Mr. President, what is left? (Croatia, Context, 2012)

| Davorka Turk |
Contexts in which we operate - Croatia 2012 ...
8. November 2012
8. November 2012

 

As this report is being compiled, the government of Croatia announces a layoff of 20.000 public sector employees. Faced with an unfavorable response from the general public, they provided an explanation that the cases in question refer mainly to early retirements and buying of extra years of service towards retirement. They add, however, that there will be layoffs as well, based on so-called “evaluation of employees.” “All the drama around layoffs is quite nonsensical” states Croatia’s DPM and adds: “Serious cuts are ahead.”

With regard to this issue, the “new” government brings about nothing new. Without a solid plan on how to mitigate the problems of deficit and public spending, eradicate political corruption and monopolization (1) present in certain segments of the electorate (such as workers in agriculture, or some other groups that use various state funds), or indeed jumpstart a dying economy – the government is targeting its own citizens. An intensive campaign is underway, with the objective to convey the following: a) citizens are lazy, and have inherited their poor work ethics from the socialist times, therefore they have to be disciplined, and b) there is no such thing as a free lunch in capitalism. Consequently, there is an intensive effort underway to undermine any remains of the welfare state, and so different forms of social welfare are withdrawn (or transferred into service sector), and state bodies are replaced with independent, non-governmental ones, meant to take on these services. The collective bargaining agreements (between the Government and trade unions) are being fundamentally shaken and the negotiations with the employers’ associations are conducted without the participation of trade unions. For this reason, it feels important to mention the fact that Croatia has more than 50 billion kuna [Croatian currency. TN] in tax debt. Since ordinary citizens can hardly escape taxation, we have to ponder on why this tax debt was “forgiven” and who was allowed to get away with it – is it people like Marko Perković Thompson, apparently one of those exempt from paying, who readily and eagerly declares his love of the homeland? Unlike the privileged ones, ordinary citizens have to bear the brunt of the crisis or, put differently, tighten the proverbial “belt”. These citizens have the “pleasure” of following the court trial of the former PM Ivo Sanader, charged with corruption and draining of funds fromstate enterprises and institutions, while simultaneously taking the “lessons in survival”, courtesy of the Croatian government. The allegations against Sanader also reflect on the political party he was heading – HDz. However, this hardly improves dominant perceptions regarding discrimination and the lack of effectiveness of the system’s institutions. There is a whole spectrum of misconduct, primarily in the area of privatization: once successful enterprises are being drained of their capital in the usual (unlawful) ways, and the perpetrators are not being indicted because of their strong ties to the political or the judicial elite. Workers end up on the streets.

The conflict between President Ivo Josipović and vice-president of the Independent Democratic Serb Party and Chair of Serb National Council (2) Milorad Pupovac shows that the politics of minority groups also become subject to entanglements of economic, media and political influence. It appears that President Josipović has been willing to sacrifice the good reputation of his regional policy in order to accuse Pupovac and the Serb National Council of establishing an “ethno-business,” and practicing “racketeering” and stirring up of “low intensity national conflicts.” The weekly Novosti financed by the Serb National Council with funds from the state budget, is accused of financial and political monopoly “which forecloses the possibility of pluralism within the Serb minority.” The weekly in question, instead of dealing solely with “minority issues” as expected, critically engages with current politics (regardless of who is in power), and is – according to President josipović – financed illegally. According to the President, this practice has to stop. Such accusations allegedly have nothing to do with the “ZAMP affair,” a private enterprise of the president’s friend Marko Vojković, an affair that was extensively covered by Novosti. The case is dubbed an affair because of the President’s role in making this lucrative business possible, as well as the piece of that pie (in the form of funds) that would logically find its way to the President. Following this event, Pupovac was left off the invitee list for the annual celebration of “Operation Storm,” while an invitation was extended to the president of the Serb Democratic Forum Veljko Džakula. President interpreted his attendance at the event in Knin, marking the anniversary of a military action during and after which hundreds of Serb civilians were killed, as a signal of Serbs accepting Croatian victory in the Homeland war, and Croatia as their homeland. In addition to this “dangerous way of affirming civic loyalty to the state” as expressed by Pupovac, Džakula also joined the President in condemning Novosti, and went as far as to accuse its editor Ivica Đikić (3) of being pro-ustashe. The President apparently received support from “friendly” newspapers such as Jutarnji list, and many “citizens” and “groups,” as well as “Serb’s associations,” but also from an array of right wing Croatian politicians such as Daniel Srb, the president of HSP (4).
Without going further into the intricacies of the president’s influence on the media, it seems evident that, in order to protect his own interest and limit the freedom of the media, he had in fact opened the space for criticism of the current model of minority representation. Short sided and entirely not statesmanlike, he created the space for criticism in a specific manner: as if the existing model emerged from a civil society paradigm, in which the minorities are first and foremost citizens, and only then members of ethnic groups.

