{"id":6753,"date":"2002-03-26T14:33:38","date_gmt":"2002-03-26T13:33:38","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/wp.nenasilje.net\/?p=6753"},"modified":"2019-12-06T14:09:17","modified_gmt":"2019-12-06T13:09:17","slug":"about-slobodan-milosevic-trial","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/en\/about-slobodan-milosevic-trial\/","title":{"rendered":"About Slobodan Milo\u0161evi\u0107 trial"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>The \u00abgreat trial\u00bb to Slobodan Milo\u0161evic, ex-president of Serbia and Yugoslavia, has started on<br \/>\nFebruary 12th 2002, almost eleven years since the beginning of the wars in the region of former<br \/>\nSFRY, wars whose consequences are still present for all the people from this region. In all the<br \/>\ncountries which were formed after the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the attention of the public<br \/>\nwas focused on the beginning of this trial, but with rather different expectations.<br \/>\nFor people who work on peace building, this trial, just like any other trial for war crimes is a<br \/>\nchance for dealing with crimes committed in the name of their own nation, in the name of<br \/>\nmillions of Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks and Albanians (either inside or outside of war activities) in the<br \/>\nname of unclear mythical ideas and values, rarely re-examined, and too often used to mobilize<br \/>\n&#8220;US&#8221; against &#8220;THEM&#8221;. More than any other recent trial in the Hague Tribunal, this one is perceived<br \/>\nas a possible key factor for creating an atmosphere in which it is truly possible to talk about<br \/>\nresponsibility and guilt, to deal with one\u2019s own responsibility and awake the need to create<br \/>\ndurable and sustainable peace in this region.<br \/>\nWithout concrete information about the crimes and personalizing the people who either<br \/>\ncommitted or gave orders for those crimes, big words like &#8220;guilt&#8221;, &#8220;responsibility&#8221; or<br \/>\n&#8220;reconciliation&#8221; echo hollowly and make no sense in the situation where attention is drawn<br \/>\nalmost exclusively to the crimes committed by the &#8220;other side&#8221;.<br \/>\nThis is a chance for the citizens of Serbia and Yugoslavia, to find out about the crimes committed<br \/>\nby Serbian army, police and paramilitary forces in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo,<br \/>\nfirsthand through witnesses\u2019 testimonies, and to release from the pressure that the whole<br \/>\nSerbian nation is being on trial in the Hague Tribunal.<br \/>\nThe trial is an opportunity for the citizens of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo to open<br \/>\nmany painful issues and start a dialogue with those they were once in war with, about victims,<br \/>\nrefugees, returnees, minorities and majorities. There is a potential for creating space to reexamine &#8220;war activities&#8221; of one\u2019s own armed forces.<br \/>\nIn the context of peace and trust building, there is an important expectation (demand) to have<br \/>\nfair trials, not only fair to the accused, but also fair to thousands of people of all nations who<br \/>\nwatch these trials on TV in their homes. With respect to the Slobodan Milo\u0161evic trial, having a<br \/>\nfair trial means avoiding to make him a martyr and a hero. Therefore, The Tribunal would<br \/>\nestablish credibility for the future trials, which is now rather questionable.<br \/>\nAfter a month since the trial to Slobodan Milosevic has begun, one gets the impression few of these expectations are fulfilled. There are many reasons for this and they are quite<br \/>\ncomplicated, so in my opinion one should stay away from speculations and assumptions while<br \/>\ngiving an evaluation of the whole trial. Judging from what we have seen at the beginning of this<br \/>\ntrial, The Tribunal being a legal institution is unable to distance itself from the policy of the<br \/>\ncountries that like to call themselves &#8220;the international community&#8221;. Little is done by the<br \/>\nofficials\/spokespersons of the Hague Tribunal to distance themselves from the actors of<br \/>\n&#8220;antiterrorism&#8221; and the mission of the trial which is supposed to process ALL the crimes<br \/>\ncommitted in the region of former Yugoslavia. Unwillingness to re-examine the NATO policy and<br \/>\nits role in the spiral of violence in this region (and elsewhere), which continues for years, is now<br \/>\ntaking its toll. Slobodan Milo\u0161evic has based his defence on criticism of NATO countries\u2019 policy<br \/>\nand justifying of his own crimes with the crimes committed by the \u201cother side\u201d. This does not<br \/>\ncome as a surprise and certainly doesn\u2019t amnest him. It is surprising however, that the<br \/>\nprosecution hasn\u2019t find a right way to respond to such an approach. It seems like Milo\u0161evic is the<br \/>\none to determine the course of the trial with his attempts to present himself as the<br \/>\nuncompromising fighter against both terrorism and &#8220;new word order&#8221; at the same time, and with<br \/>\nhis cynical attitude towards the victims of crimes committed while he was in power.