently also\u00a0 the\u00a0 antagonistic truths.\u00a0 The latter\u00a0 are a specific\u00a0 social construction of reality that results\u00a0 from an accurate\u00a0 re-elaboration, reinterpretation, manipulation, or even reinven- tion of the past in the present.\u201d79
\nFor Neier there\u00a0 are two crucial reasons for dealing\u00a0 with the\u00a0 past.\u00a0 The first one\u00a0 is recognition\u00a0 of \u201cthe worth and\u00a0 dignity of those\u00a0 victimised\u201d,\u00a0 because if we fail to do that we\u00a0 \u201cperpetuate, even\u00a0 compound, their victimisation.\u201d\u00a0 The second reason\u00a0 is establish- ment of the rule of law. The question of deterring future abuses is not credible enough for him, \u201cbecause it involves predictions.\u201d80\u00a0 Maybe it does involve predictions,\u00a0 but a violent past\u00a0 is a time-bomb\u00a0 if\u00a0 inappropriately dealt\u00a0 with. It can\u00a0 always\u00a0 be\u00a0 used\u00a0 as\u00a0 an\u00a0 ideal excuse to massacre other people.
\nA victim of violence, or a group that maintains a chosen\u00a0 trauma due to the victimi- sation of its ancestors, can become a perpetrator. And a new cycle of violence is opened. Reconciliation\u00a0 to\u00a0 loss\u00a0 might\u00a0 prevent\u00a0 the\u00a0 reopening\u00a0 of that\u00a0 cycle, bury it forever, and contribute\u00a0 to the start of a life in the present and for the future. Rigby argues that finding a way of dealing\u00a0 with the\u00a0 pain of the\u00a0 past\u00a0 is necessary\u00a0 for people\u00a0 \u201cto reinterpret\u00a0 that past, looking backwards\u00a0 through\u00a0 time with a different lens that\u00a0 enables them to recon-
\nstruct\u00a0 their memories\u00a0 in such\u00a0 a manner\u00a0 that\u00a0 eases the\u00a0 intensity\u00a0 of feelings\u00a0 of hatred,<\/p>\n

(78 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0See Vamik Volkan, \u201cTransgenerational Transmissions and Chosen Traumas: An Aspect of Large-Group
\nIdentity,\u201d in Group Analysis 34\/1, 79-97.
\n79 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Christian\u00a0 Giordano,\u00a0 \u201cDealing\u00a0 with the\u00a0 Past,\u00a0 Dealing\u00a0 with History,\u201d in Dealing with\u00a0 the\u00a0 Past,\u00a0 eds. Bleeker and Sisson, 56.
\n80 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Aryeh Neier in Boraine et al., eds., Dealing with the Past. Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa, 2nd ed. (Cape Town: IDASA, 1997), 3.)<\/p>\n

bitterness and\u00a0\u00a0 loss.\u201d81\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 He\u00a0 also\u00a0\u00a0 argues\u00a0\u00a0 that\u00a0\u00a0 constructive\u00a0\u00a0 dealing\u00a0\u00a0 with\u00a0 the\u00a0 past\u00a0\u00a0 is comparable to forgiveness, if this process\u00a0 is not understood as a moral obligation, but as a\u00a0 process\u00a0 of \u201cthe\u00a0 formation\u00a0 of new\u00a0 memory\u00a0 (personal\u00a0\u00a0 and\u00a0 collective)\u00a0 that\u00a0 liberates people\u00a0 from\u00a0 the\u00a0 over-determining\u00a0 negative\u00a0 influence\u00a0 of the\u00a0 past.\u201d82\u00a0\u00a0 This\u00a0 should\u00a0 not mean\u00a0 forgetting the\u00a0 pain,\u00a0 loss\u00a0 and\u00a0 numerous abuses, this\u00a0 should\u00a0 mean\u00a0 perceiving the past\u00a0 and\u00a0 present in a new light, since\u00a0 \u201chistory and\u00a0 background\u00a0 are not the only way of seeing\u00a0 ourselves and\u00a0 groups\u00a0 to\u00a0 which\u00a0 we\u00a0 belong.\u201d83\u00a0\u00a0 An indispensable step\u00a0 in\u00a0 this process is to make a decision\u00a0 whether we are going to live for the past\u00a0 or in the present, whether we are going to live at all, or to maintain and perpetuate into eternity the cycle of violence.\u00a0 But for all this\u00a0 to\u00a0 happen, a\u00a0 public\u00a0 acknowledgment of the\u00a0 past\u00a0 abuses is necessary. Mutual denial is a perfect strategy for keeping people\u00a0 locked in the past,\u00a0 and leads to the prevention of any meaningful peacebuilding.
\nAccording to my experience\u00a0 as a peace\u00a0 activist in the region of former Yugoslavia, dealing with the past\u00a0 is a crucial issue in peacebuilding and reconciliation, since it is the view of the past that\u00a0 divides and drives people.\u00a0 Thus, we have to find ways for opening and \u201ccleaning\u201d it (as Father Lapsley would say), so that wounds can be healed.84\u00a0 In this sense, constructive\u00a0 dealing\u00a0 with the\u00a0 past\u00a0 is a process\u00a0 that,\u00a0 first and\u00a0 foremost,\u00a0 recon- structs\u00a0 collective memory in such\u00a0 a way that\u00a0 it is not possible anymore\u00a0 to reinterpret\u00a0 it and\u00a0 manipulate it as\u00a0 a tool for waging violence\u00a0 against\u00a0 \u2018the other\u2019. It is a process\u00a0 that must therefore go hand in hand with the peacebuilding process.<\/p>\n

(81 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Andrew Rigby, \u201cDealing\u00a0 with the\u00a0 Past:\u00a0 Forgiveness\u00a0 and\u00a0 the\u00a0 Reconstruction\u00a0 of Memory\u00a0 in\u00a0 Divided
\nSocieties,\u201d in International Journal of Politics and Ethics 3\/1 (2003), 95.
\n82 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Ibid., 96.
\n83 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence. The Illusion of Destiny (London: Allen Lane, 2006), 19.
\n84 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Michael Lapsley, interview by Hannes Siebert in Track Two 6\/3-4 (1997), www.ccr.uct.ac.za (accessed
\nAugust 19, 2008).)<\/p>\n

4 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Dealing wi th the Past: applied\u00a0 mechanisms and current necessi ties<\/strong><\/p>\n

Prijedor is a small town in Bosnia, where horrible atrocities\u00a0 happened during the war. A number\u00a0 of detention camps\u00a0 operated in its\u00a0 surroundings; the\u00a0 most\u00a0 infamous\u00a0 among them\u00a0 are Omarska, Keraterm and\u00a0 Trnopolje, where those\u00a0 who were not (recognised as)
\n\u2018Serbs\u2019 were forcibly interned.\u00a0 Today, it is a town covered in silence.\u00a0 Most of the places\u00a0 where people\u00a0 were tortured\u00a0 are not marked\u00a0 at all. But there is a huge monument\u00a0 at the spot where the detention camp Trnopolje operated with the inscription:\u00a0 \u201cTo the soldiers who\u00a0 built\u00a0 their\u00a0 lives\u00a0 into\u00a0 the\u00a0 foundation of\u00a0 the\u00a0 Republic\u00a0 of\u00a0 Srpska.\u201d85\u00a0\u00a0 One\u00a0 of\u00a0 the survivors of the Omarska camp expressed how she feels about it:
\nI don\u2019t\u00a0 know what to call this,\u00a0 sarcasm, irony, insult\u00a0 to victims. […] I am truly hurt and cannot\u00a0 understand it. I can understand when somebody\u00a0 doesn\u2019t\u00a0 want to talk about the crimes that happened, I think, maybe some more time should pass. But to celebrate crimes with monuments? It is simply ludicrous.86<\/p>\n

Many soldiers really lost their lives in the war, and erecting a monument\u00a0 for them can be an understandable desire. But erecting such a monument\u00a0 at the place where people\u00a0 from other groups were tortured is an indicative message. In this region there is a widespread pattern\u00a0 of\u00a0 dealing\u00a0 with the\u00a0 past\u00a0 as\u00a0 either\u00a0 denying\u00a0 past\u00a0 misdeeds or glorifying those\u00a0 responsible for\u00a0 them.\u00a0 Psychologists\u00a0\u00a0 claim\u00a0 that\u00a0 a\u00a0 positive\u00a0 self-concept, as\u00a0 well as\u00a0 a positive\u00a0 view of the group they see\u00a0 themselves as belonging\u00a0 to, is important\u00a0 for human beings. Thus, most\u00a0 probably\u00a0 we are not talking in this\u00a0 case\u00a0 but also\u00a0 in general\u00a0 about conscious glorification, but about denial.
\nCohen, in his study of denial, argues that the most widespread form of it is incapa- bility and refusal to continuously\u00a0 face awkward truths or to live with them.87\u00a0 As one man said\u00a0 to the\u00a0 director\u00a0 of a TV station\u00a0 in Serbia\u00a0 that\u00a0 broadcast a documentary about\u00a0 the massacre in Srebrenica:\u00a0 \u201cIf it really was like that, then the only thing left for me is to take a gun and\u00a0 kill myself.\u201d88\u00a0\u00a0 According to Cohen, denial\u00a0 is to claim that\u00a0 something\u00a0 did not happen, that\u00a0 it did\u00a0 not\u00a0 or does\u00a0 not\u00a0 exist,\u00a0 that\u00a0 it is not\u00a0 true\u00a0 or that\u00a0 we do\u00a0 not\u00a0 know
\nanything about\u00a0 it.89\u00a0\u00a0 A group censors\u00a0 itself, and learns\u00a0 how to keep\u00a0 silent about\u00a0 certain<\/p>\n

(85 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0It was built some years ago, I presume it was in 2003 at the latest.
\n86 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Nusreta Sivac (survivor of Omarska camp), in Arnautovi\u0107 and Hod\u017ei\u0107, 2004.
\n87 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Cohen, Stanje poricanja, 46.
\n88 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Quoted in Veran Mati\u0107, \u201cOdbacivanje istine\u201d [Rejecting the Truth], in Re\u010d 62\/8 (June 2001): 75.
\n89 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Cohen, Stanje poricanja, 26.)<\/p>\n

crimes or human\u00a0 rights violations,\u00a0 because open discussion about\u00a0 them would threaten the\u00a0 group\u2019s\u00a0 (and\u00a0 group\u00a0 members\u2019)\u00a0 self-image.90\u00a0\u00a0 And one\u00a0 denial\u00a0 is\u00a0 easily\u00a0 linked\u00a0 to another: if they deny that they tortured us, we are going to deny that we tortured them.91
\nIt might not be of importance whether the first torture happened recently or ages ago.
\nAccording to Ignatieff, in the former Yugoslavia \u201cthe past\u00a0 continues to torment\u00a0 be- cause it is not past\u201d.\u00a0 He argues\u00a0 that\u00a0 we \u201care not living in a serial order of time but in a simultaneous one, in which the past\u00a0 and present are a continuous, agglutinated mass\u00a0 of fantasies, distortions, myths, and lies.\u201d He also states that\u00a0 reporters\u00a0 in the Balkan wars often\u00a0 experienced that\u00a0 \u201cwhen\u00a0 they\u00a0 were\u00a0 told\u00a0 atrocity\u00a0 stories\u00a0 they\u00a0 were\u00a0 occasionally uncertain\u00a0 whether these\u00a0 stories\u00a0 had occurred yesterday\u00a0 or in 1941, or 1841, or 1441. For the tellers of the tale, yesterday and today were the same.\u201d92
\nMany would argue\u00a0 that\u00a0 dealing\u00a0 with the\u00a0 past\u00a0 is an\u00a0 exit from this\u00a0 vicious cycle. There are many different approaches to dealing\u00a0 with the past\u00a0 around\u00a0 the globe.\u00a0 One of them\u00a0 is not\u00a0 dealing\u00a0 with it, or \u201ccollective\u00a0 amnesia\u201d93 , as\u00a0 was the\u00a0 case\u00a0 in Spain\u00a0 after Franco\u2019s death\u00a0 (the recipe:\u00a0 forget about\u00a0 human\u00a0 rights violations,\u00a0 repressions and\u00a0 other violence, and move on with life).94\u00a0 What we are doing in the region of former Yugoslavia is\u00a0 quite\u00a0 different.\u00a0 We are dealing\u00a0 with it. But in my opinion\u00a0 we are\u00a0 not\u00a0 doing\u00a0 it in constructive\u00a0 ways.
\nSo, what would constitute constructive\u00a0 dealing with the past? What does this mean in the\u00a0 context\u00a0 of former Yugoslavia? There have\u00a0 been\u00a0 diverse\u00a0 efforts\u00a0 by international actors and also by local\/regional activists in the field of transitional justice. The question is whether\u00a0 these approaches are appropriate and\u00a0 sufficient? In this chapter\u00a0 I will, first, briefly examine some applied\u00a0 approaches, and second, I will try to define what needs to be done if the goal is lasting peace\u00a0 in the region.<\/p>\n