Let us be reminded how our society understands the issue. During an appearance on the TV show “Sundays at 14:00” the mayor of Split, Željko Kerum, accused Serbs for the financial breakdown, since “the Serb and pro-Yugoslav elite has had the highest impact on the banks and the media.” Even though Željko Kerum has zero reputation as a political figure (indeed, he is considered a caricature), and is a butt of jokes of the Croatian liberal public, there obviously exists enough electoral support for him to become major and a member of parliament. This is not the first time Kerum had made similar statements (three years ago he stated that he would never “have a Serb for a son-in-law” and that “everyone should know where their place is”), and he certainly does not think that his statements are problematic (“I stand behind every word I say, it is an opinion of the majority, who just never had the opportunity to express it publicly”). Still to this date, there are no political (nor judicial for that matter) reactions to this explicit hate speech. (President Ivo Josipović has, but briefly, mentioned it in relation to the case of discrimination of Roma national minority children.) It is worthwhile mentioning another incident: end of September, Žarko Domljan, speaker of the Parliament made an appearance in the same TV show, and engaged in defamation of Milan Škorić, the chef of the Parliament restaurant, labeling him as “a Serb who purchased meat in the known gathering place of KOS and UDBA members,” [Former Yugoslav secret services. TN] which, he stated, was a principal reason for Škorić’s subsequent firing and police torture. He was acquitted for the charges of slander by the Zagreb County Court. What makes this story particularly perverse is the fact that the mentioned “gathering place” is, in fact, a local butcher store owned by Mihajlo Zec, a man who was, along with his wife and twelve-year old daughter, killed brutally by the members of the Merčep’s death squadron.
As a side note, the assistant Minister of Internal Affairs, Tomislav Merčep, is on trial which is still underway. Based on the statements of highly positioned civil servants at the time, the trial proceeding revealed that the highest instances of government, along with president Franjo Tuđman, were aware of the crimes committed by groups under Merčep’s command, but did nothing. Vladimir Šeks, the Head of the Crisis Unit for Slavonija at the time, and subsequently a state prosecutor – the man who released the killers of the Zec family based on procedural irregularities – said nothing.
The process against Mihajlo Hrastov, a judicial “tapeworm” that took twenty years to unfold (including hurdles of various kinds), has ended with a court ruling sentencing the accused to four year in prison for the murder of thirteen members of JNA [Yugoslav National Army. TV] reserve forces on the Koranski Bridge in Karlovac, 1991. The sentence, lesser than the one normally given for such crimes, was justified by Hrastov’s impaired judgment in the moment of execution, and mitigating circumstances: the fact that he has no previous criminal record, his contribution to society as a homeland defender, and that he is a parent of an underage child with an ill wife. The “tapeworm” does not end there, because the State Prosecutor’s Office announced an appeal due to what is felt to be an appallingly mild criminal sentence, while defense will demand an acquittal. Hrastov has been acquitted three times so far in the Karlovac County Court, but the Supreme Court annulled all the rulings and first returned the case to lower courts, and subsequently took it on for further proceedings in the Supreme Court itself.

The Supreme Court ruled that the Republic of Croatia is liable for the massacre of nine elderly civilians in the village of Varivode, committed on june 28th 1995. Two months after operation “Storm” they were the victims of the “terrorist act with the objective to provoke fear, panic and a sense of insecurity.” Therefore, and based on the Act on Liability for Damage resulting from Terrorist Acts, Croatia is responsible for damages to the family members, regardless of whether the perpetrator was identified, persecuted or convicted. Nobody was ever charged with this particular crime, but the ruling, however, constitutes a significant step forward in otherwise problematic and discriminatory practice of civilian victims’ rights protection.

There are certain estimates (namely, by Žarko Puhovski) that President’s Josipović affiliation with Džakula (also a self-declared president of the SAO West Slavonija) is a clever way to mend bleak relations with Serbian President Tomislav Nikolić. without delving deeper into the issue of such a political strategy, we have a right to ask if it is the most prudent one, given the circumstances. This is especially true in light of its damage to the legitimate and elected minority representatives who are accused of “ethno-business” and considered an obstacle to the creation of a civic society. And all of this happens solely for the protection of capital and profits. All that is left is to ask (like once Nenad Ivanković asked Franjo Tuđman): “Mr. president, what is left?”

Davorka Turk

(1) Deputy Prime Minister Radomir Čačić gave a statement during the attempt by Todorić to purchase the Slovenian „Mercator“ that: „What is in the interest of Agrokor, is in the best interest of Croatia and its citizens“.
(2) Serbian National Council (SNV) is an elected political, consulting and coordinating body acting as a self government of Serbs in the Republic of Croatia concerning the issues of their human, civil and national rights, as well the issues of their identity, participation and integration in the Croatian society.
(3) Once a journalist and an editor of Feral Tribune, Đikić was writing, among other things, about the evildoing of the so-called Merčep group.
(4) HSP or Croatian Party of Rights follows in the path of Ante Starčević. At the onset of the Homeland War, HSP organized para-military unites called HOS (Croatian Defense Forces) which shared the ideology of Croatian Army Forces created in NDH (Independent State of Croatia) in 1944. They were created through the merging of Home Guard (Domobrani) and Ustashe Army (Ustaške vojnice).

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