About Slobodan Milošević trial

The «great trial» to Slobodan Miloševic, ex-president of Serbia and Yugoslavia, has started on
February 12th 2002, almost eleven years since the beginning of the wars in the region of former
SFRY, wars whose consequences are still present for all the people from this region. In all the
countries which were formed after the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the attention of the public
was focused on the beginning of this trial, but with rather different expectations.
For people who work on peace building, this trial, just like any other trial for war crimes is a
chance for dealing with crimes committed in the name of their own nation, in the name of
millions of Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks and Albanians (either inside or outside of war activities) in the
name of unclear mythical ideas and values, rarely re-examined, and too often used to mobilize
“US” against “THEM”. More than any other recent trial in the Hague Tribunal, this one is perceived
as a possible key factor for creating an atmosphere in which it is truly possible to talk about
responsibility and guilt, to deal with one’s own responsibility and awake the need to create
durable and sustainable peace in this region.
Without concrete information about the crimes and personalizing the people who either
committed or gave orders for those crimes, big words like “guilt”, “responsibility” or
“reconciliation” echo hollowly and make no sense in the situation where attention is drawn
almost exclusively to the crimes committed by the “other side”.
This is a chance for the citizens of Serbia and Yugoslavia, to find out about the crimes committed
by Serbian army, police and paramilitary forces in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo,
firsthand through witnesses’ testimonies, and to release from the pressure that the whole
Serbian nation is being on trial in the Hague Tribunal.
The trial is an opportunity for the citizens of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo to open
many painful issues and start a dialogue with those they were once in war with, about victims,
refugees, returnees, minorities and majorities. There is a potential for creating space to reexamine “war activities” of one’s own armed forces.
In the context of peace and trust building, there is an important expectation (demand) to have
fair trials, not only fair to the accused, but also fair to thousands of people of all nations who
watch these trials on TV in their homes. With respect to the Slobodan Miloševic trial, having a
fair trial means avoiding to make him a martyr and a hero. Therefore, The Tribunal would
establish credibility for the future trials, which is now rather questionable.
After a month since the trial to Slobodan Milosevic has begun, one gets the impression few of these expectations are fulfilled. There are many reasons for this and they are quite
complicated, so in my opinion one should stay away from speculations and assumptions while
giving an evaluation of the whole trial. Judging from what we have seen at the beginning of this
trial, The Tribunal being a legal institution is unable to distance itself from the policy of the
countries that like to call themselves “the international community”. Little is done by the
officials/spokespersons of the Hague Tribunal to distance themselves from the actors of
“antiterrorism” and the mission of the trial which is supposed to process ALL the crimes
committed in the region of former Yugoslavia. Unwillingness to re-examine the NATO policy and
its role in the spiral of violence in this region (and elsewhere), which continues for years, is now
taking its toll. Slobodan Miloševic has based his defence on criticism of NATO countries’ policy
and justifying of his own crimes with the crimes committed by the “other side”. This does not
come as a surprise and certainly doesn’t amnest him. It is surprising however, that the
prosecution hasn’t find a right way to respond to such an approach. It seems like Miloševic is the
one to determine the course of the trial with his attempts to present himself as the
uncompromising fighter against both terrorism and “new word order” at the same time, and with
his cynical attitude towards the victims of crimes committed while he was in power.
This way, there’s plenty of political speeches and philosophising, while the crimes – what this
trial should be all about somehow remain in the background. It is important to remark that
none of the witnesses so far were able to testify how Miloševic directly took part in giving
orders to commit crimes, since none of his associates or accomplices appeared on the trial.Centar za nenasilnu akciju – Centre for Nonviolent Action
But, hopefully there’s time for that, especially since we’ve heard that the trial may last for two
years.
Relevant witnesses and solid evidence against the accused will ensure that this trial fulfils its
purpose – that people deal with the crimes ordered by those who were once called “fathers of the
nation”. It might also be the chance to put evidence back where it supposingly belongs, in a
judicial system of democratic society, which was not always the case after the September 11th ,
2001.
The absence of the factors mentioned above, in Slobodan Miloševic trial leaves people on all
sides, unsatisfied – average citizen of Yugoslavia thinks that the process is not prepared
thoroughly enough and weak, while the non-Serbian citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina may get
the impression there is not a bit of respect for the victims of crimes committed by Serbian
forces. This kind of “balance of dissatisfaction” established after the four weeks of trial, adds up
to already tense atmosphere of the political and social life in the region. Thus, passing a law on
Hague cooperation in FRY, becomes a key political problem which may cause serious government
crisis and instability of the whole region.
From the standpoint of someone who works on peacebuilding, this situation is dangerous
because it leaves no space for prevailing national solidarity to be replaced with common human
solidarity, when the human suffering, no matter what nation or religion people belong to,
determines the reaction to the crime. Until we have this empathy, each word of criticism will be
judged by the name of the one who’s expressing it, and by their presumed ethnic origin. Even if
the conditions were absolutely perfect this trial could not create such an atmosphere, but could
start the big wheel who all of us are responsible to keep turning.
Responsibility refers also to insisting on punishing all the individuals and institutions who took
part in committing crimes, but one should not forget to re-examine and criticize institution that
organize these trials. Critique of The Hague Tribunal should not be equal to denial of crimes, but
should aim towards establishing conditions within society to enable trials like this to be
organized in the countries of former Yugoslavia.
In Sarajevo, March 2002