(90 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Ibid., 35.
\n91\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0For links between\u00a0 Serbian and Croatian denial see Henry R. Huttenbach, \u201cThe Psychology and Politics of Genocide Denial: a Comparison\u00a0 of Four Case Studies,\u201d\u00a0 in Levon Chorbajian\u00a0 and George Shirinian, eds., Studies of Comparative Genocide (New York: Palgrave, 1999), 216-229.
\n92 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Ignatieff, Articles of Faith, 120-121.
\n93 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Rigby, Justice and Reconciliation, 2.
\n94 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0But since the suffering cannot be forgotten, there are voices asking for the truth to be unveiled.)<\/p>\n

4.1\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Initiatives\u00a0 for transitional justice and Dealing with the Past in the region of former Yugoslavia<\/strong><\/p>\n

4.1.1 \u201cThe Hague Tribunal\u201d and trials<\/strong><\/p>\n

If the term \u201cdealing with the past\u201d\u00a0 is recognised at all in the region of former Yugo- slavia it is immediately connected with the Hague Tribunal, which means\u00a0 with retributive justice.95\u00a0\u00a0 Vast literature\u00a0 is focused\u00a0 on the effects of the Tribunal, being for or against\u00a0 it, most\u00a0 of its writers\u00a0 offering interesting\u00a0 arguments. What cannot\u00a0 be\u00a0 denied\u00a0 is that\u00a0 the development of the\u00a0 Tribunal\u00a0 represents a kind of revolution\u00a0 in international law, thus many are excited about it.
\nHowever, many politicians\u00a0 and\u00a0 some\u00a0 ordinary people\u00a0 in the region are not happy about it. It is perceived\u00a0 either as being biased, \u2018victor\u2019s justice\u2019 and unfair or ineffective, slow, paying no attention to victims, applying too short sentences, or equating the guilt of those\u00a0 who\u00a0 attacked and\u00a0 those\u00a0 who \u2018only\u2019 defended themselves.96\u00a0\u00a0 Moreover, it is perceived as a foreign body, somewhere\u00a0 over there, kept in western hands where they do what they think should be done. It can be observed that many people\u00a0 see trials, although\u00a0 very rarely followed in detail, almost like a football match: did \u2018ours\u2019 score a goal or was it \u2018them\u2019? And the Tribunal bears its part of responsibility\u00a0 for these\u00a0 perceptions. Although since\u00a0 the\u00a0 very beginning\u00a0 it has\u00a0 presented itself as\u00a0 \u201ca tool for promoting\u00a0 reconciliation\u00a0 and restoring true peace\u201d97 , it actually has not been present in the region (until recently, when the Outreach Programme was developed)98 , and did not pay attention to how some of its acts might influence those\u00a0 that it is presumably\u00a0 ostensibly concerned about.\u00a0 It was not until 2000\u00a0 that\u00a0 it published its first press\u00a0 release in the Bosnian\/Croatian\/Serbian language,\u00a0 thus it was left to local journalists\u00a0 and politicians\u00a0 to interpret what was going
\non over there.99\u00a0 And those\u00a0 interpretations led us to the existing perceptions that\u00a0 could hardly\u00a0 be\u00a0 changed\u00a0 so\u00a0 many\u00a0 years\u00a0 later.\u00a0 The\u00a0 Tribunal\u00a0 collected\u00a0\u00a0 extremely\u00a0 valuable testimonies and facts, and it was able to greatly influence the process of shedding light on at least\u00a0 one part of the truth. But due to the \u2018satanisation\u2019 of the Tribunal (in Serbia and Croatia it is often seen\u00a0 as an instrument\u00a0 against\u00a0 the very nation: it is the nation that is prosecuted, and not individual criminals), that truth is often not believed.<\/p>\n

(95 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u201cThe Hague Tribunal”, as it is commonly referred to in the region, is the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
\n96 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0For a realistic article about\u00a0 these\u00a0 perceptions, see:\u00a0 Dan Saxon, \u201cExporting Justice: Perceptions of the ICTY Among the Serbian, Croatian and Muslim Communities in the Former Yugoslavia,\u201d in Journal of Human Rights\u00a0 4 (2005):\u00a0 559-572. See\u00a0 also\u00a0 Maryanne\u00a0 Yerkes, \u201cFacing\u00a0 the\u00a0 Violent Past:\u00a0 Discussions\u00a0 with Serbia’s Youth,\u201d in Nationalities Papers 32\/4 (2004): 921-938.
\n97 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Annual Report of the\u00a0 International\u00a0 Tribunal for the\u00a0 Prosecution\u00a0 of Persons\u00a0 Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, A\/49\/342 – S\/1994\/1007, 29 August 1994.
\n98 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0It began its work in late 1999, six years after the ICTY was established.
\n99 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Some local TV stations broadcast the trials, but few followed them\u00a0 in detail\u00a0 due to the fact that\u00a0 an \u201cordinary person\u201d,\u00a0 who is not a lawyer by profession, finds the legal proceedings too complicated and hard to follow.)<\/p>\n

Minow proposes that\u00a0 responding \u201cto mass\u00a0 atrocity with legal prosecutions is to embrace the rule of law.\u201d100\u00a0 Unfortunately, it seems that\u00a0 the ICTY has\u00a0 not even contrib- uted\u00a0 much\u00a0 to the\u00a0 promotion\u00a0 of the\u00a0 rule of law and\u00a0 justice\u00a0 in the\u00a0 region.\u00a0 Croatia and especially\u00a0 Serbia\u00a0 unwillingly cooperate with the\u00a0 Tribunal.101\u00a0 The only reason\u00a0 why they sometimes do cooperate comes down to pure national interests, not the rule of law. Both states are\u00a0 interested\u00a0 in\u00a0 international investments and\u00a0 in joining the\u00a0 European\u00a0 Union (though\u00a0 not because of the values\u00a0 and\u00a0 rules that\u00a0 it brings along), so when the interna- tional\u00a0 community\u00a0 wants\u00a0 them\u00a0 to\u00a0 be\u00a0 cooperative,\u00a0 it\u00a0 has\u00a0 some\u00a0 leverage\u00a0 for applying pressure. It is interesting\u00a0 to note in this context what kind of language\u00a0 Serbian\u00a0 authori- ties use when pressed to arrest and transfer those indicted for war crimes to the Tribunal. War\u00a0 crimes\u00a0 are\u00a0 never\u00a0 mentioned, instead\u00a0 they\u00a0 use\u00a0 constructions\u00a0 like:\u00a0 \u201cobligation towards The Hague\u201d, \u201cinternational obligation\u201d, \u201cthe last obstacle on our path to the EU\u201d.
\nMany would argue that\u00a0 it would be much better\u00a0 if those\u00a0 indicted\u00a0 were put on do- mestic trial, with local prosecutors and judges, here in the region. But from the few cases processed by local courts,\u00a0 and\u00a0 from the great political pressure under\u00a0 which the courts work, one can get the impression that\u00a0 they will never be able\u00a0 to prosecute anyone\u00a0 who held a high position in the atrocity hierarchy, but only the small pawns.
\nStill, one has to admit that the Tribunal has certain accomplishments. I see two di- rect\u00a0 benefits\u00a0 that\u00a0 these\u00a0 societies get from the\u00a0 ICTY. First, it is the\u00a0 only well organised system that struggles\u00a0 against\u00a0 impunity, so survivors and others concerned have a feeling that there is at least one body that is dealing with the injustice done to them. And that is a step forward, even if those very sentences do not contribute\u00a0 to an anti-impunity climate when those\u00a0 indicted and sentenced are treated as heroes\u00a0 by the mainstream. Also, while the ICTY database may at this moment not be perceived as a collection of certain truths, I believe\u00a0 that\u00a0 at least\u00a0 the\u00a0 next generation\u00a0 will benefit from it, when the\u00a0 political\u00a0 atmos- phere changes.
\nThe second direct benefit does\u00a0 not have anything to do with the ICTY\u2019s goals, it is more a\u00a0 consequence of its functioning:\u00a0 putting\u00a0 away those\u00a0 ones\u00a0 who could\u00a0 still be\u00a0 in positions of power in these\u00a0 states. Concerning \u201cpromoting\u00a0 reconciliation\u00a0 and\u00a0 restoring true\u00a0 peace\u201d\u00a0 I\u00a0 can\u00a0 say\u00a0 \u2013\u00a0 it has\u00a0 done\u00a0 next\u00a0 to\u00a0 nothing.\u00a0 Uncovering certain\u00a0 truths\u00a0 and punishing a few of those\u00a0 responsible is not enough.102<\/p>\n

(100 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Minow, Between Vengeance, 25.
\n101\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0In Bosnia there are different attitudes, but as the state\u00a0 runs under international control, it is clear who has the final word.<\/p>\n

102 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0By July 2007 the ICTY had indicted 161 persons, while estimates say that crimes were committed\u00a0 by a few thousand persons. At the end\u00a0 of 2004,\u00a0 the Tribunal had\u00a0 completed all investigations and\u00a0 indictments and\u00a0 it\u00a0 is\u00a0 expected to\u00a0 complete\u00a0\u00a0 all\u00a0 cases by\u00a0 2010.\u00a0 For\u00a0 further\u00a0 information\u00a0 see,\u00a0 ICTY,\u00a0 www.un.org\/icty (accessed August\u00a0 19,\u00a0 2008).\u00a0\u00a0 For concerns\u00a0 about\u00a0\u00a0 this\u00a0 completion\u00a0\u00a0 strategy,\u00a0 see\u00a0 Amnesty\u00a0 International, Amnesty International’s\u00a0 concerns\u00a0 on the\u00a0 implementation of the “completion\u00a0 strategy”\u00a0 of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, AI Index: EUR 05\/001\/2005, June 2005.)<\/p>\n

