An important segment of the Dayton Peace Accords, though not well known to the public, was the agreement on arms control measures that imposed various restrictions on the amount of weapons and number of soldiers. The agreement was signed by leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and what was then Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and as such, it was a regional attempt to introduce a mechanism that would prevent any future arms race that could lead to a new war. This was a time when it was generally and globally believed that more arms meant less security and a greater chance of war. But the times have since changed. This part of the Dayton Peace Accords has quietly been abandoned and today there is a growing belief, not just in our region, that more security is guaranteed by more arms, and not any restrictions or peace agreements.
That is why when Serbia’s president Aleksandar Vučić says in a statement announcing the reintroduction of mandatory military service, “I want to believe that all of you understand how much we need a strong army, how we’ll need to purchase, make, create more arms,” it sounds frightening, but not unexpected. Croatia had previously also reintroduced mandatory military service, and both countries are competing to see who will allocate more funds for fighter planes and various other weapons… Other countries in the region are trying to keep up with the trend, though they are faced with various limitations, such as a more modest budget in the case of Montenegro and Macedonia, or the presence of international forces in the case of Kosovo and BiH. These are bleak times for any kind of peace work, we’re in fifth gear and hurtling, eyes closed, towards the abyss.
“The introduction of military service, even if just in this two-month format, should be viewed in the context of the larger process of Western European militarisation initiated after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and through the prism of HDZ’s semi-populist election promises. Namely, two months is the bare minimum amount of training needed to teach someone to shoot a gun, but in the context of modern warfare, it does nothing more than produce drone fodder. Given the technological advances in warfare, two months is not enough time to learn anything really, it’s just an opportunity to make a video about how you went through training. The brevity and lack of seriousness of the programme, as well as the ideological unanimity regarding the war in Ukraine have ensured that the introduction of military service has gone by mostly under the radar, with just a smattering of objections coming from the few traditional Zagreb-based peace organisations. Unfortunately, mandatory military service in the context of the EU and Ukraine will not change anything, but it will be another step of escalation in the regional small-scale arms race and enhancing preparedness for war between Croatia and Serbia. Now we just have to wait and see how Serbia will put together its own assembly line for the production of drone fodder,” says Dalmir Mišković, an activist and lawyer from Zagreb and a longstanding associate of the Centre for Nonviolent Action. Serbia has met these expectations and in the classical contest over whose (military service) is longer, it has won by 15 days.
When we look back at the past year, apart from the introduction of mandatory military service and a race to purchase arms, there is also an unmistakably visible narrowing of space for freedom. From bans of festivals and exhibitions, even entirely benign folklore festivals of national minorities, to greater restrictions of movement, more hate speech by top officials and the sowing of fear, the perspective of the region looks bleak. It is little comfort that this seems to be a global trend, instead it is more cause for concern.
Croatia: Not even the EU is what it once was
This past year has been a year of elections in the region. They were held in all countries, but their results show no visible steps forward. Croatia has already held national and European parliamentary elections, and presidential elections will be held before the end of 2024.
“In the run-up to the elections, there was an attempt to cause a constitutional crisis when the SDP, in violation of the constitutional norm to maintain the neutrality of the institution of the president, tried to nominate the current president of Croatia, Zoran Milanović, for a seat in parliament and by extension as a possible choice for prime minister. The Constitutional Court responded promptly and even threatened to annul the elections if the constitutional principle of the neutrality of the president was violated. Even though the president did not ultimately end up running for parliament, the situation added fuel to much of the election campaign and affected the elections in the sense that the pre-election drama and heated atmosphere led to record turnout despite the fact that election day was in the middle of the week,” Dalmir Mišković explains.
The conflict between Prime Minister Andrej Plenković and President Zoran Milanović continued to poison public space and generate hate speech, threats and fear. All this broke over the backs of neighbouring nations, women, refugees… Dalmir Mišković believes this is a conflict between two individuals of similar social background and standing, forged in the diplomatic corridors of Brussels and the golden youth circles of Zagreb.
“Although it is good for a democratic state to have its president and prime minister come from different political blocks, as a way to ensure democratic checks and balances, in this case it comes down to a simmering conflict between two egos that produces escalations over minor matters and formalities, while ‘our boys’ mostly agree on fundamental issues and things move on,” adds Mišković.