<br \/>\nThis way, there\u2019s plenty of political speeches and philosophising, while the crimes &#8211; what this<br \/>\ntrial should be all about somehow remain in the background. It is important to remark that<br \/>\nnone of the witnesses so far were able to testify how Milo\u0161evic directly took part in giving<br \/>\norders to commit crimes, since none of his associates or accomplices appeared on the trial.Centar za nenasilnu akciju &#8211; Centre for Nonviolent Action<br \/>\nBut, hopefully there\u2019s time for that, especially since we\u2019ve heard that the trial may last for two<br \/>\nyears.<br \/>\nRelevant witnesses and solid evidence against the accused will ensure that this trial fulfils its<br \/>\npurpose \u2013 that people deal with the crimes ordered by those who were once called &#8220;fathers of the<br \/>\nnation&#8221;. It might also be the chance to put evidence back where it supposingly belongs, in a<br \/>\njudicial system of democratic society, which was not always the case after the September 11th ,<br \/>\n2001.<br \/>\nThe absence of the factors mentioned above, in Slobodan Milo\u0161evic trial leaves people on all<br \/>\nsides, unsatisfied \u2013 average citizen of Yugoslavia thinks that the process is not prepared<br \/>\nthoroughly enough and weak, while the non-Serbian citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina may get<br \/>\nthe impression there is not a bit of respect for the victims of crimes committed by Serbian<br \/>\nforces. This kind of &#8220;balance of dissatisfaction&#8221; established after the four weeks of trial, adds up<br \/>\nto already tense atmosphere of the political and social life in the region. Thus, passing a law on<br \/>\nHague cooperation in FRY, becomes a key political problem which may cause serious government<br \/>\ncrisis and instability of the whole region.<br \/>\nFrom the standpoint of someone who works on peacebuilding, this situation is dangerous<br \/>\nbecause it leaves no space for prevailing national solidarity to be replaced with common human<br \/>\nsolidarity, when the human suffering, no matter what nation or religion people belong to,<br \/>\ndetermines the reaction to the crime. Until we have this empathy, each word of criticism will be<br \/>\njudged by the name of the one who\u2019s expressing it, and by their presumed ethnic origin. Even if<br \/>\nthe conditions were absolutely perfect this trial could not create such an atmosphere, but could<br \/>\nstart the big wheel who all of us are responsible to keep turning.<br \/>\nResponsibility refers also to insisting on punishing all the individuals and institutions who took<br \/>\npart in committing crimes, but one should not forget to re-examine and criticize institution that<br \/>\norganize these trials. Critique of The Hague Tribunal should not be equal to denial of crimes, but<br \/>\nshould aim towards establishing conditions within society to enable trials like this to be<br \/>\norganized in the countries of former Yugoslavia.<br \/>\nIn Sarajevo, March 2002<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The \u00abgreat trial\u00bb to Slobodan Milo\u0161evic, ex-president of Serbia and Yugoslavia, has started on February 12th 2002, almost eleven years since the beginning of the wars in the region of former SFRY, wars whose consequences are still present for all the people from this region. In all the countries which were formed after the disintegration [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":6,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[79],"tags":[1971,1786,307],"class_list":["post-6753","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-blog-en","tag-den-haag","tag-slobodan-milosevic-en","tag-yugoslavia"],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6753","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/6"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6753"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6753\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":227002,"href":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6753\/revisions\/227002"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6753"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6753"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nenasilje.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6753"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}