4.1.2 Apologies<\/strong><\/p>\n

In the past few years there have been several apologies by officials. It is interesting\u00a0 that\u00a0 all of those\u00a0 who apologised are either\u00a0 moderate or non-nationalists. The hard-core have never apologised, and the ethnonationalist mainstream voices attacked those\u00a0 who did \u2013 \u201cThey should apologise to us\u201d, \u201cWe apologised to them three times, while they did it only once\u201d,\u00a0 \u201cWho is he\u00a0 to\u00a0 apologise in our name?\u201d,\u00a0 comments\u00a0 like these\u00a0 were fre- quently heard.\u00a0 These apologies hardly brought a visible change,\u00a0 but it is important\u00a0 that they happened.
\nThe other type of apologies are made by people\u00a0 prosecuted for war crimes in front of the\u00a0 ICTY\u00a0 court.\u00a0 Those apologies were even less\u00a0 acclaimed. By whichever group the prosecuted belonged\u00a0 to they were largely ignored, while by other groups\u00a0 they were not taken as real, many considered them to be a result of bargaining.
\nFor example,\u00a0 Predrag Banovi\u0107, who was a guard\u00a0 in Keraterm camp,\u00a0 sentenced\u00a0 to eight years\u00a0 for killings, beatings and\u00a0 abuse of detainees, pleaded guilty and\u00a0 stated in front of the court:
\nMy guilty plea\u00a0 was an expression of sincere\u00a0 remorse\u00a0 concerning\u00a0 the events\u00a0 in Prijedor, and especially\u00a0 the Keraterm camp. […] I deplore\u00a0 the period of war and hatred, and I regret that I did not find a way to avoid mobilisation\u00a0 and my role in the camp. I feel sorry for all the victims, and I curse my own hands for having in- flicted pain in any way on innocent\u00a0 people.\u00a0 I wish my sincere\u00a0 words to be un- derstood as a balm for those wounds and as a contribution\u00a0 to the reconciliation of all people\u00a0 in Prijedor and the restoration\u00a0 of the situation that existed\u00a0 before
\nthe war.103<\/p>\n

(103 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0ICTY,\u00a0 Case\u00a0 information\u00a0\u00a0 sheet.\u00a0\u00a0 Predrag\u00a0 Banovi\u0107,\u00a0 www.un.org\/icty\/cases-e\/index-e.htm\u00a0 (accessed
\nAugust 19, 2008).)<\/p>\n

Edin, whose\u00a0 father,\u00a0 brother\u00a0 and\u00a0 relatives\u00a0 were detained in that\u00a0 camp,\u00a0 and\u00a0 have been missing persons ever since, comments\u00a0 on these\u00a0 sentences as follows:
\nWhat he said in that courtroom does\u00a0 not mean\u00a0 anything to me, or to any of my relatives.\u00a0 The only positive\u00a0 effect would be if Serbs\u00a0 from Prijedor were to turn their heads away from Banovi\u0107, to hide their children from him.104<\/p>\n

Edin clearly felt that\u00a0 the\u00a0 main\u00a0 addressee for this\u00a0 apology\u00a0 was\u00a0 the\u00a0 court\u00a0 and\u00a0 not\u00a0 the people affected.\u00a0 Moreover, he knows that it is very likely, when Banovi\u0107 gets back to his hometown in a few years, that he will be treated\u00a0 as a hero or martyr.<\/p>\n

4.1.3 Truth commissions<\/strong><\/p>\n

Tribunals, trials and apologies,\u00a0 then, have very limited impact on peace\u00a0 and recon- ciliation processes in the region. Unfortunately other mechanisms of transitional justice, like truth commissions, have\u00a0 not been\u00a0 successful or have\u00a0 largely been\u00a0 neglected. One truth commission was established in Serbia (actually in the former union between\u00a0 Serbia and\u00a0 Montenegro), but it literally died (when the union fell apart),\u00a0 without any results.\u00a0 It was established by successors\u00a0 of\u00a0 the\u00a0 Milo\u0161evi\u0107 regime, but since\u00a0 they did not clearly dissociate themselves from their\u00a0 predecessors, the\u00a0 commission\u00a0 served\u00a0 its purpose\u00a0 to gather political points.\u00a0 In Bosnia, too, there have been\u00a0 initiatives for establishing a truth commission, but\u00a0 there\u00a0 is still none.\u00a0 At the\u00a0 very\u00a0 beginning\u00a0 the\u00a0 ICTY opposed the\u00a0 idea, since there\u00a0 was\u00a0 a\u00a0 fear\u00a0 that\u00a0 a\u00a0 commission\u00a0\u00a0 would\u00a0 overlap\u00a0 with\u00a0 its\u00a0 own\u00a0 mandate. In Bosnian\u00a0 society there is still an ongoing discussion whether a commission\u00a0 is needed or not; and there is no political will for such a step.105
\nHowever, it seems obvious\u00a0 that\u00a0 a truth\u00a0 commission\u00a0 could\u00a0 bring some\u00a0 improve-
\nment. But it can only succeed if it is formed jointly by people\u00a0 from Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia. It is not possible to separate the consequences of war in these\u00a0 three\u00a0 countries,\u00a0 and\u00a0 therefore\u00a0 it is not possible to separate the peacebuilding processes. Nevertheless, due to the present political circumstances such a joint endeavour is still not a real policy option.106<\/p>\n

(104 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Edin Ramuli\u0107, interview in Arnautovi\u0107 and Hod\u017ei\u0107, Slijepa pravda.
\n105\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0See, for example, articles on \u201cKomisija za istinu i pomirenje\u201d [‘Truth and reconciliation commission’], by Toka\u010da, Suljagi\u0107 and Hod\u017ei\u0107, Puls demokratije, www.pulsdemokratije.net\/index.php?a=tag&t=istorija+i+odgovornost&l=bs (accessed August 19, 2008).
\n106 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0It should\u00a0 be noted\u00a0 that there is a valuable\u00a0 initiative for establishing a regional body (in the region of former Yugoslavia) for truth seeking.\u00a0 The initiative came\u00a0 from the Humanitarian\u00a0 Law Centre from Belgrade (www.hlc-rdc.org), the Research\u00a0 and Documentation\u00a0 Centre from Sarajevo (www.idc.org.ba) and Documenta from Zagreb\u00a0 (www.documenta.hr). A\u00a0 number\u00a0 of consultations\u00a0 throughout the\u00a0 region\u00a0 with different\u00a0 social groups\u00a0 were\u00a0 held.\u00a0\u00a0 At the\u00a0 moment\u00a0\u00a0 (September\u00a0 2008)\u00a0\u00a0 it\u00a0 is\u00a0 in\u00a0 the\u00a0 process\u00a0\u00a0 of\u00a0 forming\u00a0 a\u00a0 coalition\u00a0 of organisations and individuals\u00a0 for establishing a regional commission. More information is available\u00a0 on the initiators\u2019 web sites. The idea\u00a0 is to have\u00a0 the regional\u00a0 commission\u00a0 established by the governments in the region. Bearing in mind the political circumstances, it is quite an ambitious idea. Thus, we can only hope that it is going to be a successful one. The time will show.)<\/p>\n

4.2 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0What else needs\u00a0 to be done?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Any peacebuilding process in the\u00a0 region needs to acknowledge the\u00a0 suffering of human beings\u00a0 without ethnic\u00a0 prefixes, followed by recognition\u00a0 that\u00a0 it was ethnonation- alist\u00a0 ideology\u00a0 that\u00a0 made\u00a0 war possible. Peacebuilders,\u00a0 as\u00a0 I\u00a0 have\u00a0 argued,\u00a0 should\u00a0 also avoid\u00a0 putting\u00a0 people\u00a0 into\u00a0 ethnopolitical \u2018pigeonholes\u2019,\u00a0\u00a0 that\u00a0 very \u201cminiaturization\u00a0 of human\u00a0 beings\u201d107 , which ethnonationalists use, and should\u00a0 offer other perspectives. As Sen points\u00a0 out in his brilliant book on identity and violence, our freedom \u201cto assert\u00a0 our personal identities can sometimes be very limited in the eyes of others,\u00a0 no matter\u00a0 how we see ourselves.\u201d108 Peace activists should advocate and make space\u00a0 for this freedom.
\nPeacebuilding and\u00a0 constructive\u00a0\u00a0 dealing\u00a0 with\u00a0 the\u00a0 past\u00a0 are\u00a0 twin\u00a0 processes that strengthen and\u00a0 give legitimacy to each\u00a0 other.\u00a0 Dealing with the past,\u00a0 as a quite\u00a0 difficult and\u00a0 painful\u00a0 process,\u00a0\u00a0 has\u00a0 a\u00a0 deeper\u00a0\u00a0 sense only if its\u00a0 goal\u00a0 is\u00a0 sustainable peace. But peacebuilding is not possible without facing the past;\u00a0 otherwise\u00a0 we can just reach fake or fragile \u2018peace\u2019.\u00a0 In\u00a0 order to proceed\u00a0 on this\u00a0 road\u00a0 in the\u00a0 region we have\u00a0 to take\u00a0 the following steps: 1) acknowledgment, 2) deconstructing the\u00a0 myth of \u2018ethnic war\u2019, and\u00a0 3) reconstructing identities and de-victimisation.<\/p>\n

4.2.1 Public Acknowledgement<\/strong><\/p>\n

Although crucial for peacebuilding, public\u00a0 acknowledgment of misdeeds is very hard to achieve. The maximum of acknowledgment that has been admitted by the public discourse is the idea that \u201cthe others did it also\u201d, which is actually an excuse\u00a0 and not a real recognition. Another excuse is \u201cit was a war, and in war terrible things happen.\u201d
\nDuring these\u00a0 ten years of peace\u00a0 activism, I have come to realise\u00a0 how hard it is for many people\u00a0 to accept\u00a0 and\u00a0 admit\u00a0 that\u00a0 members of their own group committed\u00a0 terrible acts. In our region\u2019s dominant frame of mind, if I point to a crime committed by a member of one group it is experienced as an attack\u00a0 on the person\u00a0 that belongs\u00a0 to that group, an attack\u00a0 on his\/her identity.\u00a0 And at the\u00a0 root of this\u00a0 phenomenon is an ethnonationalist ideology, which claims that all of us (tied to a piece of land) are one organism.
\nOne of the main obstacles to acknowledging that people\u00a0 did suffer on all \u201csides\u201d\u00a0 is a\u00a0 widespread belief\u00a0 that\u00a0 experiences and\u00a0 pains\u00a0 of others\u00a0 are\u00a0 a\u00a0 \u201cdenial\u00a0 of our\u00a0 own<\/p>\n

(107\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Sen, Identity and Violence, 185.
\n108 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Ibid., 6.)<\/p>\n

experience\u201d109\u00a0 and pain.\u00a0 It has\u00a0 to do with the conviction that\u00a0 there\u00a0 is a group who is a perpetrator\u00a0 and\u00a0 another\u00a0 group who is the\u00a0 victim. And these\u00a0 groups,\u00a0 in many people\u2019s\u00a0 minds, have clear ethnic markers. This, however, was not the reality in the given context; all groups\u00a0 were\u00a0 split\u00a0 at\u00a0 least\u00a0 into\u00a0 two factions:\u00a0 one\u00a0 promoting\u00a0 violence\u00a0 against\u00a0 \u2018the other\u2019, and\u00a0 the\u00a0 other\u00a0 struggling\u00a0 against\u00a0 that\u00a0 violence.\u00a0 When we recognise\u00a0 that\u00a0 on all \u2018sides\u2019\u00a0 there\u00a0 were\u00a0 people\u00a0\u00a0 struggling\u00a0 against\u00a0 the\u00a0 policy of violence,\u00a0 and\u00a0 against\u00a0\u00a0 the ideology\u00a0 that\u00a0 led us to slaughter, then\u00a0 we will be able\u00a0 to make\u00a0 much\u00a0 more space\u00a0 for acknowledgment to happen.
\nIt is important\u00a0 that\u00a0 those\u00a0 who did not experience the whole tragedy of war get to know, first and foremost, what other people\u00a0 endured.\u00a0 And it is important to find a way to raise awareness that acknowledgment of the atrocities\u00a0 leads\u00a0 to liberation\u00a0 from the past, it allows\u00a0 life in the\u00a0 present and\u00a0 gives hope\u00a0 for a better\u00a0 future.\u00a0 Living in fear, among accusations, feeling threatened and not safe – this is not a life.
\nAlthough a crucial task\u00a0 of the\u00a0 dealing\u00a0 with the\u00a0 past\u00a0 process\u00a0 is recognising\u00a0 \u201cthe worth and\u00a0 dignity of those\u00a0 victimised\u201d110\u00a0\u00a0 the entire society will benefit\u00a0 from this.\u00a0 Thus, the\u00a0 process\u00a0 should\u00a0 be\u00a0 shaped in a way that\u00a0 it is not only carried\u00a0 out for the\u00a0 sake\u00a0 of victims, but for the sake\u00a0 of a peaceful\u00a0 society whose\u00a0 main value is social justice.\u00a0 If we deny what has\u00a0 happened,\u00a0 we approve\u00a0 violence\u00a0 and\u00a0 thus\u00a0 establish it as\u00a0 a norm. If we acknowledge and condemn\u00a0 it, we have a chance to establish nonviolence as a norm, and the most important social value.<\/p>\n