Ultimately, it seems the only visible change is the surge of the extreme right that has entered government in the form of the Domovinski pokret (Homeland Movement). Although the Homeland Movement won its seats in parliament based on a campaign of anti-Serb hysteria and playing to the basest instincts of right-wing voters in Croatia, at the end it turned out that the political mill of HDZ was too strong and it ground down the ultra-right-wing wet dreams that the Homeland Movement won seats for.
“The political direction remained the same, actually. Except that SDSS, the party of the Serb minority, is no longer part of the government. The only significant thing to happen was that the Homeland Movement managed to tear itself apart because its inner feuding got so bad it drew blood. It’s like that song: Everything’s the same except he’s gone,” says Mišković.
Still, the entry of the Homeland Movement into government caused significant damage and makes steps in terms of peacebuilding and dealing with the past that we saw just a few years ago seem impossible today. In his capacity as prime minister, Andrej Plenković attended the commemoration for Serb civilians killed during and in the wake of Operation Storm, as did his deputy and veterans minister, the Serb minority was represented in government…
“These steps forward in peacebuilding and trust between Croats and Serbs in Croatia were certainly a positive example and demonstrated progress. At this political moment, it is difficult to expect more such steps both because of the Homeland Movement being in government and SDSS no longer being in government, but also because of a targeted process of marginalising these types of ideological issues and sweeping them under the rug. It seems to me that HDZ and Andrej Plenković have checked off their ideological to do list and don’t plan to do much on these issues proactively. Their focus is elsewhere. Also, the political cold war between Croatia and Serbia makes it more difficult to see the need for initiating processes of peace and trust building and for working on them seriously as a guarantee for the future. Their motto is ‘leave me alone, I’ll leave you alone’. Next year will be 30 years since Operation Storm, so we’ll see how things stand given that round anniversaries entail military parades, heated passions, stronger rhetoric and increased public drama,” adds Dalmir Mišković.
The pendulum swinging to the right is perhaps most visible in the developments at the Public Institution “Jasenovac Memorial Site”. Months of pressure and a witch hunt of sorts resulted in the resignation of its director, historian Ivo Pejaković, who had made this memorial centre relevant again and an important site of memory of the victims of the Ustasha regime – Serbs, Jews, Roma and all other antifascists. It seems that the very fact that Serbs were the most numerous victims of the Ustasha regime is a thorn in the side of current Croatian authorities who are trying to define Jasenovac as primarily a site of the Jewish holocaust. In this way, the genocide against Serbs and Roma becomes a fact that is unspoken, with a tendency to be forgotten. For identical reasons and with the very same intentions, the Croatian authorities obstructed the exhibition “Some were neighbours” organised by the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.
All these “turns to the right”, countless corruption scandals, the fact that he had to replace 30 ministers since becoming prime minister, all of them having been caught with their hand “in the till”, have not made a dent in the public standing and power of prime minister Andrej Plenković. In that sense, Croatia is a disappointment for the rest of the region because it demonstrates the possibility of being in the EU but remaining as corrupt and irresponsible as ever.
North Macedonia: Many years back
In North Macedonia, citizens turned out for the parliamentary elections not to choose a better government, but to punish those already in government. Seven years ago, when SDSM came to power, it raised hopes that soon soured into disappointment. This has become a familiar tune.
“Most people saw their expectations betrayed and the disappointment was huge, so all hope for a better tomorrow was lost. This became clear at the last elections, at the local level, when VMRO-DPMNE stamped out SDSM. Not because VMRO was a better option or had a better programme or for any other reason, but because SDSM had done next to nothing of what they were elected to do and because they had become what they once fought against. Moreover, SDSM had as their partner in the government coalition DUI, which had been in power for almost 20 years and was widely believed to be deeply embroiled in crime. Grand corruption, irregular appointments, the lowest levels of trust in the judiciary and the general perception that the law does not apply equally to all, this is the legacy of the previous government led by SDSM,” says Luan Imeri, an activist from the Centre for Human Rights and Conflict Resolution in Skopje.
If their early days are anything to go by, the citizens of North Macedonia should not expect much good from the new government either.