4.2.2 Deconstructing the myth of \u201cethnic war\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n

The next crucial step\u00a0 is deconstructing the myth of \u201cethnic\u00a0 war\u201d. It is important\u00a0 to raise awareness of the root causes of war, which did not consist\u00a0 in ethnic differences\u00a0 or so-called ancient\u00a0 hatreds. This myth has\u00a0 to be deconstructed as it is the source\u00a0 of fear and mistrust between\u00a0 people\u00a0 of different identities. If people\u00a0 go on believing that ethnic differences\u00a0 are the cause\u00a0 of war, then\u00a0 they can never feel secure\u00a0 because those\u00a0 differ- ences\u00a0 (although\u00a0 minor) will always exist, thus no one can guarantee that it is not going to happen\u00a0 again.\u00a0\u00a0 Ethnonationalist\u00a0\u00a0 ideology\u00a0 and\u00a0\u00a0 ethnonationalists\u00a0 give\u00a0 their\u00a0 best\u00a0\u00a0 to maintain\u00a0 the idea that having our (ethnically clean) state\u00a0 is the only guarantee for feeling safe.\u00a0 And since\u00a0 the project of \u2018clean\u2019 states did not fully succeed, many people\u00a0 still do not feel safe.\u00a0 Ethnonationalism is like a\u00a0 perpetual\u00a0 motion\u00a0 machine\u00a0 \u2013 constantly\u00a0 rein- forcing itself. It creates a climate\u00a0 of fear and\u00a0 a so called\u00a0 \u201csecurity\u00a0 dilemma\u201d.\u00a0 Ethnonationalist leaders make people\u00a0 suffer, then they boast\u00a0 that they were right when they were telling us that\u00a0 we cannot\u00a0 feel safe\u00a0 with others,\u00a0 and\u00a0 people\u00a0 still support\u00a0 them,\u00a0 because they\u00a0 are\u00a0 the\u00a0 ones\u00a0 who\u00a0 talk\u00a0 about\u00a0 \u2018our\u2019 interests, they\u00a0 address \u2018our\u2019 fears\u00a0 (that\u00a0 they created),\u00a0 and at the end they turn out to be \u2018our\u2019 guardians. This seems to be the reason\u00a0 why ethnonationalists still go on winning so many elections\u00a0 in the region.<\/p>\n

(109 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Svjetlana\u00a0 Nedimovi\u0107, \u201cSuo\u010davanja s pro\u0161lo\u0161\u0107u: Li\u010dno iskustvo\u00a0 kao samica\u201d\u00a0 [Dealing with the Past: Personal \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Experience \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0as \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Solitary\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Confinement], \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Puls \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0demokratije,\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a03 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0May\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a02007, www.pulsdemokratije.net\/index.php?a=detail&l=bs&id=114 (accessed August 19, 2008).
\n110\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Neier in Boraine et. al., eds., Dealing with the Past, 3.)<\/p>\n

Scholars recognise security as one of the main conditions\u00a0 for the process\u00a0 of recon- ciliation\u00a0 to start.\u00a0 As Rigby notes:\u00a0 \u201cTo begin\u00a0 to have\u00a0 hopes\u00a0 for the\u00a0 future, a necessary dimension\u00a0 of any\u00a0 constructive\u00a0 reinterpretation of the\u00a0 past,\u00a0 people\u00a0 must\u00a0 experience a degree\u00a0 of personal and collective security sufficient to reassure them\u00a0 about\u00a0 actions\u00a0 of former wrong-doers.\u201d111\u00a0\u00a0 Thus,\u00a0 the\u00a0 sources\u00a0 of fear must\u00a0 be\u00a0 understood, deconstructed and neutralised.
\nMoreover, the answer\u00a0 to the question of who is a wrongdoer should\u00a0 be reframed. The wrongdoer\u00a0 is not that\u00a0 neighbour\u00a0 from the\u00a0 other\u00a0 ethnic\u00a0 group, since\u00a0 he\/she is in a very similar\u00a0 situation to the\u00a0 one\u00a0 we are\u00a0 in. Wrongdoers\u00a0 are\u00a0 those;\u00a0 for example,\u00a0 who maintain\u00a0 ethnonationalist ideology for personal profit, and\u00a0 convicted\u00a0 war criminals.\u00a0 It also should\u00a0 be noted\u00a0 that only when we reconcile with the neighbour\u00a0 might we consider reconciling\u00a0 with the\u00a0 wrongdoer,\u00a0 otherwise\u00a0 we will never\u00a0 be\u00a0 able\u00a0 to reconcile with the neighbour.112<\/p>\n

4.2.3 Reconstructing identities\u00a0 and de-victimisation<\/strong><\/p>\n

In the\u00a0 literature\u00a0 on peacebuilding it has\u00a0 been\u00a0 argued\u00a0 that\u00a0 \u201cthe\u00a0 transformation of identity is necessary for reconciliation.\u201d113\u00a0\u00a0 It has been outlined that the very existence\u00a0 of ethnic\u00a0 (or other) identities could be cultural heritage,\u00a0 something\u00a0 that\u00a0 enriches\u00a0 people\u2019s\u00a0 lives.\u00a0 A\u00a0 problem\u00a0 may\u00a0 arise\u00a0 from certain\u00a0 definitions.\u00a0 In the\u00a0 Balkans,\u00a0 we have\u00a0 allowed ethnonationalist extremists\u00a0 to impose\u00a0 their perception\u00a0 of what ethnie is about,\u00a0 while all other\u00a0 perceptions are marginalised. And their main understanding of self is defined\u00a0 ex negativo,\u00a0 i.e.\u00a0 by\u00a0 exclusion\u00a0 of\u00a0 the\u00a0 others;\u00a0 or\u00a0 as\u00a0 Keen\u00a0 observes:\u00a0\u00a0 \u201cAll we\u00a0 despise in ourselves we attribute\u00a0 to them.\u201d114\u00a0 Thus, having an enemy is at the core of their version of identity.<\/p>\n

(111\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Rigby, Dealing with the Past, 97.
\n112\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0One can often hear calls by ethnonationalists in Serbia for “national reconciliation” which are actually calls\u00a0 for ethnic\/national unification.\u00a0 Dimitrijevi\u0107 made\u00a0 an\u00a0 interesting\u00a0 observation\u00a0 (as\u00a0 a reaction\u00a0 to these calls) in his article on the prospects for the determination of truth and reaching\u00a0 reconciliation\u00a0 in Serbia: “If Serbs reconcile with each other, there reconciliation\u00a0 with others will be hindered.”\u00a0 Vojin Dimitrijevi\u0107, “Izgledi za utvr\u0111ivanje istine i postizanje\u00a0 pomirenja u Srbiji”, in Re\u010d 62\/8 (2001), 74.
\n113\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Lisa Schirch, \u201cRitual Reconciliation. Transforming Identity\/Reframing\u00a0 Conflict,\u201d in Reconciliation, ed.
\nAbu-Nimer, 152.
\n114\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Sam\u00a0 Keen, Faces of the\u00a0 Enemy: Reflections\u00a0 of the\u00a0 Hostile Imagination\u00a0 (Cambridge:\u00a0 Harper & Row,
\n1986), 21.)<\/p>\n

If ethnic identity is important,\u00a0 what does it then mean to be a Serb, Croat, Bosniak, Albanian, Macedonian\u2026? What kind\u00a0 of values\u00a0 do\u00a0 these\u00a0 identities entail?\u00a0 What is the cultural heritage\u00a0 that lies behind\u00a0 them? If the only thing we know is that we are not them, then we actually do not know who we are and there are no values behind\u00a0 us. Anthropolo- gists,\u00a0 sociologists, psychologists, writers, artists,\u00a0 politicians,\u00a0 and\u00a0 also\u00a0 \u2018ordinary people\u2019 could contribute\u00a0 to changing this\u00a0 picture,\u00a0 so that\u00a0 a construction of identities would be based on real humanistic values and cultures.
\nOn the other hand, all of us have numerous identities, not only (if at all) ethnic and national ones. And we should be free to choose\u00a0 them and express them if we want.
\nIn our region, all ethnopolitical groups\u00a0 are deeply immersed\u00a0 in the role of victim. And\u00a0 there\u00a0 are multiple\u00a0 and\u00a0 understandable reasons for that.\u00a0 What is worrying is that victimisation is built into the very identity. As Buruma observes: \u201cIdentity more and more rests\u00a0 on the pseudoreligion of victimhood.\u201d115\u00a0 It goes\u00a0 so far that\u00a0 all these\u00a0 ethnies were identifying themselves with Jews.116 In this situation of victimisation it is almost impossi- ble to reflect on one\u2019s own responsibility,\u00a0 or the responsibility\u00a0 of one\u2019s own society. The role of victim turns out to be a comfortable\u00a0 one: if I am a victim I cannot\u00a0 be responsible for anything,\u00a0 and\u00a0 no\u00a0 one\u00a0 can\u00a0 argue\u00a0 with me\u00a0 because it would be\u00a0 showing\u00a0 a lack of respect\u00a0 for a victim. It is actually a powerful position.\u00a0 Thus, in addition\u00a0 to psychological reasons and\u00a0 deep\u00a0 trauma,\u00a0 de-victimisation\u00a0 is additionally\u00a0 complicated because of the comfort\u00a0 that\u00a0 role\u00a0 might\u00a0 offer.\u00a0 This lack\u00a0 of\u00a0 responsibility\u00a0\u00a0 is\u00a0 reflected\u00a0 on\u00a0 the\u00a0 level\u00a0 of society. Citizens do not feel responsible for what is going on in society, since they have given that\u00a0 up to \u2018politicians\u2019. Moreover, we live in monolithic societies where, as Staub says, strong\u00a0 authority\u00a0 and\u00a0 totalitarian rule enforces\u00a0 uniformity: \u201cThe authorities have great power to define reality and shape the people\u2019s\u00a0 perception of the victims.\u201d117
\nIt is absolutely\u00a0 necessary to empower\u00a0 people\u00a0 to abandon this\u00a0 role, because it is them who can make a change.\u00a0 If we constantly\u00a0 give up our power to ethnocratic authori- ties, we will never make a change.\u00a0 Without our power they would be powerless.
\nIn this chapter\u00a0 I have defined\u00a0 a few steps that\u00a0 should\u00a0 be taken\u00a0 in order to reach fundamental change\u00a0 in our societies. And even if there\u00a0 are only a few steps, they need quite\u00a0 a lot of work and\u00a0 effort. The open\u00a0 question remains\u00a0 whose\u00a0 job it is to take\u00a0 those\u00a0 steps, which is the focus of the following chapter.<\/p>\n

(115\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Ian Buruma, \u201cThe Joys and Perils of Victimhood,\u201d in The New York Review 46\/6 (1999), 6.
\n116\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0The historian\u00a0 Paul B. Miller wrote a brilliant text on this topic: Paul B. Miller, \u201cSvi ste vi Jevreji\u201d [All of you are Jews], Dani, 18 May 2007.
\n117\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Staub, The Roots of Evil, 19.)<\/p>\n

5 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Whose job is Peacebuilding and Dealing wi th the<\/strong><\/p>\n