“I’m most worried by the ethnic radicalisation that is reaching a culmination these days. Hate speech is increasing. Here, for example, there are currently calls to boycott markets owned by Albanians, there’s an initiative to no longer have Albanian as an official language… At the same time, laws are being pushed that will lower taxes for the ‘real owners of the state’, large companies owned by a few wealthy families that privatised everything under the sun shortly after independence. No one is talking about changes to the Criminal Code, enacted near the end of the previous government’s mandate, which legalised usurpation of power so that no one will be held responsible for it. Here’s another concrete example in education: The current minister is doing everything she was against when she was part of the opposition. We’re backtracking. Sometimes the past defines us instead of informing us. We are slaves of our past and I often think that, unfortunately, most citizens can only feel secure, happy and hopeful in an ethnically homogeneous environment. That is devastating!” adds Luan Imeri.
A big novelty in the political life of North Macedonia is the DUI being part of the opposition. This party had been a constant in government for decades and presented itself as the main Albanian party in Macedonia. According to Imeri, the new Albanian party, the VLEN coalition actually, is new only in name.
“It’s like a book you’ve read, but now with a new title. Their leaders were previously either part of DUI or part of governments with DUI and were doing the same things as DUI up until just a few months before the elections. They have nothing new to offer and nothing new is expected of them. Another thing not in their favour is that they are coming to power after DUI, which had “an Albanian as prime minister” and what not, while the VLEN has an insignificant role in the new government led by VMRO-DPMNE, both because of their numbers and the positions they were given in government. Now, VMRO-DPMNE is doing to their Albanian partner in government what DUI did to SDSM – degrading them! The defeat of SDSM led to having a strong VMRO-DPMNE back in power. I think VMRO-DPMNE will unknowingly return DUI to power and make it stronger than ever,” Luan Imeri explains.
We said already last year that Bulgaria is the new Greece when it comes to North Macedonia’s EU integration. The Macedonian government, led by SDSM, accepted a painful compromise with Greece in exchange for a fast track towards EU membership. Instead, the European Union has supported the demands of Bulgaria and is effectively once again blocking Macedonian accession. Citizens felt cheated and SDSM paid the price. Bulgaria has stuck by its conditions for lifting the veto against negotiations with the European Union, which is incomprehensible to people in Macedonia.
“The EU’s inapt response has managed not only to strengthen the arguments of Eurosceptics, but to create an anti-Western mood among the most pro-Western citizens, primarily Macedonians. Macedonia’s accession to the EU now revolves around constitutional changes, that is, it depends on whether Bulgarians will be written into the Constitution. We have seen several instances of constitutional changes in recent history and the politicians’ main argument had been progress towards EU membership. It is hard to say which constitutional amendments were more painful, those adopted in 2001 under threat or war, or those from 2019 when the name of the country was changed, or the current changes to satisfy Bulgarian wishes, which have actually now become EU requirements. I personally believed the constitutional changes should have been just a technicality. But when we let them get politicised, I think there was less time for constructive discussion and for finding solutions that would be in the best interest of citizens. Disappointment over Bulgaria’s blockade is vast, but I am even more concerned with the fact that the current ruling elite has already secured itself an alibi for its own failures. I wish experts would discuss the benefits, or what would be lost by including Macedonian Bulgarians in the Constitution and what kind of consequences that could have. Unfortunately, today the loudest EU accession opponents are precisely those who have secured their livelihoods and whose children are already living in an EU country or in the US. The loudest are the professors who last academic year saw no students enrol in their classes, those who have no one to teach at university because the students, would you believe it, get Bulgarian passports and run off to the EU,” says Luan Imeri.
When asked about the concerns of ordinary people, the topics dominant in conversations among ordinary people, in addition to daily political issues, Luan Imeri says poverty is a major issue.
“Poverty is what concerns ordinary people. Injustice. The fact that they are becoming ‘invisible’ for the state because of their ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, religion or social status. Because the collective is given increasing significance to the point where the individual becomes insignificant.”
Kosovo: No visas, but same old problems
In an atmosphere of endless negotiations and without any agreements between Pristina and Belgrade, a significant new development in 2024 is visa-free travel for citizens of Kosovo to the Schengen area. It was the last of the Western Balkan countries to have visa restrictions for travelling to the European Union and we still have to wait and see what effects this will have. In the case of other countries in the region, in addition to freedom of movement, visa-free travel also meant mass emigration.
According to census data from 2024, the population of Kosovo has significantly decreased compared to 2011. Today, Kosovo has a population of some 1.6 million, which is 200,000 people less than in 2011.
“Many residents of the four Serb-majority municipalities in the north of Kosovo did not take part in the census. A high percentage of unoccupied dwellings was recorded in all municipalities in Kosovo. In addition to migration out of Kosovo, there was also migration within the country, with the population moving from border areas to central cities. The average age of the population in Kosovo is currently 34.3 years. Detailed and final population census data are expected to be published in December this year. Data on the diaspora will also be published at that time. The Kosovo Statistics Agency estimates the registered diaspora number around 600,000,” says Amina Kaja, a student and activist from Pristina.
She feels the lifting of visa restrictions is another step towards a better future and the recognition of Kosovo as an equal among European states.
“It seems the world is accepting us and we are finally moving away from war. We now feel like part of Europe. For young people, this is also key in terms of travelling to study abroad and for various projects. We had always been made to jump through hoops to get visas and it always set us apart from other participants who could travel without problems to conferences or workshops. We often had to miss out on big opportunities simply because we couldn’t get visas, which is harmful both at the individual and the national level. Not to mention how stressful, expensive and long the process to get a visa could be. And finally: Young people are really eager to see other countries, I’ve had many friends travel to Paris, Amsterdam, Vienna, etc. It is now easier to connect with people from different cultures and introduce them to our country and our people, while also getting to see something and learn something along the way,” Kaja adds.
Despite having the youngest population in Europe, Kosovo also lacks optimism, especially when you ask ordinary people whether they see an agreement happening between Belgrade and Pristina in the foreseeable future.
“Unfortunately, I don’t think people are very optimistic. My own opinion constantly varies from positive to negative and back again. Honestly, I don’t see the dialogue moving forward. In general, ordinary people don’t talk about this too much, but I think most see things the same way as me. They think Serbia doesn’t want anything like dialogue and that this will frankly never happen. Nothing is happening on the ground or in dialogue offices, so people are trying to forget we have those problems. At the same time, people are tense, expecting war or conflict. A few of the friends I spoke to were even against any kind of reconciliation, which surprised me because they are my age and you’d expect them to be more peace-oriented. I guess there must be many who feel that way. All in all, there’s a lot of hatred towards Serbia and Serbs, a lot of negativity around this topic and I think we’re all tired of the same old promises and words like “dialogue” or “peacebuilding’, so we’re trying to get over whatever is going on at the moment and get on with our lives as normally as possible. Personally, I’ve met incredible people from Serbia who give me hope that something can be done in the future. I have faith in the friends I made there and I hope that together we will build something better,” says Amina at the end with a welcome dose of optimism.
Serbia: Lost (elections)
After 3 May and the massacre at the Belgrade primary school, and the crime in the villages around Mladenovac that followed the next day, it may have seemed to society at large that there was no deeper evil, still nothing happened that would indicate a step towards reducing the general level of violence in society in Serbia. On the contrary, despite protests that went on for months and hundreds of thousands of people in the streets of Belgrade and other cities across Serbia, the only thing that happened, and that no one had asked for, was that parliamentary elections were called, as well as local elections in some Serbian cities. When we consider them from the perspective of their known outcome, the elections were lost, according to Katarina Milićević, member of the team at the Centre for Nonviolent Action in Belgrade.