Past?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Scholars\u00a0 mostly agree\u00a0 that\u00a0 reconciliation\u00a0 and\u00a0 peacebuilding are processes in which all layers\u00a0 of\u00a0 a society\u00a0 need\u00a0 to be\u00a0 included.\u00a0 Lederach\u00a0 explicitly says\u00a0 that\u00a0 \u201cpeacebuilding must be undertaken simultaneously at numerous levels of society\u201d.118\u00a0 At the same\u00a0 time, Bar-On remarks\u00a0 that\u00a0 \u201ctop-down\u00a0 and\u00a0 bottom-up\u00a0 processes are\u00a0 difficult to synchronize because of the\u00a0 lack of a common\u00a0 language\u00a0 and\u00a0 social\u00a0 perspective\u201d.119\u00a0 Actually, in the region of former Yugoslavia, so far peacebuilding\u00a0 processes have\u00a0 not been\u00a0 initiated\u00a0 by the top level of decision\u00a0 makers in governments and parliaments. Others have tried to fill that\u00a0 gap.\u00a0 In this\u00a0 last\u00a0 chapter,\u00a0 I\u00a0 focus\u00a0 on\u00a0 actors\u00a0 that\u00a0 do have\u00a0 or should\u00a0 play a role in peacebuilding and\u00a0 dealing\u00a0 with the\u00a0 past\u00a0 processes, including\u00a0 steps suggested in the previous chapter.\u00a0 I also focus on obstacles that I am aware of which some of these\u00a0 actors face.<\/p>\n

5.1\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Governments, parliaments and political parties<\/strong><\/p>\n

Political institutions in our countries\u00a0 are\u00a0 still very weak\u00a0 and\u00a0 many\u00a0 of them\u00a0 are dominated by ethnonationalists.\u00a0 Peacebuilding is not\u00a0 their\u00a0 priority, since\u00a0 maintaining enemy images\u00a0 and\u00a0 ethnopolitical borders\u00a0 is very useful\u00a0 to them\u00a0 as\u00a0 a tool for securing their power. When representatives of governments, parliaments and\u00a0 political parties\u00a0 in this region talk about reconciliation\u00a0 they usually mean \u201cnational\u00a0 reconciliation\u201d,\u00a0 seeking ethnic unification\u00a0 and promoting\u00a0 the\u00a0 concept\u00a0 \u201cwe-represent-one-body\u201d which excludes others.\u00a0 Dealing constructively with the past\u00a0 and interethnic\u00a0 reconciliation\u00a0 is a threat\u00a0 for them, which endangers their identity. Those who we consider as \u201ccivic parties\u201d also often use ethnonationalist rhetoric to gain more votes in elections, even if they do not believe in it themselves. And even\u00a0 if they do not flirt with\u00a0 ethnonationalism, they do not see peacebuilding as\u00a0 a priority either.\u00a0 Even politicians\u00a0 who belong\u00a0 to the\u00a0 political factions that peace\u00a0 activists set most hopes\u00a0 on have argued that \u2018reconciliation\u2019 is important, but it should\u00a0 be done\u00a0 by NGOs, and not by the state\u00a0 or state\u00a0 actors. According to them, the
\nstate\u2019s job is focused on arresting and prosecuting war criminals.120<\/p>\n

(118\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Lederach, Civil Society, 843.
\n119\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Dan Bar-On, \u201cEmpirical criteria for reconciliation\u00a0 in practice,\u201d in Intervention 3\/3 (2005), 180.
\n120 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Gordana \u010comi\u0107, lecture held on \u00abThe role of a state\u00a0 in dealing with the past\u00bb as a part of the seminar\u00a0 on dealing with the past at the Centre for Nonviolent Action, 18-22 November, 2007.)<\/p>\n

The priority concern of most politicians\u00a0 in our region is the economy (which is un- derstandable since\u00a0 so many people\u00a0 live on the\u00a0 edge\u00a0 of deprivation),\u00a0 assuming that\u00a0 a better life standard will set\u00a0 all things\u00a0 right. But the development of our economy alone will not lead us to more truth, justice, and peace. Moreover, when they are going to arrest some\u00a0 more war criminals,\u00a0 some\u00a0 of them\u00a0 will get their sentences, but\u00a0 that\u00a0 still will not \u201cmake things right\u201d.
\nUnless we go through\u00a0 the\u00a0 steps listed\u00a0 in the\u00a0 previous\u00a0 chapter,\u00a0 we will not reach fundamental changes in our societies. People\u00a0 on the top and at the middle level of the societies could do a lot in order to achieve these steps and make crucial changes, if only there\u00a0 was enough\u00a0 will, knowledge,\u00a0 but\u00a0 also\u00a0 courage.\u00a0 I believe\u00a0 that\u00a0 a number\u00a0 of them would start taking these steps if they knew how, and if they got support by citizens.
\nGiven the fact that\u00a0 the \u2018top\u2019 level is still so far from any interest\u00a0 in peacebuilding, this kind of work is left exclusively to civil society actors.\u00a0 Thus there is a big task for civil society actors to learn how to motivate\u00a0 and\u00a0 involve authorities in their activities,\u00a0 to get supported by them and also to give them support.<\/p>\n

5.2 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0NGOs<\/strong><\/p>\n

The emerging sector of NGOs has often been confused\u00a0 with \u201ccivil society\u201d as such. In recent years, after being perceived as the \u2018key\u2019 actors\u00a0 in post-war situations by many international and also some local actors, there is a growing criticism of the phenomenon of NGOs.121 Although it is mostly well grounded,\u00a0 it has to be admitted that many of these\u00a0 groups\u00a0 feel\u00a0 the\u00a0 gap\u00a0 and\u00a0 are,\u00a0 after\u00a0 all,\u00a0 struggling\u00a0 to\u00a0 do\u00a0 the\u00a0 job\u00a0 that\u00a0 state\u00a0\u00a0 actors, representatives of governments, administrations or parliaments are incapable of doing or unwilling to do\u00a0 (due\u00a0 to\u00a0 the\u00a0 lack of political\u00a0 will). On a global\u00a0 level, one\u00a0 of the\u00a0 most constructive\u00a0 critiques\u00a0 of NGO work can\u00a0 be\u00a0 found\u00a0 in Fisher and\u00a0 Zimina\u2019s open\u00a0 letter\u00a0 to peacebuilders.122\u00a0 There, they observe two contrasting\u00a0 approaches in the peacebuilding field:\u00a0 transformative,\u00a0\u00a0 which\u00a0 aims\u00a0\u00a0 at\u00a0 fundamental\u00a0 political\u00a0 and\u00a0\u00a0 social\u00a0\u00a0 change,\u00a0\u00a0 and technical,\u00a0 which aims\u00a0 to\u00a0 make\u00a0 a\u00a0 practical\u00a0 difference\u00a0 in a\u00a0 specific\u00a0 domain,\u00a0 while not \u201cnecessarily\u00a0 challenging the deeper\u00a0 context.\u201d123<\/p>\n

(121\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0See,\u00a0 for example,\u00a0 Rastko Mo\u010dnik, \u201cNVO, sluge\u00a0 neoliberalne dr\u017eave\u201d\u00a0 [NGOs, servants of\u00a0 neoliberal\u00a0 states], in Buka, 20.06.2006; Vlasta Jalu\u0161i\u0107, \u201cIdeologija i realnost\u00a0 civilnih dru\u0161tava\u201d [Ideology and the reality of\u00a0 civil\u00a0 societies],\u00a0\u00a0 in\u00a0 H-Alter,\u00a0\u00a0 13.11.2006;\u00a0 Paul\u00a0 Stubbs,\u00a0\u00a0 \u201cCivil\u00a0\u00a0 Society\u00a0\u00a0 or\u00a0 Ubleha?\u201d,\u00a0\u00a0 in\u00a0 20\u00a0\u00a0 Pieces\u00a0 of Encouragement\u00a0 for Awakening\u00a0 and\u00a0 Change.\u00a0 Peacebuilding\u00a0 in the\u00a0 Region\u00a0 of the\u00a0 Former Yugoslavia,\u00a0 eds. Helena Rill et al. (Belgrade, Sarajevo: CNA, 2007), 215-228.
\n122 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Simon Fisher and\u00a0 Lada Zimina, Just Wasting Our Time? Open Letter to Peacebuilders, March 2008.\u00a0 [Editors\u2019 note: an edited version is forthcoming as part of Berghof Handbook Dialogue No. 7 in late 2008.]
\n123 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Ibid., 20.)<\/p>\n

5.2.1 Local \/ regional peace and human rights organisations<\/strong><\/p>\n

In our microcosms,\u00a0 there\u00a0 is a lot of \u201ctechnical\u201d,\u00a0 and\u00a0 also\u00a0 \u201ctransformative\u201d work being done by local NGOs. These groups have a remarkable\u00a0 potential\u00a0 due to the fact that they\u00a0 have\u00a0 gained\u00a0 a\u00a0 lot of knowledge\u00a0 during\u00a0 the\u00a0 last\u00a0 decade. They have\u00a0 much\u00a0 more experience\u00a0 than most\u00a0 of the\u00a0 candidates for positions in governments, parliaments and political parties.\u00a0 But there are obstacles that prevent this potential\u00a0 from being fully used.\u00a0 First of all, personal animosities\u00a0 and\u00a0 competition\u00a0 prevent\u00a0 effective\u00a0 networking\u00a0 in the field.\u00a0 Beyond\u00a0 this,\u00a0 there\u00a0 are\u00a0 also\u00a0 some\u00a0 more\u00a0 complex\u00a0 barriers\u00a0 that\u00a0 prevent\u00a0 effective action and might reduce the NGOs\u2019 impact.
\nPeace groups in our region are usually so deeply opposed to nationalism that they lack any understanding and\u00a0 empathy\u00a0 for the reasons that\u00a0 make many \u2018ordinary people\u2019 maintain\u00a0 ethnonationalist feelings\u00a0 and\u00a0 attitudes. This distances NGO activists\u00a0 funda- mentally from a large percentage of the population. Thus they find themselves in strong opposition or confrontation to those\u00a0 who they would like to address or invite to be their allies.\u00a0 Moreover,\u00a0 space\u00a0 for constructive\u00a0 action\u00a0 is\u00a0 constricted. In Serbia,\u00a0 for instance, peace\u00a0 activists\u00a0 who decided to work with war veterans,\u00a0 were strongly criticised by some others\u00a0 for working with so-called\u00a0 \u201cethnonazis\u201d and\u00a0 \u201ckillers\u201d. The problem\u00a0 is that\u00a0 such rigid behaviour\u00a0 by peace\u00a0 NGOs pushes away many \u2018ordinary\u2019 people\u00a0 who could be allies and might have a strong potential\u00a0 to contribute\u00a0 to sustainable peace. Shifting that \u201cself- righteous\u00a0 style\u201d a bit would, I believe, open many doors.
\nAnother limitation that narrows the NGOs\u2019 impact on peacebuilding is an unspoken and\u00a0 unwritten\u00a0 rule\u00a0 between\u00a0\u00a0 NGOs that\u00a0 forbids\u00a0 dealing\u00a0 explicitly with the\u00a0 \u201ccrimes\u00a0 of others\u201d. There seems to be\u00a0 a consensus that\u00a0 if I am an ethnic\u00a0 Serb, I am expected to criticize only acts of Serb forces and politicians, and should not deal with those\u00a0 of Croats or Bosniaks since this should\u00a0 be left to the others,\u00a0 \u201cthey should\u00a0 clean their own house\u201d. This approach reproduces the experience that public debates shy away from reflecting on the own responsibility,\u00a0 and\u00a0 ends\u00a0 up tending\u00a0 to overemphasise the responsibility\u00a0 of the own group and establishing a new taboo\u00a0 with respect\u00a0 to the crimes committed\u00a0 by other stakeholders of the wars. I might feel more shame\u00a0 and discomfort\u00a0 with misdeeds done by those\u00a0 who belong\u00a0 to my \u2018tribe\u2019 or society,\u00a0 but\u00a0 I am equally responsible for what\u00a0 is done\u00a0 by any of the sides,\u00a0 since\u00a0 I am or was part of that\u00a0 society and, whether\u00a0 I like it or not, part of that problem. And none of the criminals are \u2018mine\u2019 anyway. If I were to accept\u00a0 that\u00a0 some\u00a0 criminals\u00a0 are\u00a0 mine, and\u00a0 some\u00a0 others\u00a0 not, I would contribute\u00a0 to the existing ethnocentric world view, instead of bridging it. So even if it is not intended, the above mentioned unwritten\u00a0 rule risks actually reinforcing ethnocentric narratives.\u00a0 However, as has\u00a0 been explored\u00a0 on the previous\u00a0 pages\u00a0 and\u00a0 in the literature,\u00a0 the main problems\u00a0 and causes of the\u00a0 violent conflicts\u00a0 in the\u00a0 region were not and\u00a0 are not about\u00a0 ethnic\u00a0 differ- ences.
\nAlthough I am aware of many obstacles that peace\u00a0 and human rights groups face, I am also aware\u00a0 of much valuable\u00a0 and\u00a0 brave work done\u00a0 by them:\u00a0 collecting\u00a0 testimonies and oral histories,\u00a0 bringing facts about\u00a0 crimes committed\u00a0 during the war into the public discourse, providing space\u00a0 for lacking public debates, building bridges,\u00a0 motivating\u00a0 the wider public to react, providing legal and medical support\u00a0 to the victims of human\u00a0 rights abuse, dealing\u00a0 with trauma,\u00a0 sowing seeds of humanistic social\u00a0 values\u00a0 that\u00a0 almost\u00a0 got forgotten\u2026 Isn\u2019t that something?
\nA lot of things rest on the shoulders of peace\u00a0 and human\u00a0 rights activists.\u00a0 But they are\u00a0 not\u00a0 going\u00a0 to\u00a0 change\u00a0\u00a0 the\u00a0 situation fundamentally\u00a0\u00a0 if they\u00a0 do\u00a0 not\u00a0 find\u00a0 modes\u00a0\u00a0 of cooperation, and if they do not forge alliances\u00a0 with other actors: people\u00a0 from the media, artists,\u00a0\u00a0 education,\u00a0\u00a0 religious\u00a0\u00a0 institutions,\u00a0 political\u00a0\u00a0 parties,\u00a0\u00a0 state\u00a0\u00a0 institutions,\u00a0 local authorities, and business\u2026
\nIt should\u00a0 also be noted that these\u00a0 groups that work on social change\u00a0 lack support.\u00a0 Many of them feel like they are left alone, since their work is usually not publicly valued and\u00a0 sometimes\u00a0 not\u00a0 even\u00a0 recognised. Activists\u00a0 get\u00a0 tired\u00a0 and\u00a0 burn\u00a0 out.\u00a0 But,\u00a0 for the beginning, they could be the best support to each other.<\/p>\n