“The opposition participated in the elections, the general impression was that there would be a change of government in Belgrade and a few of the larger cities, the ‘Proglas’ movement took part, made up of public figures advocating democracy, but it turned out on election day that phantom voters from Republika Srpska and smaller towns in Serbia were put on the voting lists in droves. The place where they were gathering was discovered, as were the headquarters of the entire operation, but still, because of their action and fictitious parties being put on the ballot by the government to confuse voters, the elections were lost. Truth be told, quite a few people knew the elections were as good as lost because they were being held in an undemocratic atmosphere, with the media completely occupied by the ruling party, with voter lists out of order, but I guess hope dies last, even when it is futile. This was followed by protests, a hunger strike by a few opposition leaders, the protestors being beaten up and arrested, and then under great political strain, the Parliament and the Government were somehow constituted and new local elections were called in Belgrade. Formally, the reason was that the number of councillors in the City Assembly was almost identical between the country-wide ruling majority and the opposition, while the phantom group of citizens that could tip the balance either way decided not to do so. Of course, all these manoeuvres were orchestrated by Aleksandar Vučić’s regime because they suit his political aims. The new local elections were held in June and were also lost. It wasn’t all the fraud and irregularities that ensured the elections would be lost, but two facts: the fact that despite evidence to the contrary, the courts recognised the elections as legitimate and the fact that despite observers from the EU registering manipulations, the election results were accepted by the EU. The fact that even the EU betrayed us was perhaps the biggest blow for people fighting to democratise the country,” says Katarina Milićević.
Serbia’s president Aleksandar Vučić makes up for lack of progress in negotiations with Pristina by spewing verbal violence and threats. Paradoxically, even when he targets the Kosovo authorities, the price is paid by Serbs living in Kosovo and trying to survive between Vučić’s hammer and Kurti’s anvil. Serbia has refused to extradite Milan Radoičić who was in full military gear when he led last year’s attack in the Banjska Monastery in Kosovo when three people were killed. Between Radoičić and Serbs in Kosovo, the government has chosen to rescue Radoičić who lives today as a free citizen.
“The Kosovo authorities are currently entering health clinics that used to be controlled by Serbia, while Vučić is off somewhere in western Serbia making pancakes and trying to convince people that there is absolutely nothing harmful or bad about lithium mining. He still declares he “won’t give Kosovo away”. In the meantime, since the terrorist attack in Banjska, Serbs in Kosovo have accepted Kosovan number plates and identity cards and are having them issued. The Pristina authorities have abolished almost all so-called parallel institutions, which is quite a blow for Kosovan Serbs. In the midst of all this uncertainty and fear, some people have simply chosen, if that can be called a choice, to move away,” adds Katarina Milićević. As of mid-August, all citizens of Kosovo can travel visa-free to the EU, regardless of whether they have a Kosovan or Serbian passport. After the visa requirement was lifted for citizens with Kosovan passports on 1 January 2024, in mid-August the requirement was also lifted for citizens of Kosovo whose passports were issued by the Coordination Body of the Republic of Serbia.
Still, travelling is no simple matter if you are a human rights activist like Sofija Todorović, the director of the Youth Initiative for Human Rights. At one point in September 2024, Sofija made public the fact that she was subject to special measures and included on secret lists, which meant that over the past few months she had been held up at border crossing-points for hours for no reason.
“The fact that these lists exist was found out when Croatian singer Severina was kept at the border for hours when she tried to enter Serbia. She was asked about whether there was a genocide in Srebrenica, what she thought about lithium mining, and other such common questions to ask a singer. Also, in June, the Bosnian-Herzegovinian actor Feđa Štukan was denied entry into Serbia. Although the government never explained why, the reason is almost certainly his support for anti-violence protests in Serbia,” explains Milićević.
This year, the government has also banned the art festival “Mirëdita, dobar dan” that features artist exchanges between Kosovo and Serbia. Officially, the festival was banned because the government was unable to guarantee the participants’ safety due to ultra-right-wing protest groups.
“With their public statements and hate speech, ministers and top officials effectively called on these groups to block the festival venue so that they would have an excuse to ban the festival,” says Katarina.
Huge numbers of citizens of Serbia turned out in August for environmental protests demanding that the lithium mining project in Western Serbia be abandoned because it would impact the ecosystem and the future of the whole country.
“Before the protests were even held, the organisers were invited to the Security Information Agency for a talk, and after the protests, the institutional framework was abused to deliver a summary judgement against the three young men and to arrest the lawyer and president of the Valjevo Resistance Movement. However, the second instance court overturned the judgements under public pressure. Fear, dictatorship, arrests, terrorism and eco-terrorism, as well as militarism, these are the six words that describe the past year in Serbia,” concludes Katarina Milićević.