5.2.2 International NGOs<\/strong><\/p>\n

International NGOs and\u00a0 external\u00a0 donors\u00a0 can play an important\u00a0 role and\u00a0 have cer- tain\u00a0 impacts\u00a0 on peacebuilding in the\u00a0 region, given the\u00a0 experience they have\u00a0 gathered throughout the world. A precondition is that\u00a0 they are aware of their own role, potential\u00a0 and\u00a0 also limits.124\u00a0 Work on peacebuilding is much more sensitive\u00a0 than\u00a0 development or humanitarian aid, at least when it comes\u00a0 to the issue\u00a0 of dealing\u00a0 with the past.\u00a0 The first question that\u00a0 international NGOs\u00a0 have\u00a0 to\u00a0 answer\u00a0 is\u00a0 what\u00a0 is\u00a0 their\u00a0 own motivation\u00a0 to support this kind of work in post conflict areas?\u00a0 Second, they have to make explicit what they have\u00a0 done\u00a0 in their\u00a0 countries\u00a0 of origin on\u00a0 dealing\u00a0 with the\u00a0 past\u00a0 that\u00a0 gives\u00a0 them credibility\u00a0 to\u00a0 be\u00a0 a\u00a0 part\u00a0 of that\u00a0 process elsewhere.\u00a0 And\u00a0 these\u00a0\u00a0 questions should\u00a0 get answers\u00a0 if the base\u00a0 of any cooperation is to be established: namely, trust.
\nExploring what kind of role international NGOs can play in the peacebuilding proc- ess\u00a0 in the region would be a topic for another\u00a0 article. But it should\u00a0 be noted\u00a0 that in may cases international NGOs do give valuable\u00a0 support\u00a0 to local actors,\u00a0 sometimes they are even the main source of moral support.<\/p>\n

(124 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0See Fisher and Zimina, Just Wasting Our Time?)<\/p>\n

5.3 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Media, arts and culture<\/strong><\/p>\n

Beyond NGOs, media,\u00a0 arts and culture can also contribute\u00a0 substantially to peace- building.
\nIn May 2008,\u00a0 a Eurovision song contest was held in Belgrade that\u00a0 was accompa- nied by absolute excitement.\u00a0 During these\u00a0 days, listening to the Belgrade Radio B92 one could\u00a0 quite\u00a0 frequently\u00a0 hear\u00a0 a commercial\u00a0 for a newly released album\u00a0 by the\u00a0 Bosnian singer Laka, who was representing Bosnia in the contest. The main message in the short commercial was: \u201cLet\u2019s prepare for action! Support the neighbour!\u201d Given the context we live in, this should\u00a0 be considered as a great campaign\u00a0 that contributes to peacebuilding much more than\u00a0 many \u2018projects\u2019 which proclaim this goal, although\u00a0 the initiators\u00a0 most probably\u00a0 did not think about this kind of effect at all. This is just an example\u00a0 that\u00a0 arts and\u00a0 entertainment \u2013 at least\u00a0 implicitly \u2013 can make important\u00a0 contributions to changing political cultures or at least to bridging ethnopolitical gaps.<\/p>\n

5.4 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Survivors and victims\u2019 groups<\/strong><\/p>\n

Peace\u00a0 activists\u00a0 working locally and\u00a0 regionally have\u00a0 to explore more clearly where our own potentials are and who else\u00a0 can contribute\u00a0 and could be our alliance\u00a0 partners.\u00a0 We should\u00a0 include\u00a0 the\u00a0 individuals\u00a0 and\u00a0 groups\u00a0 that\u00a0 are\u00a0 considered as\u00a0 those\u00a0\u00a0 mostly affected\u00a0 by the wars: victims and survivors, and their families, who I will focus on in this section, and also ex-combatants, who I will focus on in the next and last section.
\nThere is a number of associations of families of victims, of ex-detainees in concen- tration camps,\u00a0 and refugees\u00a0 across\u00a0 the region. Their goals are mainly to find the remains\u00a0 of their dear ones,\u00a0 to uncover the truth about\u00a0 their destinies, to have that truth acknowl- edged,\u00a0 and\u00a0 also\u00a0 to\u00a0 have\u00a0 the\u00a0 perpetrators held\u00a0 responsible for their\u00a0 misdeeds. The difficulty is that\u00a0 many of these groups\u00a0 are organised according\u00a0 to the \u2018ethnic key\u2019, and one can easily notice that to a large extent they maintain competing\u00a0 narratives, there is a lack of constructive\u00a0 communication and cooperation between\u00a0 them,125\u00a0\u00a0 and\u00a0 sometimes they perceive the other association (whose members\u00a0 belong to a different ethnic group) as an enemy itself. It happens that someone who committed war crimes is perceived as a perpetrator by one\u00a0 association and\u00a0 as\u00a0 a hero\u00a0 by some\u00a0 other.\u00a0 There is also\u00a0 a lack of acknowledgment of the\u00a0 suffering\u00a0 of the\u00a0 members\u00a0 of the\u00a0 other\u00a0 associations, having\u00a0 a
\ncompetition\u00a0 about\u00a0 who is the greater victim. Some victims\u2019 groups are highly politicised<\/p>\n

(125\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0There are attempts to develop\u00a0 cooperation between\u00a0 these groups,\u00a0 like projects\u00a0 of the International
\nCommission on Missing Persons.)<\/p>\n

and\u00a0 they\u00a0 are\u00a0 easily\u00a0 abused by ethnonationalists who gain\u00a0 points\u00a0 on account\u00a0 of their misery.
\nOne can\u00a0 frequently\u00a0 hear\u00a0 representatives of victims\u2019 groups\u00a0 saying:\u00a0 \u201cMay these tragedies never happen anymore\u00a0 to anyone\u201d126 , but the difficulties I have\u00a0 listed\u00a0 above usually contradict\u00a0 this wish and prevent these\u00a0 groups from reaching their goals. Victims\u2019 groups from different sides\u00a0 have similar goals (with respect\u00a0 to acknowledgement, justice and compensation for those\u00a0 who suffered from war crimes and human\u00a0 rights violations). They have\u00a0 huge\u00a0 credibility\u00a0 and\u00a0 they are also\u00a0 quite\u00a0 respected in their societies. If they were to\u00a0 act\u00a0 in cooperation, and\u00a0 not in opposition, exchanging\u00a0 more\u00a0 information\u00a0 and exerting joint pressure on authorities, they could be much more effective and the whole society would benefit\u00a0 from the results\u00a0 of their work. It is difficult for all these\u00a0 groups\u00a0 in the\u00a0 countries\u00a0 of former Yugoslavia to make\u00a0 this\u00a0 move, but\u00a0 at the\u00a0 same\u00a0 time there\u00a0 are indicators\u00a0\u00a0 that\u00a0 individuals\u00a0 exist\u00a0 in\u00a0 many\u00a0 groups\u00a0 who\u00a0 do\u00a0 not\u00a0 feed\u00a0 into\u00a0 ethnocentric divisions and could be relevant actors for peacebuilding.<\/p>\n

5.5 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Ex-combatants and war veterans\u2019\u00a0 organisations<\/strong><\/p>\n

It seems that international organisations have also recently developed some inter- est in two specific groups: victims and perpetrators, followed by a kind of consensus that both groups should\u00a0 be worked with. As many would say, it is easier\u00a0 to identify who is a victim, but there\u00a0 are difficulties in identifying the\u00a0 perpetrators. When discussion about perpetrators starts,\u00a0 then\u00a0 the\u00a0 only group\u00a0 that\u00a0 is\u00a0 often\u00a0 talked\u00a0 about\u00a0 are\u00a0 war veterans,\u00a0 although many of them did not commit any crime and many of them were forced to join the\u00a0\u00a0 war.\u00a0 Unfortunately,\u00a0\u00a0 the\u00a0\u00a0 perception\u00a0\u00a0 and\u00a0 conceptualisation\u00a0 of\u00a0 dealing\u00a0\u00a0 with\u00a0 war veterans\u00a0\u00a0 in\u00a0 international\u00a0 reconstruction and\u00a0 reintegration programs\u00a0 is\u00a0 usually\u00a0 rather superficial,\u00a0 or to use\u00a0 more diplomatic\u00a0 term, borrowed\u00a0 from Fisher and\u00a0 Zimina, techni- cal.127
\nIn our experience, among war veterans many people can be found who raise brave voices\u00a0 and\u00a0 go\u00a0 against\u00a0\u00a0 the\u00a0 stream,\u00a0 despite having\u00a0 strongly\u00a0 expressed their\u00a0 national identity. NGO activists\u00a0 should\u00a0 be open to approaching those\u00a0 individuals\u00a0 that have huge acceptance and credibility in society and can take on important\u00a0 functions\u00a0 as multipliers and ambassadors for peace.
\nEx-combatants\u00a0 are often perceived\u00a0 as\u00a0 \u2018spoilers\u2019. Observing a number\u00a0 of associa-\u00a0 tions of war veterans\u00a0 throughout the region, it is easy to label them as \u2018spoilers\u2019, due to<\/p>\n