The visit of the German Chancellor Olaf Scholz to Serbia during the summer and the signing of the agreement on lithium supply was seen by the majority of people as one more piece of evidence that people in the EU couldn’t care less about the fate of people living in Serbia. It is a bitter pill for those in favour of democracy and European values.
Montenegro: The European path unblocked and unhinged
Once again in 2024, Montenegro was not spared political drama. Even though there were no parliamentary elections, the conflict between the prime minister and the president, former allies, the government restructuring, the local elections in Podgorica and elsewhere, all this contributed to political issues dominating public space. This autumn, all eyes are on the elections in Podgorica whose significance surpasses the local level because they are a test of how the parties stand across the country.
“The work of the government was marked by ‘deep’ politically motivated hiring, political upheaval/squabbles and accusations between the president and prime minister, as well as promises to establish social and economic stability in the country. All these are the levers and practices of the previous government that the new government could not or would not abandon,” says Radomir Radević, member of the Centre for Nonviolent Action from Podgorica.
On the day the government was formed in 2023, the leaders announced a government restructuring. The promise was fulfilled at the height of the tourist season. Symbolically, nine months later, an expanded government was born, now also formally including representatives of pro-Serbian parties, as well as the Bosniak party that for years served as a partner of the Democratic Party of Socialists and Milo Đukanović.
“With a surefire recipe of fragmenting portfolios, room was made for 11 new members of the Montenegrin executive branch, which brought their total number to 32, making the Montenegrin government one of the largest in the region. The government of Serbia, for example, has the same number of posts, but in a country with ten times the population. The government had to be restructured so as not to lose parliamentary support precisely from those political subjects in particular that are now part of the government. On the one hand, the wide range of civic and national parties gives cause for optimism regarding equal representation and inclusion of all, but there is also cause for concern about how long this motley crew can sustain itself,” Radević adds.
The hot summer in Montenegro was also marked by two resolutions. Montenegro voted in favour of the Srebrenica Resolution at the UN General Assembly, having first submitted a number of amendments that were adopted. The proposed amendments were in aid of an attempt by prime minister Milojko Spajić to balance between the dissatisfaction over the adoption of the Resolution felt by part of the Serb people in Montenegro, making sure not to lose the support of part of the electorate, on the one hand, and acting in the interests of pro-Western policies that he advocates, on the other. The latter could also be said to include the support for the Jasenovac Resolution adopted shortly afterwards. In the latter case, the government tried to balance mentions of Jasenovac, Dachau and Mauthausen. The Jasenovac Resolution elicited a strong response from Croatia, which proclaimed a number of Montenegrin officials unwelcome and openly threatened to block Montenegro’s EU path.
A repeat of the kind of political divorce that Montenegro has seen before, a split between the prime minister and the president (formerly Momir Bulatović and Milo Đukanović), culminated when president Jakov Milatović left the Europe Now Movement, his own party, and prime minister Milojko Spajić got that party in the divorce proceedings. Just like when in 1997 Momir and Milo couldn’t go on together, so in 2024 the duo Jakov and Milojko could not stay together.
“Milatović had already been known as someone who is “pro-Belgrade” and he demanded that Mandić and DF stay in government, against the demands of the at that time pro-Western Spajić. However, as the political circumstances changed, this duo completely overhauled their positions. After initial foul plays with the US administration, Milatović is trying to show that Spajić is not the person the international community should count on. On the other hand, from a politician offering citizens the prospect of a better life and speedy EU integration, Spajić has turned into someone eager to meet the various demands of DF and Serbia’s president Aleksandar Vučić. Even if we disregard the rumours about the conflict also being personal, the consequences are still quite extensive. The most promising civic party, with a clear programme of social and economic reforms, is now divided and Milojko and Jakov are on two opposing sides for the upcoming local elections in Podgorica. A state where the president and prime minister are not cooperating, but are increasingly at odds is the best illustration of the political and myriad other crises and general instability,” says Radević.
The EU-Montenegro Intergovernmental Conference held in Brussels on 26 June brought some good news for Montenegro. The Interim Benchmark Assessment Report (IBAR) for chapters concerning rule of law was adopted, which meant that EU membership negotiations could be unfrozen. Montenegro has been in the negotiation process for EU accession for 12 years now, and the adoption of the IBAR saw it come out of several years of stalemate. In addition to IBAR the Montenegrin government was presented in Brussels with the final benchmarks for closing chapters and bringing the negotiation process to a close. This news, following years of stagnation, gives hope for speedy EU accession not just among the ruling party, but also among Montenegro’s citizens. After the adoption of the IBAR, European diplomats are expecting Montenegro to make progress in the second half of the year in closing further chapters, which will depend on how much the authorities invest in meeting those requirements.
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Stable political crisis
Bosnia and Herzegovina was given candidate status for European Union membership at the end of 2023, almost like a New Year’s gift, and it is now part of the club of Western Balkan countries that have candidate status. In truth, the leaders of Balkan countries don’t seem particularly eager to advance along the European path, and the EU itself doesn’t seem sure about what to do with its candidate countries. This was apparent in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina because its candidate status was made conditional, to be “activated” once BiH meets the remaining few requirements. A year later, BiH has not met the remaining requirements, so it’s hard to say whether BiH has some sort of candidate status today or not.
This meant little to nothing for most citizens. The emigration trend is such that even attempting to make an estimate of how many people still live in the country is precarious because it can be colossally off the mark. The census, a highly politicised issue, should have been conducted in 2021, but is never even brought up. The government of Croatia, for example, having faced negative publicity following the publication of census results in 2021 that revealed how the population had declined by 413,000 or 10 percent, decided in 2024 to abolish the population census. It seems BiH made its “mistake” with the census in 2013 and has no intention of repeating it. Demographic trends can only be projected based on other data: the number of students in Bosnia and Herzegovina has declined over the past 12 years by 44,000 or 36 percent. The population is ageing, there are now almost as many pensioners as those in active employment, and pensions have been reduced to social benefits from tax revenues.
Political crisis is steadily present in BiH. In fact, the concept of a “stable political crisis” could be post-war BiH’s contribution to world intangible heritage. The protagonists have been the same for years, with the same behaviour patterns and rhetorical devices. This year, the crisis saw a major uptick with the start of the trial of Milorad Dodik, president of Republika Srpska, who stands accused of undermining the constitutional competences of the High Representative of the international community in BiH, Christian Schmidt, especially during the adoption of the Resolution on the Srebrenica genocide. One change compared to last year is that the United States sanctions, which many had thought to be inconsequential, turned out to be effective. In our globalised world, or at least that part of it where our region is located, there is still just one centre and it is in Washington DC. Being put on Uncle Sam’s black list, as some 20 or so politicians and companies in BiH found out, means that no one will open a bank account in your name or issue you a credit card, which essentially means you don’t exist.
Although known from before, it seems that femicide, as a specific form of violence, has recently escalated, especially following last year’s brutal murder of a woman in Gradačac. In 2024, the public was again shocked by several brutal femicides. Unfortunately, apart from the initial shock, there are no meaningful reactions to adequately address this problem. The situation is similar across the region, little has been done beyond changes to the criminal codes, and murders of women are on the rise. In particular, there is no re-examination of deeply embedded mechanisms that reproduce violence against women, ranging from the patriarchy to glorification of war and various things that are collectively referred to as tradition.
Because when you have a tank, freshly painted and restored, installed as a monument right next to a school in the centre of town, with its barrel pointing at the street – as was done in Sarajevo in the autumn of 2024 – then what can you expect? Militarism, retraumatisation, the sowing of fear and constant uncertainty for victims, as a rule, come down on those who are closest. The projected enemy is too far away, but all that aggression is there and it can’t wait “for the right time”, it can’t wait for another Prizren, for some new “June dawns”…
The tank next to a school actually has a positive side: it is the perfect illustration of school curricula, especially those for the “national group of subjects” which includes history, literature, language… Educational authorities in BiH are divided along ethnic lines and since 2019, they have been introducing increasingly one-sided and stark depictions of the past in which, as Luan Imeri said of North Macedonia, history is meant to define us, not inform us. The motto here is: only my truth for my child. Our heroes may be war criminals, but that’s not a reason to keep them out of textbooks.
A positive step in 2024 was made by judicial institutions that prosecuted several hate speech cases that involved calls for revenge, glorification of war crimes and the like. This is a small but important change, even if it is only dealing with the consequences and not the cause.