(126 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0See,\u00a0 for example,\u00a0 Svetlana\u00a0 Broz, \u201cFacing the\u00a0 Crime \u2013\u00a0 Vengeance,\u00a0 Justice\u00a0 and\u00a0 Understanding,\u201d in Balkan\u00a0 Yearbook\u00a0 of Human\u00a0 Rights\u00a0 2005.\u00a0 Confronting\u00a0 the\u00a0 Past,\u00a0 Consequences for the\u00a0 Future, eds.\u00a0 Dino Abazovi\u0107 and Branko Todorovi\u0107 (Sarajevo: Balkan Human Rights Network, 2005).
\n127\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Fisher and Zimina, Just Wasting Our Time?)<\/p>\n

the fact that\u00a0 they are, like victims, very much affected\u00a0 by the war and\u00a0 quite\u00a0 politicised.\u00a0 They usually maintain\u00a0 ethnocentric narratives\u00a0 and enemy images,\u00a0 and in addition\u00a0 many of them share identities marked by militarised masculinity. But, as is the case with other groups and institutions, they consist\u00a0 of individuals,\u00a0 and many individuals\u00a0 do not fit this general\u00a0 picture.\u00a0 Most\u00a0 of them\u00a0 did\u00a0 not\u00a0 want those\u00a0 wars, and\u00a0 they\u00a0 certainly\u00a0 cannot\u00a0 be blamed\u00a0 for starting\u00a0 them;\u00a0 they were either\u00a0 drafted,\u00a0 or the\u00a0 war \u201ccame\u00a0 under\u00a0 their win- dow\u201d.128\u00a0\u00a0 That experience changed their lives, and\u00a0 based on that,\u00a0 many of them have a powerful\u00a0 anti-war\u00a0 and\u00a0 peacebuilding\u00a0 potential.\u00a0\u00a0 Many\u00a0 peace\u00a0\u00a0 activists\u00a0\u00a0 can\u00a0 easily\u00a0 be discredited by ethnonationalists as\u00a0 \u2018non-patriots\u2019.\u00a0 However, this\u00a0 is\u00a0 not\u00a0 so\u00a0 easy\u00a0 with respect\u00a0 to war veterans\u00a0 who have huge social credibility and acceptance. People listen to them. Thus they are important\u00a0 multipliers\u00a0 and can be messengers for peace. This could be\u00a0 observed\u00a0\u00a0 during\u00a0 the\u00a0 public\u00a0 forums\u00a0 that\u00a0 the\u00a0 Centre\u00a0 for\u00a0 Nonviolent\u00a0 Action (CNA) organised, where some\u00a0 of the speakers were war veterans.129\u00a0 The audience, which had never\u00a0 had\u00a0 the\u00a0 opportunity\u00a0 to hear\u00a0 a story\u00a0 of a combatant from \u2018the\u00a0 other\u00a0 side\u2019,\u00a0 was listening to every word \u2013 carefully and with respect.
\nCNA\u2019s work with war veterans\u00a0 has shown that these\u00a0 individuals\u00a0 usually have great motivation\u00a0 to meet\u00a0 people\u00a0 from the\u00a0 other\u00a0 side\u00a0 they fought against. Galtung points\u00a0 out one reason for this: to get to know, as all professionals would like to do, whether they did a good job, since \u201cfew would know this better than the other side\u201d.130\u00a0\u00a0 This might be true, but to a large degree they were not professionals, rather they were ordinary people\u00a0 who became soldiers\u00a0 due to the circumstances. And a number\u00a0 of them discovered\u00a0 that\u00a0 after getting to know those\u00a0 \u201cothers\u201d\u00a0 and\u00a0 having\u00a0 honest discussions with them,\u00a0 they could sleep\u00a0 properly for the first time since the war. Thus, it is more likely that their motivation to meet former \u2018enemies\u2019 is due to the traumatic experience they endured.
\nThere is a growing number\u00a0 of brave\u00a0 veterans\u00a0 who are\u00a0 joining informal networks that contribute\u00a0 to peacebuilding, trying to rebuild broken bridges and find answers\u00a0 to the questions that distress them (\u201cwhy?\u201d). Doing this, they mostly swim against\u00a0 the tide and they risk being criticised. So it is not easy for them, and to sustain their engagement, the
\nsupport from other actors is crucial.<\/p>\n

(128 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Adnan Hasanbegovi\u0107,\u00a0 Four views, 6.
\n129 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0For more information, see publications on the \u201c4 views\u201d programme, www.nenasilje.org\/publikacije\/4 pogleda_e.html (accessed October 10, 2008).
\n130 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Johan\u00a0 Galtung,\u00a0 \u201cTwelve creative\u00a0 ways\u00a0 to\u00a0 foster\u00a0 reconciliation\u00a0 after\u00a0 violence,\u201d\u00a0 in\u00a0 Intervention\u00a0 3\/3 (2005), 229.)<\/p>\n

6 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Outlook: the necessi ty of building alliances\u00a0 for Peace- building in the region<\/strong><\/p>\n

The above\u00a0 mentioned groups\u00a0 that\u00a0 are\u00a0 concerned\u00a0 about\u00a0 dealing\u00a0 with the\u00a0 past\u00a0 and\/or peacebuilding\u00a0 and\u00a0 reconciliation\u00a0\u00a0 are\u00a0 still\u00a0 a\u00a0 minority\u00a0 in\u00a0 the\u00a0 societies of\u00a0 the\u00a0 former Yugoslavia. How could\u00a0 the\u00a0 wider\u00a0 society\/societies be\u00a0 included\u00a0 in\u00a0 peace\u00a0\u00a0 processes? Journalists\u00a0 and\u00a0 activists\u00a0 from the\u00a0 media\u00a0 have\u00a0 often\u00a0 reported\u00a0 that\u00a0 people\u00a0 are\u00a0 tired\u00a0 of stories about dealing with the past and about victims. This is understandable, on the one hand\u00a0 since facing the\u00a0 past\u00a0 is hard\u00a0 and\u00a0 an emotionally\u00a0 tense\u00a0 process,\u00a0 especially\u00a0 if not dealt\u00a0 with in a\u00a0 constructive\u00a0 way, and\u00a0 many of us really lack happiness and\u00a0 optimistic perspectives in our lives. On the other hand,\u00a0 this \u201ctiredness of dealing\u00a0 with the past\u201d\u00a0 is also\u00a0 worrying. Apathy is quite\u00a0 a\u00a0 dangerous phenomenon in any society,\u00a0 because it is accompanied by a lack of taking responsibility.\u00a0 And if we as citizens do not feel respon- sible\u00a0 for our society,\u00a0 then\u00a0 authorities\u00a0 will\u00a0 not fulfil their responsibility\u00a0 either,\u00a0 because there will be no critical mass to control their work.
\nWhile both\u00a0 local\u00a0 and\u00a0 international NGOs can\u00a0 make\u00a0 important\u00a0 contributions to peacebuilding, one\u00a0 should\u00a0 not expect\u00a0 that\u00a0 NGOs on their own and\u00a0 as\u00a0 the\u00a0 only actors could\u00a0 be\u00a0 effective\u00a0 in establishing long\u00a0 lasting\u00a0 peace. Peace\u00a0 groups\u00a0 in the\u00a0 region\u00a0 of former Yugoslavia, although\u00a0 doing valuable work, are small in number and not supported by our governments,\u00a0 neither morally nor financially (or if some of them are, this support\u00a0 is almost\u00a0 invisible). The financial means\u00a0 for peace\u00a0 activities\u00a0 come from abroad,\u00a0 mainly from western governments. The very moment\u00a0 when that support\u00a0 stops\u00a0 we will be lucky if we stay on with a few enthusiasts \u2013 with no perspective, of course.
\nWe are not going to reach sustainable peace\u00a0 if peacebuilding remains\u00a0 the concern of\u00a0 activists,\u00a0 academics and\u00a0 artists\u00a0 alone.\u00a0 Our only chance,\u00a0 if sustainable peace\u00a0 is our goal, is to make it become\u00a0 institutionalised, spreading across\u00a0 professional fields and all layers of society, providing a critical mass and a good base\u00a0 for a better future for all of us. Luckily, there\u00a0 are\u00a0 individuals\u00a0 in\u00a0 all\u00a0 these\u00a0\u00a0 spheres who\u00a0 do\u00a0 act\u00a0 and\u00a0 react,\u00a0 swimming against\u00a0 the tide, and the least we can do is to give them support or join their actions.
\nIn the\u00a0 end,\u00a0 any small\u00a0 step\u00a0 that\u00a0 any citizen can\u00a0 take\u00a0 would be\u00a0 a contribution\u00a0 to lasting\u00a0 peace. It is especially\u00a0 hard\u00a0 in a\u00a0 situation where\u00a0 political\u00a0 systems\u00a0 and\u00a0 public debates are dominated by ethnopolitical and ethnonationalist actors. But for the citizens in our region\u00a0 it is\u00a0 important\u00a0 to\u00a0 stop\u00a0 complaining\u00a0 about\u00a0 politics\u00a0 and\u00a0 instead become aware\u00a0 that\u00a0 it is each\u00a0 member\u00a0 of society\u00a0 who can\u00a0 contribute\u00a0 to change,\u00a0 by no longer voting for ethnonationalists and refusing\u00a0 to give any power to them.\u00a0 In our region, we have\u00a0 to\u00a0 continue\u00a0 to\u00a0 build\u00a0 peace\u00a0 from the\u00a0 bottom-up,\u00a0 because we cannot\u00a0 expect\u00a0 the authorities to start that job. But work on the grass-root\u00a0 level alone will not help, it has to \u2018get sealed\u2019\u00a0 approval at the tops level, in a way that would prevent decision-makers from obstructing\u00a0 peace\u00a0\u00a0 processes,\u00a0 and\u00a0\u00a0 beyond.\u00a0\u00a0 It\u00a0 is\u00a0\u00a0 our\u00a0\u00a0 responsibility\u00a0\u00a0 to\u00a0\u00a0 encourage authorities to support this process.<\/p>\n

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Power,\u00a0 Samantha. A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide. New York: Basic Books, 2002.<\/p>\n

Preece,\u00a0 Jennifer Jackson.\u00a0 \u201cEthnic Cleansing\u00a0 as\u00a0 an Instrument\u00a0 of Nation-State\u00a0 Creation: Changing State\u00a0 Practices\u00a0 and Evolving Legal Norms.\u201d In Human Rights Quarterly 20 (1998): 817-842.<\/p>\n

Ramet, Sabrina P. \u201cExplaining the Yugoslav meltdown, 1. \u2018for a charm of pow\u2019rful trouble, like a hell-broth boil and bubble.\u2019 Theories about the roots of the Yugoslav troubles.\u201d In Nationalities Papers 32\/4 (2004): 731-763.<\/p>\n

Rangelov, Iavor. \u201cInternational Law and Local Ideology in Serbia.\u201d\u00a0 In Peace Review 16\/3 (2004): 331-337.<\/p>\n

Rigby,\u00a0 Andrew. Justice and\u00a0 Reconciliation\u00a0 after\u00a0 the\u00a0 Violence. London:\u00a0 Lynne Rienner
\nPublishers,\u00a0 2001.<\/p>\n

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—. \u201cDealing with the\u00a0 Past:\u00a0 Forgiveness\u00a0 and\u00a0 the\u00a0 Reconstruction\u00a0 of Memory in Divided
\nSocieties.\u201d In International Journal of Politics and Ethics 3\/1 (2003): 93-111.<\/p>\n

—. \u201cTwenty Observations on \u2018Post-settlement\u2019 Reconciliation.\u201d\u00a0 (Paper\u00a0 presented at the
\nReconciliation Expert Network seminar, Stockholm, 15-17 March 2006).<\/p>\n

Rill, Helena\u00a0 and\u00a0 Ivana Franovi\u0107. Ne mo\u017ee\u00a0 meni\u00a0 bit dobro\u00a0 ako je mom\u00a0 susjedu\u00a0 lo\u0161e\u00a0 [I
\ncannot feel well if my neighbour\u00a0 does\u00a0 not]. Beograd:\u00a0 Centre for Nonviolent Action,
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Rill, Helena, Tamara \u0160midling and\u00a0 Ana Bitoljanu, eds.\u00a0 Twenty Pieces of Encouragement for\u00a0 Awakening\u00a0 and\u00a0 Change.\u00a0 Peacebuilding\u00a0\u00a0 in\u00a0 the\u00a0 Region\u00a0 of\u00a0 Former Yugoslavia. Translated by Marija Stojanovi\u0107. Beograd: Centre for Nonviolent Action, 2007.<\/p>\n

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\n397.<\/p>\n

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\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.<\/p>\n

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\nTranslated by Marion Faber. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992.<\/p>\n

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Velikonja, Mitja et al., \u201cThe Role of Religions and Religious Communities\u00a0 in the Wars in ex-Yugoslavia\u00a0 1991-1999.\u201d\u00a0 Translated\u00a0\u00a0 by\u00a0 Radmila\u00a0 Obradovi\u0107-\u0110ur\u0111evi\u0107\u00a0 et\u00a0 al.\u00a0 In Religion in Eastern Europe XXIV\/4 (August 2003): 1-42.<\/p>\n

Vojvodi\u0107, Mirjana,\u00a0 ed.\u00a0 Ne\u00a0 u\u00a0 moje\u00a0 ime\u00a0 [Not in\u00a0 my\u00a0 name].Ni\u0161:\u00a0 Odbor\u00a0 za\u00a0 gra\u0111ansku inicijativu, 2008.<\/p>\n

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\nLarge-Group Identity.\u201d In Group Analysis 34\/1 (2001): 79-97.<\/p>\n

Weitsman,\u00a0 Patricia.\u00a0 Women,\u00a0 War, and\u00a0 Identity:\u00a0 Policies of Mass\u00a0 Rape in Bosnia\u00a0 and Rwanda.\u00a0 (Paper\u00a0 presented\u00a0 at\u00a0 the\u00a0 Annual\u00a0 meeting\u00a0\u00a0 of\u00a0 the\u00a0 International\u00a0\u00a0 Studies Association,\u00a0 Town & Country Resort and\u00a0 Convention\u00a0 Center, San Diego, California, USA, 22\u00a0 March 2006).\u00a0 Available at\u00a0 www.allacademic.com\/meta\/p98059_index.html (accessed October 10, 2008).<\/p>\n

Yerkes,\u00a0 Maryanne.\u00a0 \u201cFacing\u00a0 the\u00a0\u00a0 Violent\u00a0 Past:\u00a0\u00a0 Discussions\u00a0 with\u00a0 Serbia\u2019s\u00a0\u00a0 Youth.\u201d\u00a0 In
\nNationalities Papers 32\/4 (2004): 921-938.<\/p>\n

Zarkov, Dubravka. \u201cThe Body of the Other Man. Sexual Violence and the Construction of Masculinity, Sexuality and\u00a0 Ethnicity in Croatian Media,\u201d in Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence, eds.\u00a0 Caroline O. N. Moser and Fiona C. Clark. London: Zed Books, 2001, 69-82.<\/p>\n

Reports<\/strong><\/p>\n

Ambroso, Guido. New issues\u00a0 in refugee\u00a0 research. The Balkans at a crossroads: Progress and challenges\u00a0 in finding durable solutions for refugees\u00a0 and displaced\u00a0 persons\u00a0 from the\u00a0 wars in\u00a0 former\u00a0 Yugoslavia.\u00a0 UNHCR\u00a0 Research\u00a0 Paper\u00a0 No. 133, November\u00a0 2006. Available\u00a0 at\u00a0 www.unhcr.org\/research\/RESEARCH\/4552f2182.pdf\u00a0 (accessed\u00a0 August
\n27, 2008).<\/p>\n

Amnesty International. Amnesty\u00a0 International\u2019s concerns\u00a0 on the implementation of the
\n\u2018completion strategy\u2019 of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
\nAI Index: EUR 05\/001\/2005, June 2005.<\/p>\n

Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council\u00a0 Resolution\u00a0\u00a0 780\u00a0 (1992),\u00a0 S\/1994\/674.\u00a0 Prepared\u00a0\u00a0 by\u00a0 M.\u00a0 Cherif\u00a0 Bassiouni. Available\u00a0 at\u00a0 www.ess.uwe.ac.uk\/comexpert\/report_toc.htm (accessed\u00a0 August\u00a0 28,
\n2008).<\/p>\n

Centar za nenasilnu akciju.\u00a0 Suo\u010davanje\u00a0 s pro\u0161lo\u0161\u0107u:\u00a0 na\u010dini i pristupi\u00a0 [Dealing with the
\nPast: Ways\u00a0 and\u00a0 Approaches].\u00a0 Seminar\u00a0 report,\u00a0 Ilid\u017ea\u00a0 (Bosnia-Herzegovina),\u00a0 17-21
\nNovember 2006.<\/p>\n

Documenta.\u00a0 Istra\u017eivanje\u00a0 javnog\u00a0 mnijenja\u00a0 o suo\u010davanju\u00a0 s pro\u0161lo\u0161\u0107u.\u00a0 Sa\u017eetak\u00a0 rezultata, [Opinion\u00a0 poll on dealing\u00a0 with the\u00a0 past.\u00a0 Summary\u00a0 of the\u00a0 results].\u00a0 Zagreb, October
\n2006. www.documenta.hr\/dokumenti\/istrazivanje.pdf (accessed October 10, 2008).<\/p>\n

Human\u00a0 Rights\u00a0\u00a0 Watch.\u00a0\u00a0 Justice\u00a0 at\u00a0 Risk:\u00a0 War\u00a0 Crimes\u00a0 Trials\u00a0 in\u00a0 Croatia,\u00a0 Bosnia\u00a0\u00a0 and
\nHerzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro 16\/7 (D) (October 2004).<\/p>\n

—. Dangerous Indifference. Violence Against Minorities in Serbia 17\/7(D) (October 2005).<\/p>\n

—. Croatia: A Decade of Disappointment. Continuing Obstacles\u00a0 to the\u00a0 Reintegration\u00a0 of
\nSerb Returnees 18\/7(D) (September 2006).<\/p>\n

International Crisis\u00a0 Group.\u00a0 Serbia:\u00a0 Spinning\u00a0 its\u00a0 Wheels.\u00a0 Europe\u00a0 Briefing 39\u00a0 (May 23,
\n2005).<\/p>\n

Kruhonja, Katarina, ed. Monitoring war crime trials: Summarized findings on war crime trials in Republic of Croatia for 2006.\u00a0 Centre for Peace, Nonviolence and Human Rights Osijek, 2006. Available at www.documenta.hr\/dokumenti\/Annual_Report_2006.pdf (accessed August 27,
\n2008)<\/p>\n

Scherg,\u00a0 Nina. From Dealing With the\u00a0 Past to Future Cooperation: Regional and\u00a0 Global Challenges of Reconciliation. General Report of the International\u00a0 Conference, Berlin, January 31 \u2013 February 2, 2005.\u00a0 Organised\u00a0 by Deutsche\u00a0 Gesellschaft\u00a0 f\u00fcr Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) and\u00a0 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. www.gtz.de\/de\/dokumente\/en- conference-report-reconciliation.pdf (accessed June 4, 2007).<\/p>\n

Documentaries<\/strong><\/p>\n

Arnautovi\u0107, Aldin and\u00a0 Refik Hod\u017ei\u0107. Slijepa parvda [Justice Unseen]. Sarajevo:\u00a0 XY\u00a0 Films
\nProdukcija, 2004. DVD.<\/p>\n

Baljak, Janko. Vukovar \u2013 Poslednji rez [Vukovar \u2013 Final Cut]. Belgrade: B92, 2006.<\/p>\n

The Death of Yugoslavia. London: Brian Lapping Associates, 1995.<\/p>\n

\u0160varm, Filip. Pad krajine [The Fall of Krajina]. Beograd: Vreme Film, 2007.<\/p>\n

Vukosavljevi\u0107, Nenad. Tragovi [Traces]. Beograd-Sarajevo:\u00a0 CNA, 2005. DVD.<\/p>\n

—. Ne mo\u017ee da traje ve\u010dno [It cannot last forever]. Belgrade-Sarajevo: CNA, 2006. DVD.<\/p>\n

—. Svi bi rado bacili kamen [All wish to cast a stone]. Belgrade-Sarajevo: CNA, 2007. DVD.<\/p>\n

Woodhead, Leslie. A Cry from the Grave. UK: Antelope, 2000.<\/p>\n

Web sites<\/strong><\/p>\n

Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN). www.birn.eu.com<\/p>\n

B92. www.b92.net<\/p>\n

Centre for Nonviolent Action (CNA). www.nenasilje.org<\/p>\n

Documenta \u2013 Centre for Dealing with the Past. www.documenta.hr<\/p>\n

H-ALTER, Hrvacka alternativa. www.h-alter.org<\/p>\n

Humanitarian Law Centre. www.hlc-rdc.org<\/p>\n

Institute for War & Peace Reporting (IWPR). www.iwpr.net International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP). www.ic-mp.org International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). www.un.org\/icty\/ Puls demokratije. www.pulsdemokratije.net
\nResearch and Documentation Centre. www.idc.org.ba<\/p>\n

UNHCR. www.unhcr.org<\/p>\n

(All accessed October 10, 2008)<\/p>\n

Appendix
\nFigure 1: Main displaced populations from the former Yugoslavia, December 1995<\/p>\n

Source: UNHCR Maps, Map of Main Displaced Populations from the Former Yugoslavia, December
\n1995, 1 June 2000 (www. unhcr.org\/publ\/PUBL\/3ae6bb000.pdf).<\/p>\n

Figure 2 : The 1995 Dayton Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina<\/p>\n

Source: UNHCR Maps, Map of the 1995 Dayton Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1 June
\n2000 (www.unhcr.org\/publ\/PUBL\/3ae6baea8.pdf).<\/p>\n

Table 1: Levels of Reconciliation<\/p>\n

Levels of
\nreconciliation\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Type of
\ncoexistence\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Nature of cross-
\ncommunity interaction\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Typical
\ninitiatives to deepen
\nrelationships\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Key actors in initiatives
\nSurface reconciliation of non-lethal coexistence\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Separate lives. Live apart. Kind of apartheid\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Minimal social interaction \u2013 mainly by arrangement\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Dialogue of words\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Third parties. Top and middle level leaders
\nShallow reconciliation of civil association\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Live alongside each other as fellow citizens. Parallel lives. Benign apartheid.\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Role-specific interaction\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Dialogue of projects\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Third parties. Middle- & grass- roots level opinion-leaders
\nDeep reconciliation of community \u2013 ubuntu\/
\nrainbow kingdom\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0People from different communities live with and
\namongst each other\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Rich and multi- textured\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Dialogue of living\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Grassroots everyday people<\/p>\n

Source:\u00a0\u00a0 Andrew\u00a0 Rigby.\u00a0 \u201cTwenty\u00a0 Observations\u00a0 on\u00a0\u00a0 \u2018Post-settlement\u2019\u00a0 Reconciliation.\u201d\u00a0\u00a0 (Paper presented at the Reconciliation Expert Network seminar, Stockholm, 15-17 March 2006, 13).<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia by Ivana Franovi\u0107<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":38,"featured_media":6712,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[56,361,32],"tags":[665,285,138,145,892,1548,147,890],"class_list":["post-6709","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-downloads","category-istrazivanja","category-publikacije","tag-berghof","tag-bosnia-and-herzegovina","tag-croatia","tag-dealing-with-the-past","tag-nationalism","tag-research","tag-serbia","tag-victimisation"],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6709","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/38"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6709"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6709\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":230034,"href":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6709\/revisions\/230034"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/6712"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6709"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6709"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6709"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}